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Government History Documentation Project
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era

THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE AND PUBLIC INFORMATION,
EDUCATION, AND PLANNING, 1967-1974

Paul Beck	From the Los Angeles <u>Times</u> to the Executive Press Office, 1967-1972
Alex Sherriffs	Education Advisor to Ronald Reagan and State University Administrator, 1969-1982
John Tooker	Director of the Office of Planning and Research, and Legislative Assistant, 1967-1974
Peter Hannaford	Expanding Political Horizons

Interviews Conducted by
Malca Chall, Gabrielle Morris, and Sarah Sharp
in 1981 and 1982

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PREFACE

California government and politics from 1966 through 1974 are the focus of the Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series of the state Government History Documentation Project, conducted by the Regional Oral History Office of The Bancroft Library with the participation of the oral history programs at the Davis and Los Angeles campuses of the University of California, Claremont Graduate School, and California State University at Fullerton. This series of interviews carries forward studies of significant issues and processes in public administration begun by the Regional Oral History Office in 1969. In previous series, interviews with over 220 legislators, elected and appointed officials, and others active in public life during the governorships of Earl Warren, Goodwin Knight, and Edmund Brown, Sr., were completed and are now available to scholars.

The first unit in the Government History Documentation Project, the Earl Warren Series, produced interviews with Warren himself and others centered on key developments in politics and government administration at the state and county level, innovations in criminal justice, public health, and social welfare from 1925-1953. Interviews in the Knight-Brown Era continued the earlier inquiries into the nature of the governor's office and its relations with executive departments and the legislature, and explored the rapid social and economic changes in the years 1953-1966, as well as preserving Brown's own account of his extensive political career. Among the issues documented were the rise and fall of the Democratic party; establishment of the California Water Plan; election law changes, reapportionment and new political techniques; education and various social programs.

During Ronald Reagan's years as governor, important changes became evident in California government and politics. His administration marked an end to the progressive period which had provided the determining outlines of government organization and political strategy since 1910 and the beginning of a period of limits in state policy and programs, the extent of which is not yet clear. Interviews in this series deal with the efforts of the administration to increase government efficiency and economy and with organizational innovations designed to expand the management capability of the governor's office, as well as critical aspects of state health, education, welfare, conservation, and criminal justice programs. Legislative and executive department narrators provide their perspectives on these efforts and their impact on the continuing process of legislative and elective politics.

Work began on the Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series in 1979. Planning and research for this phase of the project were augmented by participation of other oral history programs with experience in public affairs. Additional advisors were selected to provide relevant background for identifying persons to be interviewed and understanding of issues to be documented. Project research files, developed by the Regional Oral History Office staff to provide a systematic background for questions, were updated to add personal, topical, and chronological data for the Reagan period to the existing base of information for 1925 through 1966, and to supplement research by participating programs as needed. Valuable, continuing assistance in preparing for interviews was provided by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, which houses the Ronald Reagan Papers, and by the State Archives in Sacramento.

An effort was made to select a range of interviewees that would reflect the increase in government responsibilities and that would represent diverse points of view. In general, participating programs were contracted to conduct interviews on topics with which they have particular expertise, with persons presently located nearby. Each interview is identified as to the originating institution. Most interviewees have been queried on a limited number of topics with which they were personally connected; a few narrators with unusual breadth of experience have been asked to discuss a multiplicity of subjects. When possible, the interviews have traced the course of specific issues leading up to and resulting from events during the Reagan administration in order to develop a sense of the continuity and interrelationships that are a significant aspect of the government process.

Throughout Reagan's years as governor, there was considerable interest and speculation concerning his potential for the presidency; by the time interviewing for this project began in late 1980, he was indeed president. Project interviewers have attempted, where appropriate, to retrieve recollections of that contemporary concern as it operated in the governor's office. The intent of the present interviews, however, is to document the course of California government from 1967 to 1974, and Reagan's impact on it. While many interviewees frame their narratives of the Sacramento years in relation to goals and performance of Reagan's national administration, their comments often clarify aspects of the gubernatorial period that were not clear at the time. Like other historical documentation, these oral histories do not in themselves provide the complete record of the past. It is hoped that they offer firsthand experience of passions and personalities that have influenced significant events past and present.

The Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series was begun with funding from the California legislature via the office of the Secretary of State and continued through the generosity of various individual donors. Several memoirs have been funded in part by the California Women in Politics Project under a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, including a matching grant from the Rockefeller Foundation; by the Sierra Club Project also under a NEH grant; and by the privately funded Bay Area State and Regional Planning Project. This joint funding has enabled staff working with narrators and topics related to several projects to expand the scope and thoroughness of each individual interview involved by careful coordination of their work.

The Regional Oral History Office was established to tape record autobiographical interviews with persons significant in the history of California and the West. The Office is under the administrative direction of James D. Hart, Director of the Bancroft Library, and Willa Baum, head of the Office. Copies of all interviews in the series are available for research use in The Bancroft Library, UCLA Department of Special Collections, and the State Archives in Sacramento. Selected interviews are also available at other manuscript depositories.

July 1982
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Project Director

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VOLUME INTRODUCTION

As Ronald Reagan's administration in California developed the agency-cabinet system, then a relatively new concept for managing the myriad functions of government, and labored to improve efficiency and cost control in state programs, the operation of the governor's office itself became more specialized in implementing Governor Reagan's philosophy and providing liaison with all levels and branches of government. The four interviews in this volume document the responsibilities and evolution of this major aspect of Reagan's governorship. Other interviews in this series, listed on a separate page, deal with additional aspects of the governor's office.

These short memoirs by Paul Beck, Alex Sherriffs, John Tooker, and Peter Hannaford discuss public information, educational policy, and planning activities of the governor's office from 1967 through 1974. They convey a lively sense of the complexity and interaction in the governor's office and also provide valuable insights into shifts in organization and emphasis of the administration.

Beck and Sherriffs became members of the governor's immediate staff in 1967 and 1968, respectively, and reflect Reagan's first years in office as well as the maturing of the administration during his second term. Tooker focusses on the development of the major planning unit that was established in 1970 in response to legislative and federal government environmental guidelines, and also discusses his later work as legislative aide. And Peter Hannaford became director of public affairs in 1974, after membership on appointive commissions, and provides a clear explanation of the effort to make Reagan's final year as governor the first step toward later political activity.

Gabrielle Morris
Project Director

June 1984

Regional Oral History Office
The Bancroft Library

University of California
Berkeley, California

Government History Documentation Project
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era

Paul Beck

FROM THE LOS ANGELES
TIMES TO THE
EXECUTIVE PRESS OFFICE,
1967-1972

An Interview Conducted by
Gabrielle Morris
in 1982



Paul J. Beck conferring with Edwin Meese III [left] and Governor Reagan in the hall of the state capitol, ca. 1968.

Associated Press Photo

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INTERVIEW HISTORY

Paul Beck was interviewed by the Regional Oral History Office to document the role of the press secretary in Ronald Reagan's gubernatorial administration. Beck has been described by campaign staffer Norman (Skip) Watts as "always right there at the governor's elbow. He could recall everything the governor said, practically, which was useful in reacting quickly to political attacks or whatever." Compact and dark-haired, Beck relaxed in his office as director of government relations for the Los Angeles County Medical Society on a warm morning in August 1982 and recalled the evolution of the governor's news section from Reagan's election in 1966 through the middle of 1973.

Lyn Nofziger recruited Beck for the governor's staff from the Los Angeles Times, even though he was "known to have given Reagan a hard time upon occasion" during the 1966 campaign. As a political reporter, he had been well acquainted with legislators and continued to stay in touch with them informally. His suggestions that others do likewise met with little response from those on the governor's staff who are described as generally preferring to avoid contact with people who did not agree with the governor's positions.

At first, Beck dealt primarily with state issues and Nofziger was more the political spokesman, particularly at the national level and as one of those involved in unofficial preliminary work for the presidential nomination as early as the spring of 1967. When Nofziger moved over to the 1968 campaign organization, Beck became press secretary. By then, program, planning, speechwriting, and research functions had been added to the staff, specialties that are discussed by Rus Walton, Jerry Martin, Donald Livingston, and others interviewed for this project. There appear to have been some internal tensions over whether these units should be part of the press section. Such suggestions were resisted on the grounds that they involved "more the philosophical approaches than the day-to-day press."

Particularly interesting in this interview is the light Beck sheds on organization and decision-making in Governor Reagan's administration. As the agency system of administration developed and additional aides and liaison people were included in discussions, cabinet meetings in the second term "got to be unruly, because there were so many people starting to attend." The answer was to institute breakfast meetings of a smaller group that would sort out extraneous material so as "not to have an endless debate which didn't accomplish the decision-making ideal." About the same time, Beck found that some decisions were being made at press conference briefings. "In the process of figuring out what you were going to say to that question, the governor would sometimes say, 'Here is what we're going to do.' So the policy had just been made."

Under the agency system, it was Beck's job to broker which things ought to be announced by an agency or department and which ought to be announced by the governor. This also led to discussions with department and agency heads about what the governor wanted in a release and review of releases by the press office.

"You pick out the things you want to emphasize and hope that's what the press will use. Now, they don't always do that," he added. And, with a grin, "Which shows they're not as smart as I am." Asked how he had made announcements of Reagan's complicated taxation and spending reforms appeal to the press, Beck responded, "Money is what makes the government go, and where you get it and who you give it to is of interest to everybody. I think the financial stories were the key element of his whole philosophical approach to government."

Other interviews in this series deal with development of a radio and TV service for the media after Beck's departure from the governor's office in 1973 to join Houston Flournoy's campaign for governor and with the creation of an umbrella public affairs section in the governor's office to coordinate these various functions.

Beck reviewed the transcripts of his interview and made only minor revisions in the text. He also offered helpful suggestions for later interviews in the project.

Gabrielle Morris
Interviewer-Editor

June 1984

I FROM POLITICAL REPORTER TO PRESS SECRETARY

[Date of Interview: August 12, 1982]##

On the Reagan Campaign Trail With the Los Angeles Times

Morris: Overall one of the things that we are interested in is how policy is developed in terms of what is presented and how it is presented, and then how that is translated into the press function itself. How did you happen to join the governor's office?

Beck: I was a political writer for the Los Angeles Times, and during that election I covered Reagan substantially, particularly in the primary. He won the primary election by a big margin; it wasn't close. I think there were two other candidates.

Morris: Right, George Christopher was the--

Beck: Christopher, and then there was a guy by the name of Patrick who was kind of a--

Morris: William Penn Patrick.

Beck: Yes, right. During the general election between Pat Brown and Reagan, I covered Reagan most of the time, although the Times had a policy, and I think it probably still does, that they try to trade the reporters off so you don't get--

Morris: I was going to ask you about that.

Beck: They try to--you would maybe hit two weeks with a candidate and then they'd switch you off to go with the other candidate because you didn't--you might get bored with the same campaign all of the time because a lot of times there wasn't that much new happening. Or a new guy coming on to the campaign could see things in a different perspective that you might have thought you had already explained,

##This symbol indicates the beginning of a new tape or tape segment.
See Tape Guide, p. 42

Beck: you had already reported on, but you really hadn't. So there was a variety of reasons for that, but I think I probably spent more time with Reagan than I did with Pat Brown.

Morris: This was actually traveling with--

Beck: Yes, with the campaign. There were extensive--I think they campaigned more then than they are really doing now, one week at a time type of trips.

Morris: Visiting the small towns?

Beck: Yes. I think nowadays there is much more emphasis on hitting a couple of places and having a media event so that you can get on television that night. It wasn't considered to be that important in those days, but now there are news stations. They've got an hour or two hours, or some of them three hours to fill. The chances of getting the stuff on the six o'clock, four o'clock, five o'clock or whatever news is a lot bigger than what it used to be.

Morris: Who were the people in the Reagan campaign itself that you would deal with?

Beck: Lyn Nofziger was the press secretary and he was the one I dealt with primarily, other than the campaign manager. I believe I dealt pretty extensively with Phil Battaglia.

Morris: Would you talk with them for background briefing sessions?

Beck: Yes, lots of times, and Reagan was always pretty accessible if you were on a bus or an airplane or whatever; or sometimes you would get in the car with him if you were going to do an interview. He was always pretty accessible, so you could talk to the candidate, Reagan, about a lot of things you didn't need to go into background on.

Morris: How many people from the press would be traveling with you?

Beck: It would vary from what kind of schedule it was. The Times had the policy that you covered them; even if there wasn't a story, you still went to it, and everything that he did that was public, and you would try to do some of the things that he was doing that weren't public. So Associated Press and United Press--Bill Boyarsky for the AP and George Skelton for the UP (both of them work for the Times now)--they or their counterparts from their respective organizations usually were at all of these things. Then there would be some of the larger papers in the state and then, depending on where it was going on, you would have television crews. There would be four or five; if it was a good pictorial type of thing that was going on, you would have more television crews.

Morris: The television people, even in '66 were looking for visual kinds of things?

Beck: Oh, yes, and of course Reagan was such a widely known person nationally, the networks also sent crews lots of times. So we had an awful lot of television coverage for a campaign in those days.

Morris: How was he to interview?

Beck: He's good. I think he's probably the master at that sort of thing. He has always been good at press conferences. We had an interesting press conference in Chico toward the end of the campaign. It must have been middle to late October of '66, and he had been on the road for a long time. Everybody was tired and he was, too. We were sitting out on a patio in this motel in Chico and the press conference was primarily designed for the local press to give them the chance to ask the candidate about stuff, and they did. Then somehow or other the questions started evolving into--and I can't specifically remember what it was, but I think it had to do with repeal of the Rumford Act, that was on the ballot, or something like that.

Morris: Yes, Proposition 14. That was fair housing.

Beck: Right, and we got started asking him about it, and I asked him a question and he gave me an answer. I said, "If you say that, doesn't it mean that you mean this." I can't remember the specifics, but he kept giving an answer and digging himself into a hole, and every time I'd ask him, he'd come up with an answer that didn't jibe with what he had said in the past and so forth. It just got to be--he was in a terrible situation. He really got mad at me and he said, "You are boring in, Paul; you are boring in on me. I'm too pooped to think, I'm too tired to think," or something like that, and he kept digging himself into the hole! [laughs]

Morris: You were trying to--

Beck: I was trying to clarify--

Morris: To change his mind?

Beck: The answers that he was giving us were in conflict with things that he had said before, so we were trying to clarify what his position really was. The more he tried to clarify it, the less clarifying it was. He just wasn't able to communicate, one of the few times I have ever seen him not be able to communicate, because he is probably the best communicator that has been in this generation. He just couldn't come up with the answer.

Morris: That was a very tricky issue. It was one of those where you were sort of damned if you do and damned if you don't.

Beck: It was a very tricky issue, yes. As I say, I can't remember any of the specifics of it. Anyhow, it turned out to be a damned good story.

Morris: You tried to get the sense of that whole exchange into your story?

Beck: That turned out to be the story. Not so much his answer on what the position was, but the fact that he accused a reporter of boring in and he's too pooped to think, and he got mad and so forth. That was the story as opposed to the issue! [laughs]

Morris: It's quite frequently said that he is a master communicator. How do you define what that quality is?

Beck: I don't know that you can define it. There are some ingredients that go into it. One is that he's a quick study and so he picks up things fast. He retains things, and somewhat occasionally there is a problem with that because he retains things so well that he retains bad information as well as good and it's difficult to purge that bad information out, or it used to be. I don't know how it is now.

He's a very charming individual and he knows how to use that. He knows how to phrase--whether it is a speech or a press conference--the points that he wants to make. He knows certainly, because of his work in television, how to react to a camera, how to approach the camera, not to be afraid of it; because the camera shows a lot. You really can't hide behind a television camera; it's there to show you for all your warts and everything else, and he knew how to use it.

Morris: Was the UC campus unrest something that you were aware of?

Beck: Oh, yes, that was probably one of the biggest issues, not only during the campaign but throughout much of his term. I mean, there were violent, scary times both in the campaign and certainly after the campaign when he was governor so that where I was traveling with him I was scared to death.

Morris: Really?

Beck: Oh, yes, yes.

Morris: To be with him?

Beck: You would go to board of regents' meetings or things like that--breaking windows and throwing rocks and spitting at you and all kinds of stuff. That's not fun. It was very, very scary.

Joining the Reagan Administration in Sacramento

Morris: How did you get from the L.A. Times into the Reagan administration in Sacramento?

Beck: Yes, we kind of went by there. After the election in November, I got a phone call from Nofziger, who said, "Would you be interested in coming to work?" I said, "Gee, I don't know. Let me talk about it a little bit." So we talked briefly and then I talked to Reagan.

Morris: You talked with Mr. Reagan, too?

Beck: Yes, because I wanted to find out what his thoughts were and he said, "Yes, I would like to have you come to work." I said, "Let me talk to my wife about it and think about it because I am very happy with the Times." It is one of the best newspapers in the country.

So I thought about it a couple of days. I have been involved in politics, I guess, since I almost started working in one form or another, as a newspaperman and then as a press secretary and now in government relations. You always run across opportunities to get involved in campaigns, and I was never approached in any campaign that ever interested me before. But being a press secretary, or at that time assistant press secretary, to the governor of California was something that I just didn't think I could turn down. It was an opportunity.

So I told the people at the Times, and they thought that it was something that if I felt that way that I certainly should try. I said that I would like to get a leave of absence and come back in two years. They said, "We just can't do that, but certainly we'll look at that when the time comes."

As it turned out, I spent fire and a half years, I guess, with Reagan and two and a half with Hugh [Houston] Flournoy.

Morris: Reagan didn't hold it against you that you had put him in a--

Beck: No. When they announced that I had been hired and they put out a press release, a lot of the stories announcing that appeared in the Times as well as in other papers around the state, which pointed out that I had been a reporter who had given him a very hard time on occasion and--I don't know. [laughs] So, no, he didn't hold it against me, obviously.

Morris: Had you studied political science in school?

Beck: Yes, I was a journalism major at Drake University. But my real interest--or not my real interest, because it was journalism--but the second minor, I guess is what you would call it (it's been so long) was political science and I really enjoyed that. Then I went to work

- Beck: for the Associated Press while I was still in college, as a matter of fact. But eventually I went to Frankfort, Kentucky, which is the capitol of Kentucky, and covered the legislature there. That's where I really got started in politics.
- Morris: The Kentucky political scene, was that notably different from California?
- Beck: Oh, yes, it's different. Yes, California is different from many places. In those days--I don't know what it is like any more, because it has been a long time ago, twenty years or so--it was southern politics and that's different. They didn't have the kind of reforms that were instituted by Hiram Johnson in California. They didn't know what that stuff was. They didn't have the initiative. They had a very strong party system or heavy patronage. Civil service was sort of a joke. So the government was entirely different than California.
- Morris: And different to cover, then, as a newspaperman?
- Beck: Yes. Happy Chandler was the governor and he was a real character.
- Morris: The man who later became or was also baseball commissioner.
- Beck: Yes, he had been governor and then became baseball commissioner and then became governor again later on. As a matter of fact, he just got inducted into the Hall of Fame. I didn't know he was still--he must be about eighty-five.
- Morris: Yes, he seems to be of a very durable legion.
- Beck: [laughs] Yes, he was a real character.
- Morris: Did Mr. Nofziger or Mr. Reagan ask you--were they concerned about your own political stance in terms of dealing with information?
- Beck: I don't think so, because I don't think anybody ever knew what I was as far as whether I was a Republican, Democrat or whatever. At the time, I happened to be a Republican but I don't know that anybody knew that. No, I don't think so. I suspect that after they saw me every day for six months or so, they probably had a good idea of what I was made up of.

The Communications Staff

- Morris: You said you were assistant press secretary when you first went it--assistant to Mr. Nofziger?

Beck: Yes, Nofziger had the title of communications director and I had the title of assistant press secretary. There wasn't any press secretary as such. Then in July of '67, when Lyn got much more involved in the political parts of it, he retained the title of communications director but for all intents and purposed I was running the press office and being press secretary, so they gave me the title! Glad Hill wrote me a funny note congratulating me on advancing to a position that was not in existence. [laughs]

Morris: The Dancing Bear man?*

Beck: Yes. He was with the New York Times. I think Glad is semi-retired now.

Morris: Looking at the staff list, it looks like there was a group concerned with communications when you went in. There was Lyn Nofziger and Rus Walton.

Beck: Rus Walton wasn't around initially. He didn't come until--my recollection is around '69, prior to the re-election campaign, I think. I think he was working in one of the agencies or some place like that, but he was not in the governor's office. Rus Walton really had nothing to do with press anyhow. He did more putting out the issue papers, trying to develop some TV shows, speech writing, more the philosophical approaches than he was on the day-to-day press.

Morris: At one point it was called programs and plans.

Beck: Yes, we had some fights about that. They wanted to be part of the press operation and I said no, and I was basically upheld that way. As I say the programs and plans had originally started, my recollection was, to prepare and get geared up for the 1970 re-election. There may have been some work that Reagan was doing maybe in '68, too, now that I think of it, when he was running for president. But it was really pretty separate. They were more off in the think tank approach and they really didn't have hardly anything to do with the press operation.

Morris: How did they see themselves relating to the press operation?

Beck: Sometimes people do that. They want to be more involved in what somebody else is doing or expand their scope and things like that.

*Dancing Bear, An Inside Look at California Politics, Gladwin Hill, World Publishing Co., Chicago, 1968.

Morris: I see, and then Jerry Martin came in as--

Beck: He was a speech writer and I can't remember when Jerry came to work.

Morris: But he came in as--he related more to Rus Walton?

Beck: Yes, although he was sort of independent, too. He wasn't under my direction nor I under his, and Rus Walton was not under my direction nor I under his. They went their separate ways and did separate things. Obviously, a lot of it had to be coordinated. There had to be some coordination there.

Morris: Then how did you and Mr. Nofziger work together?

Beck: He initially was a prime spokesman for the governor. As the transition occurred and people became more familiar with what their roles were and so forth, Lyn became much more the political person and I became much more the daily spokesman. Lyn also was more of the spokesman on the political part of it, especially on a national level as the governor became more of an interest because of who he was and how things were going and because of the presidential bid. I was more of the state government, state politics spokesman.

Morris: Were your functions primarily in terms of responding to political queries or putting out material in relation to--

Beck: My responsibilities?

Morris: Yes.

Beck: Mine primarily were--excuse me. [tape interruption: telephone]

Morris: You were telling me your responsibilities in state politics.

Beck: Not so much with the politics but the state issues, and a lot of that obviously had to do with politics. Nofziger was mostly involved in the big, overall political picture and particularly as it related to getting Ronald Reagan president or first winning the nomination.

Morris: Rumors about his interest in the presidency began in 1967 and--

Beck: They began before he was even elected governor. I don't know that he took it very seriously until everybody else started pushing him.

Morris: That is what I was going to ask you. Were there any guidelines for you on how to deal with that kind of question when it came up with the press?

Beck: Basically, on the presidential stuff in those days, I stayed away from it and referred that stuff to Nofziger. I was not that involved

Beck: in the relatively--secret is not the right word, but there certainly wasn't a public effort being made to find out whether there was a chance to become president or get the Republican nomination. There was a lot of preliminary work done and, of course--

Morris: As early as '67?

Beck: Yes, yes. I would say by the early summer of '67 the talk in political circles nationally was that Ronald Reagan was going to be running for president.

Morris: It was in all of the national magazines. At that point, they were talking about Reagan and Rockefeller and Romney.

Beck: Yes, Romney.

Morris: It is curious that they were all "Rs"! What is interesting is the idea of whether his running was coming from the journalists or to what extent that was actually being seriously considered by some of the people close to the governor.

Beck: It certainly was being considered most seriously by some people close to the governor, no question about that. They were encouraging that kind of stuff.

Morris: The people in the office or some of the--

Beck: Some in the kitchen cabinet and Nofziger, but primarily in the governor's office with maybe Phil Battaglia and Nofziger. Most of the other people in the governor's office were working on state stuff--the legislature and whatever else we were doing in those days.

Morris: It was within six months or so that Phil Battaglia ran into some difficulty--

Beck: He left in about--it would be the summer, I guess, the late summer; probably August of '67.

Morris: Did it fall to you to deal with the questions about that?

Beck: I dealt with some questions about it. The governor certainly dealt with a lot of them and Nofziger dealt with a lot of them, but I did not get into it that much because there was no more to say about it than what our position was.

Morris: There are two schools of thought, one that there were administrative difficulties, that he was not terribly effective as executive secretary, and then the other school of thought was that there was some question of homosexuality.

Beck: Drew Pearson raised that question, yes.

Morris: From the actual working operations, which was the more important concern?

Beck: I don't think I want to really get into that one.

Morris: Then he just left and had no more contact with the governor or--

Beck: No, there was probably some contact, but very little.

Morris: Did that make a particular difference from your point of view in how the office functioned and your responsibilities?

Beck: No, I don't think so. I worked very closely with Battaglia and I got along with him very well, but Bill Clark was a super guy, too, so there were different kinds of style. But, no, I don't think it really changed the basics. They operate in different ways, but from my standpoint, I don't think it really changed much.

II MEDIA TACTICS

Cabinet and Staff Meetings on Issues

Morris: How did you go about developing what the positions would be and what the stance would be on the various issues as they came up?

Beck: There were a variety of ways and the most common one would be the cabinet meetings, where issues would come in and you probably heard about the mini memos and the one-page memos.

Morris: Was that your idea?

Beck: No, that was Bill Clark's because he was the cabinet secretary before he became the executive secretary. No, that was Bill Clark's idea. So there were lots of issues and decisions made through that process and then, depending on what it was, we would write the paper in the press office or somebody in a department would or somebody in the governor's office or somebody else in the governor's office. It was a collaborative type of approach and depending on--

Morris: As to how the governor wanted to present the case?

Beck: Yes, and how to release the--say we were going to take a position on something: how you go about getting the maximum exposure if that's what you wanted to do, and whether you scheduled a press conference just for that or whether you lead off a regular press conference with that, whether you leak it someplace--a variety of things to go about doing it. It just depended on how you wanted to do it and you couldn't always use the same old way all the time, either.

Morris: Right, those are the techniques. Win Adams has said that later on, when he was cabinet secretary, there were daily early morning staff meetings.

Beck: Yes, that was, I think, started in the second term. That's my recollection.

Morris: Because the volume of work had built up then?

Beck: No, I think it was because they felt that they were able to accomplish more with a smaller group of people at the breakfast meetings than they could with a large group of people at the cabinet meetings. And I think they filtered out a lot of stuff and were able to present the best of it to the governor by filtering it and without having all kinds of unimportant stuff be involved in it. I think that's why they did it.

Morris: In other words, a lot of things could be solved and decided on without being referred to the governor?

Beck: No, they would refer it to the governor, but they would sort out all of the extraneous stuff and not have it cluttered up, and not have to have an endless debate which didn't accomplish the decision-making ideal. The cabinet meetings got to be unruly, I think, because there were so many people starting to participate in them that they had to have sort of an executive cabinet. I guess that would be a way to--

Morris: In other words, those morning sessions would be a place for everybody to let down their hair and exchange ideas and--

Beck: No, morning sessions were much, much smaller; the key people were able to filter out because there weren't all these other people there. So when they went to the full cabinet meeting, the key people knew how they were going to approach the problem and so--

Morris: Because they had already worked through--

Beck: Yes, right and so the huge group, they weren't making the decisions.

Morris: Would these key group people sometimes include some of the cabinet secretaries?

Beck: Yes, in most cases there would be each of the cabinet secretaries, the director of finance, and a few people in the governor's office.

Morris: That's a heavy load of meetings as time went on. When did you find time to actually sit down at the typewriter?

Beck: I don't know, you just did it. You were having a lot of meetings, but I don't know, I think in every job there are a lot of meetings. You just find that time and it is not a nine to five job by any means.

Morris: I can believe that.

Beck: It's seven to ten and eleven and on.

Morris: Let me turn over my tape, so I don't have to stop you in the middle of a question.##

Morris: To what extent would your job have involved gathering up what the press was saying and the concerns that were coming in from various parts of the state?

Beck: We had somebody who clipped the papers every day and Xeroxed everything from every major newspaper, and then as the stuff from Allen's or whatever would come in, they would also do that. But this was a daily thing where every day there was--and sometimes twice a day--a stack of clippings, and that went to the key people in the governor's office.

Press Conference Briefings

Beck: I want to go back to an area that we were talking about a minute ago, and that is how you arrived at decisions and so forth. One of the other ways that evolved into the decision-making process was because of the press conferences. We developed, I think, a very sophisticated approach to briefing the governor prior to his press conferences.

Morris: Tell me how that worked.

Beck: I'd ask people on my staff plus other key people in the governor's office or even agencies or departments saying that by such and such a time I want from you anything that you know is going on in your area that the governor could be asked about that is important and significant.

I think we had them every Tuesday morning or something like that, but it was almost every week. So the people would bring all of this in and it would filter into my office. Then I would sit down and put together a memo to the governor on what I thought were the key things, without trying to write the answers down.

Morris: Would that be specific bills or would that be a hassle in the department?

Beck: Yes, it could be a specific piece of legislation. It could be a problem that was going on at UC Berkeley. It depended obviously on what was going on, whether the legislature was in session, what Jesse Unruh just said about somebody, or whatever. So all of those would be listed on a memo. Sometimes they would be quite long, thirty or forty items, sometimes they would be relatively short. Then we'd have a briefing with not too many people, because when you get in a crowd, you just can't get anything done. But they were people who were knowledgeable; sometimes somebody would be just knowledgeable on one thing, and he would come in for that subject.

Beck: What eventually happened is that I found--and it was an interesting approach--that some decisions were being made at the press conference briefing, because in the process of trying to figure out what you were going to say to that question, the governor said, "Here is what we are going to do." So the policy had just been made. That's really a--

Morris: Can you recall some examples?

Beck: I can't recall any examples, but I used that on occasion when I felt that we were--and I don't know that I have ever told anybody this--when I felt that the cabinet was holding back in getting the recommendation to the governor, I would use that device at the briefing and force the governor to make the decision then. By the time that the cabinet figured that out, the governor would say, "I have already said that this is what we are going to do." So it was an interesting device.

Morris: I should say so. In the briefing sessions, would three or four of you sit around and say, "All right, this is the question that Paul has figured is probably going to come in," and exchange ideas on what might go into that answer.

Beck: Usually what we'd do is say, "They are going to ask you about--"

Morris: Let's say the abortion bill.

Beck: Yes, okay, the abortion bill, right. He would say, "I think this is probably what I will do," and so forth. If somebody had some objections, they'd say, "You shouldn't say that." He'd say, "Why not?" "Because of this." He'd say, "That sounds fine, that covers it," or "Maybe you ought to explain something more beyond that."

So it wasn't a question that we would tell him what the answer was. We would toss the questions to him and he would say what he thought. If we objected to that, he'd listen to our objections and then he would, depending on whether he agreed with that or not, do what he wanted to do anyhow, whatever he felt. If he agreed with us, why, certainly he would say, "Oh, yes, that's a good point, I'll put that in." But if he didn't, he'd say, "That's not--" Sometimes we'd argue about it pretty good, and that was good for everybody. It was good for him because he saw the different points of view and sometimes you'd be just the devil's advocate.

Morris: He would?

Beck: No, we would; I mean, you have to do that because you know if it's a tough issue, you know that there is not going to be just one question. There is going to be a series of tough questions that are going to keep following on that.

Dealing with the Press Corps

Beck: The format of the press conference was such that the one subject was--the press could not ask about another subject until everyone in the press corps had been satisfied that this subject had been--

Morris: That they had had their questions answered.

Beck: Yes, on this issue.

Morris: Who developed that?

Beck: That kind of evolved with the press corps and we went along with it. In one sense it works pretty good because you can keep things in focus. On the other hand, it gives the press a hell of a lot of bigger opportunities to really be tough because they keep going on the same--bang and bang and bang and bang and maybe if you bang enough, something is going to give, whereas now if you see the press conferences, they just bang from one subject to another and there is very little follow-up.

Morris: Each of them on the national level has their own issue that they are--

Beck: Right and there is very little follow-up.

Morris: Did you have the sense in Sacramento that the press corps was sufficiently together that they could maybe themselves get together beforehand and say, "I want to ask this and so on."

Beck: No, they don't do that, they don't do that. I mean, a couple of them may have, but they were pretty professional people in most cases.

Morris: How did it evolve that they would--

Beck: I think it was done before Reagan got there. I think the capitol press corps or whatever they call it--the Correspondents Association* --kind of evolved that and Squire [Earl] Behrens was--

Morris: He was running things.

Beck: Yes, he was still the dean and he'd come down and he'd talk about the problems with the press conference with me.

Morris: He would?

Beck: Yes, we would try to make the press conference accommodating to both sides, and I'm not sure that could have happened today! [laughs]

* Capitol Correspondents Associaton, formed in 1943. By legislative action, performs the task of authenticating credentials of all press representatives and passes upon applications for press privileges.

Morris: By then he was pretty much, as you say, the dean and ruled things pretty firmly.

Beck: Yes, everybody respected Squire and if there was a problem with a reporter, he was not above going to that reporter and saying, "You were asking a bunch of dumb questions and cut that out," or whatever.

Morris: Were there some reporters that you had some concerns about that you--

Beck: Oh, sure, yes! There were some turkeys there, I'll tell you. [laughs]

Morris: Do you say "turkey" because you didn't think they were good newspapermen?

Beck: They weren't good newspapermen or women.

Morris: Thank you.

Beck: There were women reporters.

Morris: I should hope so!

Beck: Even then! [laughs]

Morris: Come on, that really wasn't that far back. A lot has happened, but--

Beck: No, I know that. It just seems like it.

Morris: Yes. Who in general did you find helpful in the press corps?

Beck: Obviously, I can't talk about individuals because I think that may be unfair. There were reporters that I felt that I could go to and talk to on any subject and they would respect my confidence if I had asked them to. On the other hand, there were reporters that if I told them it was five minutes after twelve, they'd put it on the wire and so I wouldn't tell them anything.

Morris: Did that reflect in some cases their political persuasion or papers that maybe were not favorable to the governor?

Beck: I don't think it had so much to do with the papers as just that they were very unprofessional people and I had been a newspaperman long enough to understand that there are some ethics involved. I always tried to follow those ethics and I think I always did, so I was not going to deal with somebody that wouldn't. I would deal with them, but they ain't goin' to get nothin' of any importance out of me because I just can't--if you can't trust somebody, then they have no right to be given any information other than what is in the public interest--I mean the public domain, the stuff that everybody knows about. But I'm not going to go out and give background and so forth

Beck: on why issues were developed this way or that way if I couldn't trust someone, because they would have turned it against the guy who I was working for, who happened to be the governor.

Morris: Some of the print journalists have suggested that the television journalists were different and made life difficult for the print journalists. Was that visible from your side of the--

Beck: Sure. Yes, heck, I was a print journalist and I used to have problems with the media--I mean the electronic guys--because they were sticking the microphone all over the place and I'd push it away half the time. That's when I was a reporter. When I became press secretary, obviously I had to try to get along with everybody, and they still do. The nature of their medium is that they have to have something that is exciting, that is visual, and the old talking head of the press conference is not. So they need to stir the pot to get something exciting for thirty seconds.

In those days, it was thirty seconds on the six o'clock news--now, it's three or four or five minutes, and you see a lot of stuff because they've got three hours to fill--and they did not have the time to really explore a complicated issue. They'd have time to pull out one question and one answer and maybe cut that and that's all they'd get on the six o'clock news. That's not a very good way to explain to the California citizens what the governor's position is on something. So there are those inherent--and there still are. I think there were some pretty good television reporters there--

Morris: Network or local California--

Beck: Both, The networks didn't cover those press conferences unless they knew that there was something really coming up that was of national interest. Then they'd show for those.

Press Office Decisions

Morris: If you were having press conferences about once a week, what did you use press releases for?

Beck: We used press releases primarily for--well, a lot of stuff, minor things, minor appointments, stuff like that. Sometimes we'd be asked during the week a position on something. Some reporter would call up and ask; so rather than having to tell thirty reporters individually, we'd say, "Hey, we'll put out a release on it and we'll get it up to you in half an hour."

Morris: You said that when you were developing positions and press releases, you used other people on staff and the departments.

Morris: In turn, did that develop into a system where you had some input into departmental and agency press?

Beck: There is always a tendency for the people, cabinet secretaries or department heads, to want to announce things because they, like everybody else, like to get their names in the paper and they like to be thought of as important and so forth. It was my job to sort of broker that and make a decision or a recommendation that that ought not to be announced by Joe Blow, that ought to be announced by Governor Ronald Reagan because it's that important; that's good stuff for him. So we'd take it away from them.

On the other hand, if it were something that maybe was bad news or was not that important, let Secretary So-and-So announce it. So to that extent we did. Of course, I would be able to talk to either the department head or the cabinet secretary and explain the things we'd want to emphasize in the release and then have their PR people draft it, and then they'd send it over and we'd work it over if necessary.

Morris: That's kind of an elaborate procedure.

Beck: No, it isn't. You just get on the telephone and say, "Hey, here is what we ought to talk about and emphasize." Or I could talk to--depending on the quality of the information officer, because most of them were civil servants and so they didn't have a loyalty to Ronald Reagan in particular. So it was a mixed kind of thing, but it was not elaborate.

Morris: Did you ever make recommendations as to who, when they needed a press officer, might be a good person?

Beck: Oh, on occasion, but as I say, most of those jobs were civil service so you don't have any say-so over it anyhow. There were some people in the administration who wanted to have their own press secretaries and I stopped that.

Morris: In the agencies?

Beck: Yes.

Morris: Would that have gotten a little more complicated in the second term, say, when there was a very complex process of revising the welfare legislation.

Beck: Yes, that's when it occurred, in the second term.

Morris: Would that be a case where there would be things that the governor would want to have announced out of the Health and Welfare Agency rather than his office?

Beck: There probably were some. I think Earl Brian was the secretary then, wasn't he?

Morris: Yes.

Beck: There probably were some because he was very involved in the negotiations and all that. But in most cases, that decision was made by the press office and Ed Gray was primarily assigned to that job. So his job was--

Morris: He worked with Brian's people?

Beck: He worked with Earl Brian and Bob Carleson and then, depending on what was happening, either one of those would be the spokesman. Or it got to the point where we were having a daily briefing and I'd do the daily briefing for the press.

Morris: That is what I was going to ask you about. What was it, six weeks when the governor, the legislature, and the agency people--

Beck: Something like that, yes. I did the daily briefing because the press wanted it, number one, and rather than try to handle fifteen or twenty or thirty or fifty phone calls, which we used to get on that one thing, it was a lot easier just to go in and say, "Here is what's happening and here is what's not happening." Then they'd ask the questions and most of the time I'd give them a nonanswer. [laughter]

Morris: I was wondering how much information you could convey when something was very much fluid.

Beck: A lot of times there was not a lot of information you could convey, and there were many times when there was information that you could convey but you couldn't because it would affect the negotiations. So they would ask you about something which you knew full well what the answer to it was, but you were not permitted to give that because that might affect what Bobby Moretti is going to come back with.

Morris: Would it ever be the case, say, that Moretti and the governor used the press questions as a way of getting information or nuances back and forth between the two?

Beck: Yes, and I can't remember what it was. I remember at one of those briefings I said something that caused a flap that Moretti used against us, and I don't remember what it was. But that's par for the course, I guess. Excuse me. [tape interruption: telephone call]

Learning to Work with the Legislature

- Morris: One of the standard observations on the first years of Governor Reagan's administration is that there were difficulties in relation to the legislature. Was this an area that you--
- Beck: Yes, there were some people--you have to understand that most of the people in the governor's office had never been to Sacramento, almost, and they had never had any relationships with members of the legislature or the legislative process. I was one of the few who had had relationships with the legislators because of being a reporter.
- Morris: You watched the process?
- Beck: And I had covered campaigns and stuff like that. We had done a big series on the financial resources of the legislature, three of us reporters, at the time, back in, I don't know, it must have been '64 or '65.
- Morris: Do you mean Jesse Unruh's development of--
- Beck: No, what led to it was Proposition 1A, which was a full-time legislature. We went into the records and files and the county recorders' offices around the state and everything else to find out how much people who were members of the legislature owned--at that time, it was a part-time legislature--and then interviewed them and filled out forms and all that stuff. Then we did a huge supplement to the Times. We worked on this thing for just about three months and nothing else.
- Morris: Doing the background.
- Beck: Just doing the research, yes. So anyhow, I was familiar with a lot of those people in Sacramento when I came up there. There was a tendency on the part of some people not to even talk to the legislature or have anything to do with them. I'd go out to lunch and I would be out hanging around the places at night, and some people thought that was terrible, that I was mingling with members of the legislature; that wasn't my job. I would tell them to--whatever you tell those people! But that certainly was a problem, and the governor's relations with the legislature, particularly in the first year, were god-awful; and that's not just with the Democrats, that was with the Republicans.
- It didn't take them too long. Ronald Reagan is a smart fellow. He learned that [laughs] we weren't doing something right, and that was corrected. But he could have accomplished, I think, a lot more in the first two years if we had had a better idea of how to deal with the legislature.

Morris: But a former legislator was brought into the governor's staff--

Beck: Vern Sturgeon?

Morris: Vern Sturgeon--was he distrusted by other people on the staff?

Beck: It was not a question of distrust; it was just that that's not what you do and, of course, Vern was an old shoe of a guy, a nice guy, and had been around and certainly knew the senate better than almost anybody else, or probably better than anybody else in the governor's office or maybe the entire administration. But his usefulness was curtailed because he did not have that ability to convince other people that you had to deal with these people.

Morris: The concern seems to have been that the legislators were large egos that needed to be soothed and that that was not a good thing to do (I have sort of paraphrased some things people have said) and that the process of compromise was somehow not being true to the principles of Governor Reagan. Is that a fair reflection?

Beck: Sure, that is part of it. The fact, particularly with some of the Republicans and even the Republican leadership, was that unless they agreed with Reagan on an issue or whatever and unless they agreed with the administration, maybe it wasn't even the governor, they they were somehow traitors to the Republican party and, therefore, ought to be slapped down. As it turns out, not everybody always agrees a hundred percent on every issue. You have to understand that, and it took some time for that all to be learned.

Morris: Did you advocate some changes in how people looked at the legislature?

Beck: I tried to keep the relationships, particularly with the Republicans, on a better level than some other people. I don't know whether I had that much influence or not, but that's what I tried to do--not enough influence, I guess.

Morris: Was this something that was brought up at staff meetings, cabinet meetings, or was this--

Beck: It may have been, although I don't recall anything. It's kind of an amorphous deal and you may not see it as an individual thing, but over a longer period you could see the trends and the attitudes and so forth; that would probably be a better description of how you'd see it. Those were very hectic days, people would work eighteen hours a day. You were trying to put out fires and you didn't have a whole lot of time to sit back with your feet up on the desk and contemplate the huge broad picture and the philosophical approaches that you ought to do. You are just rushing from one fire to another.

Morris: Would you say that most of your work was putting out fires rather than building an overall picture?

Beck: Yes, unless we had the leisure to really come up with a program--and we did that--and then really plan on how we're going to get that going over a period of time, but those were rare.

Brief Media Messages from the Governor

Morris: There was a media office--the governor's office set up its own unit of radio and television. I came across some references to it and I wasn't quite sure what that was.

Beck: I may have been leaving around then, I think. We did set up a bank of tape recorders that we would put messages on from the Governor, thirty seconds or something, where a radio station could call in and tape it for broadcast.

Morris: Was that used by the press?

Beck: Yes, it was used pretty heavily.

Morris: Who was in charge of that?

Beck: Ed Gray basically did that.

Morris: He was in charge of health and welfare things.

Beck: He was, kind of; it depended on what was going on, but Ed did get more involved in the health and welfare area than I did.

Morris: Was he an assistant to you?

Beck: Yes, he was assistant press secretary.

Morris: You had a group of people--

Beck: I had two or three assistants and he would have been the first assistant.

Morris: Then you brought in--

Beck: I am trying to think of--there was a guy who worked for Hayakawa who went in there, Harvey Yorke, is that right? There was a guy by the name of Joel Holmes, but he wasn't on the payroll. He was more of a consultant who did some TV stuff and we'd send it around the state, too.

Morris: One-minute stuff?

Beck: Yes. Thirty-second things.

Morris: Things that could be slipped into the news?

Beck: Yes. Of course, we did that periodically, too, in the press offices. We'd get the governor and we'd sit him down and we'd do a thirty-second thing and then send that around. But I think that was mostly done after I had gone because I left in May, I think it was, in '72.

Morris: Yes, the record shows you in the governor's office until May 20, 1972.

III REAGAN'S PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH TO GOVERNMENT

Changes in the Budget

- Morris: I came across a note that you had a lot to do with writing the material on the budget and other aspects of the state's finance.
- Beck: Yes, I worked pretty closely with the director of finance.
- Morris: Gordon Smith?
- Beck: Yes, with Gordon. Gordon didn't last very long. He was very difficult to keep on track, I guess. With Cap [Caspar] Weinberger I did a lot of stuff. Of course, Cap is not a novice at that. He used to have--
- Morris: He's an old pro and he also did a television commentary.
- Beck: Right, so he was easy to work with and he understood it. [laughs] I remember one time I wrote a press release for Cap in which he attacked Jesse Unruh.* Jesse was the Speaker and Jesse took real umbrage at what the press release said and somebody asked him, "What are you going to do about Cap for saying those things about you?" He said, "Cap didn't write that. That's Paul Beck who wrote that. He's got sauerkraut juice in his veins!" [laughs] Later on that afternoon, from the speaker's office comes a little can of sauerkraut juice addressed to me! [more laughter]
- Morris: It sounds like Unruh was not impossible to deal with.
- Beck: Oh, I liked Jesse. I always have liked Jesse. You know where he is. He is not devious. He's up front. You can trust him. When he says he's going to do that, he's going to do it. I have always liked Jesse.
- Morris: Was his Big Daddy image part of the reason, back when you were at the Times, did the study of legislative power--?

*Regardless of spelling, Unruh was commonly spoken of as "Jess" by his friends and colleagues.

Beck: Oh, he got that before we did that. He got that image almost the day that he became Speaker. I can't remember, that must have been '62, something like that?

Morris: Right.

Beck: Then he locked up the Assembly and the Republicans couldn't get out for dinner, or something like that.

Morris: Yes, that was one of those "are we going to get the budget approved?" Somehow writing state finance in a way that's interesting and newsworthy sounds like one of the major challenges of being a press secretary.

Beck: I don't know. I hadn't really thought about that! [laughs] I don't think so, because what we were doing, particularly in the budget area, was really of great interest to a lot of people, more so than I think it is today. We were changing drastically a course that had been going on for many years, especially the last eight.##

Morris: You were changing course?

Beck: Yes, so when you start talking about raising taxes and when you start talking about cutting this program and that program, that's the stuff of front page stories, or the first spot on the six o'clock news. So, yes, if you get into the nitty-gritty detail of the budget or stuff like that--but that's not the kind of stuff that you emphasize anyhow.

Morris: You were writing then, building the press releases around the philosophical idea that you were changing--?

Beck: Yes, and whether it was on a tax program or on a budget, you pick out the things that you want to emphasize and hope that that's what the press will use. Now, they don't always do that, which shows that they're not as smart as I am! [laughs]

Morris: They are on the other side of the fence, as it were.

Beck: Right, yes, but I haven't really thought of it being a dull thing, because it really isn't. The money is what makes the government go, and where you get it and who you give it to is of interest to everybody; so I never thought of it as being something that you can't get people interested in.

Morris: So it sounds as if the financial stories were indeed a way of getting across the overall message that the Governor had in mind?

Beck: I think the financial stories were the key element of his whole philosophical approach to government. That's where it all is, especially in that first year or two.

Morris: More so in that in the later--?

Beck: Yes, I think so, because in the first year or two we had a huge tax increase because we were in a deficit position and they had a cut. After you really begin, after about two or three years, there is not a whole lot of major items in a budget that you can cut out for one reason or another--politically or because you can't do it.

Morris: The things that are sort of locked in by the federal subventions?

Beck: Yes, right. Then you have, as you become accustomed to the power, other projects that you want to do, and so you talk about those projects. And some of those projects, whether they are conservation or whatever, cost money. But I think the financial implications are what sets the tone of how the government is going to operate, because you can't do anything without it.

Task Force on Governmental Efficiency and Economy

Morris: Did I hear that after Mr. Reagan was in office for awhile, he did find that there were some things that he did want to--

Beck: Sure, it wasn't all cut, squeeze, and trim. I think the cut, squeeze, and trim ended probably really at the end of the first two or three years. Now, in '71, when they went to the welfare reform, that was a form of cut, squeeze, and trim because that program--the whole thing was getting out of hand. The same thing is happening again. That's what I was talking about in Medi-Cal reform now. Anyhow, that has nothing to do with that.

Morris: What about the task forces on that and the big task force that first year on government efficiency and economy?

Beck: I think they were very good. They were a handle that we could really use very well to call attention to the fact that the government was just costing too much and that we were spending all kinds of money for stuff that really wasn't necessary. So it was an excellent vehicle from a PR standpoint, yet also forced people to look inward as the task forces went into various departments to find out--

Morris: It forced the governmental operations people.

Beck: Yes, and it was a help to the newly appointed members of departments or whatever to find out more about their department than they might ordinarily, than if they had just gone with business as usual. Finally, they did come up with some recommendations that were--

Morris: Numbers of them.

Beck: Yes, some of them which were absolutely ludicrous and were never implemented, some of which were very good. But I think of most benefit was the ability to use those task forces as a way to focus on a problem and use it from a PR standpoint--let the taxpayers know that's going on--and then, secondly, to get the education of a department head on what is going on in his department. I think that was more important than the amount of money that they were able to save by specifically recommending that certain things be done.

Morris: That was sort of an unusual idea for that time. Did you take some heat from the press about what on earth is going on here?

Beck: Yes, initially we did, particularly about, "My God, they're turning the government over to businessmen and they don't know anything about government, and they don't mean anything anyhow, and it's all these old conservatives who are going to be in there," when in fact it was upper middle level management types from various companies that came here who had some good ideas, and some of those people who probably were involved emerged as candidates for appointments.

Morris: Did you have any input into the appointments process, or concerns?

Beck: Not really, because I didn't know--I came out of an area where I wouldn't know who people were in the business community, who ought to be--I wasn't in that territory. So from the appointments standpoint I didn't ever get really very much involved.

Keeping Tabs on the Public: Polls, Experience, and Instinct

Morris: We have talked a lot about the media, your professional counterparts. What about ways of keeping tabs on the public out and beyond?

Beck: I don't know. I think if you do what I did, it's something I guess you just know, and that's not quite what I want to say either. Everybody has polls and, of course, people have polls much more today than they had then. In my opinion, polls are only a tool; they confirmed what you already know in most cases, and I don't know how you know it. I guess it is because you talk to somebody, you go to a cocktail party that has nothing to do with what it is you are doing. You get into a conversation with somebody or you are sitting next to somebody on an airplane and they don't know what you do; or you ride in a cab and you ask the cab driver; you read the newspapers and you listen to the radio and you watch

television; you talk to your wife and the kids say something that somebody said in school, and all this stuff gets mixed up. At least that's how I operate; I don't know how anybody else does. So you have an instinctive feel for what people are thinking about and what you know they can accept and what they can't.

Morris: Did you make it a point to get out and around and talk to unrelated people, unrelated to you?

Beck: Yes, but I don't know that I did it consciously. It's just the way I do it, I guess, and I'm still that way, because I still dabble in politics, although not on a partisan basis, and I have a feel for-- I knew how the election was going to go, the Reagan election. Just this last primary in the state-wide offices, there weren't any--it's just something that I have, I guess. I'm not always right, and I don't know that anybody is. But, I don't know, I just have something.

Morris: It sounds like a skill that is part instinct and part experience. When would you get some official polls?

Beck: It depends on what we were doing. DMI [Decision Making Information company] did it in most cases. Rus Walton got into a substantial role in the polling.

Morris: He would work with DMI to develop the kind of--?

Beck: The questions, right. He was very involved in it, particularly in the re-election campaign of '70.

1970 Campaign for Re-election

Morris: Do you remember having any feeling as to how serious a campaign Unruh was going to mount?

Beck: We knew it was going to be a serious campaign. I never have subscribed to the view that Jesse could win because his image was wrong. I think his candidacy was doomed from the very start, but Reagan ran a very tough campaign, too, and Jesse ran a good campaign for Jesse.

Morris: He didn't have much money or much of what has come to be the required "organizational staff."

Beck: I don't know that he didn't have enough money. Hell, he ought to have been able to--he was the Speaker for a long time, and that's the place to raise money.

Morris: Indeed, for other people's campaigns he was very effective at that.

Beck: I don't remember what the costs were. Of course, they weren't anything like they are now, but I really just don't know.

Morris: At some point during that campaign, didn't Lyn Nofziger go over and help Max Rafferty's re-election campaign?

Beck: Yes.

Morris: What was that all about?

Beck: Rafferty was becoming an embarrassment to the Republicans and nobody could get a handle on his damn campaign or what he was doing, and so they dispatched Nofziger and Tom Reed, wasn't it?

Morris: I think so, yes.

Beck: That was the Rafferty Senate campaign, wasn't it? It was in the Senate campaign.

Morris: Yes. That was what I was thinking of.

Beck: But that wasn't in 1970; that was 1968. Anyhow, they dispatched some people over there to try and get the campaign squared away and to not let it bring down the whole ticket because it was a disaster the way it was being run.

Morris: You're right about the year. But it was because of the back to basics, fundamentalist approach that he was using?

Beck: I don't know, he was outrageous. Max was always outrageous, but he was more outrageous in that campaign, and I think they tried to get Rafferty to cool it a little bit, plus the fact that he was a Republican, [and a Republica] can't win in this state unless he can attract some Democrats. With the things that he was doing, I mean it was a sure--

Morris: They were going to have a negative impact on the Republicans?

Beck: Yes, as well as losing half of the elections.

Morris: Tom Reed sort of appears and disappears.

Beck: Yes, he still does, I think! [laughs] I haven't seen Tom in a long time.

- Morris: He's in Washington, but he still has a base in San Rafael.
- Beck: Yes, I guess he's doing some consulting for the National Security Council.
- Morris: But his function was also primarily political. He worked in relation to campaigns.
- Beck: Sure, Tom Reed is a politico's politico.
- Morris: In the sense that he knows people and how they work together and how the communities are going to respond to issues?
- Beck: Yes, I guess so, plus he knows where people have money. He's a brilliant guy. I think he's a nuclear physicist or something, isn't he?
- Morris: I think it is electronics, but it's out there--
- Beck: I think he knows how to build an atom bomb or something. That always impressed me. He's a very smart guy, a very smart guy.
- Morris: He has connections, too, to national Republicans. He functioned as a link between the state's organization and the national organization. That must have been very interesting--you are trying to do things in California, but there is this national interest looking over your shoulder.
- Beck: He was heavily involved in the '68 presidential campaign. I think maybe Tom was the guy in charge of it all. I think maybe he was.

1968 Presidential Campaign

- Morris: Did they really think it could be done on the basis of two years in the governor's office, or did they think of it primarily as a training exercise for--
- Beck: No, they thought it could be done, and it was almost done. It was within a fraction of an inch of not being done, and a lot of people don't know that or don't understand it. There were about six votes that changed the course of history, in my opinion, and I think if you talk to people like Nofziger, Cliff White, Teddy White--
- Morris: Teddy White, the writer?
- Beck: Yes, he made a reference to it in his book on the '68--##

Beck: There were three southern states--Florida, Mississippi, and South Carolina, as I recollect, and I am not absolutely sure--they adopted the unit rule. There were a number of delegates in those states who were solid Reagan supporters, but their votes didn't count. If we had been able to break the unit rule, we believed--I certainly believed--that Nixon would not have gotten the nomination on the first ballot. If he had not gotten it on the first ballot, a lot of delegates would have come to Reagan because they were only committed to Nixon for the first ballot. The delegates were with Reagan, but they were committed to Nixon, but just for the first ballot.

We would not have gotten it on the second ballot. On the third or whatever subsequent ballot, but probably the third or fourth, the erosion from Rockefeller would have even picked up and Nixon would have fallen off even more, and I think Reagan would have been a nominee. Now, obviously he was not as prepared to be president in 1968 as he was in 1980, but who knows what would have happened? I don't know. But I really think that we were within a hair of getting the nomination, the Republican nomination.

Morris: Did you go to the Miami convention?

Beck: Oh, yes.

Morris: Can you think of something else--some of the people?

Beck: It was a very fascinating role. I went with the Governor every place, to all of the caucuses and so forth. Then in the trailer that night where the ballots were, we could see--we knew what was going to happen because we couldn't break that. So it wasn't a surprise when Nixon got it on the first ballot because we knew that was going to happen unless we were able to break something on the floor, which was--

Morris: Who was working the floor?

Beck: Oh, they had a whole bunch of people. Tom Reed was in the trailer, Cliff White, Tom Van Sickle, a guy out of Kansas who was secretary of state in Kansas, as I recall--no, it was state senator. But they had regional guys who were responsible for certain--and we had communications and all that stuff. It was a very well put together, well run operation, and the Governor was there, obviously.

Morris: Sure. Well, he came in sort of at the last few days.

Beck: No, he came in about a week before. He was in and out, as a matter of fact. I got there maybe two weeks before the convention and set up the press room and all that stuff and then he was in for one day to testify before one of the committees on the platform, and then he was out again. He kept flying around the country, I guess. But he was there about--yes, maybe it was only three or four days. I can't remember.

Morris: How did he feel about this? Was he enthusiastic about it?

Beck: Yes, oh sure. Yes, and he also took it very well when we knew, when it was announced that it went over the top for Nixon. Of course, he knew that was going to happen, but I guess he always hoped for a miracle some place along the line.

Morris: Did it have an impact on the relations with Washington on state business when Nixon was then elected?

Beck: We had some very good relationships with Nixon and some pretty bad ones. One of the bad ones--and it may be the only bad one--was Nixon's welfare reform program, and I guess the other one was the legal services. We had some real fights on those, but Nixon certainly listened to Reagan. I think he recognized that he had to deal with Reagan.

Morris: As somebody who commanded a lot of respect in the party?

Beck: Yes, plus being the governor of the largest state. I mean, that's a lot of juice and Ronald Reagan was certainly no--he was going to be around for a while and he was somebody that he had to deal with; and fifteen years later, that's more true than ever! [laughs]

IV FIVE YEARS AS PRESS SECRETARY IS TOO LONG

Move to the Controller's Office

Morris: Then in 1973, you went to work for Hugh [Houston] Fluornoy.

Beck: In May of '72.

Morris: Yes, what brought that about?

Beck: I had stayed too long as press secretary, five years in essence.

Morris: Why too long?

Beck: I think you can't be press secretary that long. Being a press secretary is a lousy job. I mean, it was exciting and I would not have changed it, but I am sorry that I stayed as long as I did. The press begins to not like you any longer because you are not doing what they want you to do.

Morris: You are the screen.

Beck: I am the screen. Okay, the guy you are working for begins to wonder what you are doing, too, because you are not protecting him from the press. You are caught in the middle, and you are caught there from the day you first take that job. It took me a very short time to learn that I wasn't one of the boys any longer.

Morris: That must be kind of painful.

Beck: Yes, it was, but you have to accept that. As time goes on, you get squeezed because the boss, the guy you are supposed to be representing, is not always happy with what the press does, and so you are the link to the press, you get blamed for that.

Morris: Reagan began to feel the pressure of having the press pick at him?

- Beck: Yes, he's just like any other person. And the press, on the other hand, thinks that you are not giving them all the information they rightfully deserve.
- Morris: From their point of view, that's true.
- Beck: Sure, and so I think you begin to lose credibility with both sides, and it's not because you are not doing what you have always done. It's just that the wear and tear after awhile builds up into that reaction. So I would say that I don't think anybody ought to be a press secretary more than a maximum of four years and probably three. I didn't know that at the time! [laughs]
- Morris: You never do in these things. Why did you settle in the controller's office?
- Beck: It was in part politics, and I didn't really know what else I wanted to do. Hugh was talking about running for governor and not too many people were really taking him very seriously.

Houston Flournoy's 1974 Bid for Governor

- Beck: The interesting thing is that as soon as it was announced that I was working for Flournoy, everybody started taking him seriously. We unfortunately lost that election by--it was the closest election in fifty years for the governor. The reason we lost the election had nothing to do with the fact that people loved Jerry Brown. It had to do with the fact that people in California were very, very mad at Richard Nixon and a little bit mad at Jerry Ford.
- Morris: Do you think it was an anti--
- Beck: Oh, no question about it. You could see it in the--this was all during 1974 when Flournoy was running for governor. It was during the Watergate problems, and every time we'd get some campaign momentum going, something would happen in Washington and then it would go bang, just down like that and the fund raising would stop. Okay, we'd start getting some momentum again and something else would come out of Washington and bang, down we'd go again.
- If you go back and look, you can see the polls and how we were closing in the last two weeks. If the election had been maybe three to five days later, we would have won going away, because it was just going that way. But what happened was that the Flournoy campaign was really taking off when Jerry Ford pardoned [Nixon], and then that closed down the money again and we were not able to buy time in Los Angeles on television in the last two weeks that we should have had, if all these things hadn't happened.

Morris: But you didn't have the money to buy the time you wanted?

Beck: Right, and we lost Los Angeles County by 150,000 votes.

Morris: And that was enough to--

Beck: That's enough; that's it. So it wasn't that Jerry Brown was--Jerry Brown did not beat Hugh Flournoy; Watergate beat Hugh Flournoy.

Morris: Public opinion can change that fast?

Beck: [snap] Like that. Yes, you could see it. It was just amazing that when a major disclosure on the Watergate thing came out of Washington, our campaign just went down, and then we built it back up again and something else would happen. It was just a disastrous time for a Republican to run. Of course, Jerry Brown, he's a shrewd fellow, He had the--what proposition was that on fair political practices?

Morris: He had the fair campaign practices-- [Proposition 9, June ballot].

Beck: Yes, so he had that going for him, too.

Morris: Did the national troubles in the presidency affect the Governor's decision? He seemed to sort of stay out of that and not be terribly supportive of Flournoy.

Beck: Oh, I don't think that had anything to do with it. Reagan and Flournoy were never very close. I think Reagan helped him in the general election, but probably not a whole lot. But Reagan has never really gone out and done that sort of thing. He hasn't done it that much in California. He has done it in other states, but he's pretty well stayed aloof from the politics in California. He did, I think, in those days.

Morris: Why?

Beck: I don't know. He just didn't want to really get involved in California politics. I don't know why. I don't know that it's true now, but there was a period of time when he just didn't pay much attention to the Republican party in California. But I never have really put my finger on why.

Morris: So while you were working on Hugh Flournoy's campaign, you didn't have too much contact with the people working for the Governor?

Beck: Not too much and, of course, Reagan at the time was also pushing his own initiatives, so he was more involved in that than--

Morris: In '73, the special--

- Beck: Yes, and in '73, that wouldn't really affect the--I think he probably in his heart was supporting Ed Reinecke anyhow, who was lieutenant governor, and then Ed ran into some fallout, not really out of Watergate, but something like that.
- Morris: An unfortunate situation, certainly.
- Beck: Yes, because I think Ed Reinecke was the guy that the Governor wanted to succeed him. When that didn't happen, and he couldn't take a public position during the primary and then--
- Morris: By the primary, Reinecke had already withdrawn--
- Beck: He hadn't withdrawn.
- Morris: He didn't withdraw, but he was already--
- Beck: Pretty well out of it, yes.
- Morris: Under very, very--
- Beck: That had to have some impact on what Reagan did in the campaign, but I think the Reagan people, while many of them were not initially Hugh Flournoy supporters, saw that he had the potential eventually and they did help to support him financially, both in the primary but particularly in the general election. But it was just one of those things that--it was Watergate, pure and simple.
- Morris: That certainly is a very interesting analysis. Had Flournoy been helpful as a controller in working out some of these financial questions on dealing with the budget?
- Beck: They had a relatively stormy start in '67, and Hugh was the last guy who was elected. He just--
- Morris: Squeaked in?
- Beck: Squeaked in, beating Cranston and nobody had thought that that was going to happen. Hugh kind of did it on a lark, anyhow, and that's a different story. Then there were times when Hugh in his role as controller had to do things that didn't necessarily mesh with what the Governor's view was. Hugh tried to minimize his doing this as much as he could, but he couldn't avoid it because he had certain constitutional duties that he had to perform. I don't know that the governor's office--and maybe not the Governor; I suspect there were many cases that it was people who poisoned wells more than it is what the contact is between the two individuals.
- Morris: The principals?

Beck: Yes, so I think that--excuse me a second##

Morris: We were talking about the '74 campaign and Hugh Flournoy and the Governor. I was wondering about--you said he ran for controller on a lark?

Beck: Yes. Remember, he was a member of the assembly--Monagan and Bagley, Flournoy and a couple of other guys. He was a professor at Claremont College, and they were a part-time legislature and it wasn't really paying very much. So he decided to hell with it, I have done enough; I've got a family and so I better go back and make a normal living.

They were all out one night having a good time and they decided that somebody has got to run against Cranston for controller. He said, "I'll do it." So at the last minute, they pooled their money and went over, or however they did it, and paid the filing fee. Hugh woke up the next day and discovered that he was running for controller, and that's kind of what happened.

Morris: How helpful or not was that foursome? They all seemed to be very bright men.

Beck: Initially, they were treated as, "unless you agree with me every time, there is something wrong with you and so you are not really a Republican." I am not saying that this is always the governor; it was probably more importantly other people who were certainly in positions that could influence the governor and/or influence those young guys. So they tried to be very helpful to Reagan, but they were, in their opinion, rebuffed most of the time.

After a certain time, and it may be two years or so, that really changed. Particularly, Bob Monagan became Speaker for two years. People learned things, so later on in the administration, those guys were very helpful. In fact, when Jack Veneman left to go back to Washington with Bob Finch, Bagley was very helpful and Monagan was very helpful.

Morris: Some of the tax reforms and other things.

Beck: Yes.

The New Governor's Mansion

Morris: I understand that there were occasionally dinners, barbeques, and things like that for groups of legislators. Did that soften things up any?

Beck: I suspect that it depended on the individual member of the legislature, what he thought of it. Some of them were pretty formal. It wasn't

- Beck: that they weren't meant to be, it's just that that's the way they turned out. On the other hand, I have been to some of them where everybody started having a good time and everybody loosened up. So I think it varied from one time to the next, and it varied probably on a legislator's perspective and how he looked at things. Some of them probably really thought that it was a great thing and really enjoyed it, and some people thought it was awful.
- Morris: Who started that idea and who decided who would--
- Beck: I don't know really how it got started.
- Morris: It wasn't something that you advocated?
- Beck: I advocated it certainly, but I don't know that I originated the idea. If I did, I don't remember, but I don't think I did. They tried different formats. I mean, they weren't always the same and sometimes they would do the series. They would invite--because it really wasn't much of a place to entertain.
- Morris: To have 120 people--
- Beck: No, there was no place that you could entertain 120 people and there was no governor's mansion as such. They rented this house and had to do some renovation there to make it where you could have a sit-down dinner for twenty people. So they tried different formats and so forth, and sometimes they worked and sometimes they didn't.
- Morris: Did Mr. Reagan enjoy them?
- Beck: He liked some of them and some of them were--
- Morris: Yes, depending on--
- Beck: A lot of it probably depended on how the tensions were at that particular time, whether there was a big fight going on between the administration and the Democrats on a particular issue or whether things were going along swimmingly. I think it just varied.
- Morris: You mentioned the governor's mansion. That received a lot of attention, the whole business of--I gather it was Mrs. Reagan who was not happy with the official governor's residence.
- Beck: Oh, yes, I can't imagine why anybody would be. I am surprised that Mrs. Brown put up with it.
- Morris: She put in a swimming pool for Pat.
- Beck: Yes, he used to have to paddle across the street to the Mansion Inn and go to the swimming pool across there, but it was a busy corner.

Beck: It's not a--they had a rope tied to a dresser leg to escape in case of fire. It just wasn't much of a place to live.

Morris: Then when a group of friends decided they would find another place for him to live, that received quite a lot of notoriety.

Beck: Yes, there was a lot of negative publicity because the press took the position that why should some of the governor's friends buy it? Why can't he live in a mansion--I don't know. I think a lot of it is jealousy and probably a lot of it was, "Gee, I can't do that, so why should he be able to?" Most of the criticism was, in my opinion, absolutely, totally unjustified, and that includes many members of the press as well as people who were doing it just for partisan purposes. There was just no reason for that kind of criticism, none whatsoever.

Morris: Considering the fact that then the new mansion was built and still hasn't been--

Beck: I thought that what Reagan tried to do was really a statesman-like thing. He knew that he would never live in it. He knew that if he didn't do something, they would never have a mansion because they couldn't ever agree on anything, and history has proved that. So he forced it and people gave--donated money and gave the land and so forth, and then Jerry Brown [laughs] comes along and decides not to live in it. The Flurnoys would have been happy to live in it, and it's too bad that they didn't. But my recollection is that both Deukmejian and Bradley have said that they would live in it if they were elected, so maybe that issue will be put to rest.

The other thing is that there was a carping by the Sacramento Bee because they wanted the thing in the city limits of Sacramento and who knows now. Nobody else knows whether Carmichael is a part of Sacramento or not. You can't tell; it's just like any other suburb.

Reagan's Style of Working, Relaxing, Speechmaking

Morris: That's true. Since you were there for five years (although you thought you shouldn't have stayed that long) what kinds of changes do you see in Ronald Reagan as governor and in terms of dealing with the press?

Beck: I think he has a much better ability to do the things as president than he did as a man who was just elected to governor for the first time, and I'd be surprised if that wasn't the case because he is a smart fellow and he has learned by his mistakes and things like that. [tape interruption]

Morris: Do you feel that he enjoyed what he was doing?

Beck: Oh, yes, he really enjoyed what he was doing, he really did. Yes, there were many times when he was really down and he didn't like what was happening and was very disappointed in things; but he felt that he had changed things for the better and he sincerely believed that. And, what the hell, if you believe that, if, in fact, it is true, then you probably have done what you are supposed to do in life and I think he--

Morris: You may have done something you can--

Beck: Yes, and I think he feels that way. I do not have that kind of contact with him now, so I don't know how he feels now. But that certainly is the way he appeared to be when he was governor.

Morris: You said you were putting in eighteen-hour days. Was he willing to--

Beck: No. It's well known, I think, that he is not a person who is a slave to the office. He likes to get out of the office at five o'clock. That doesn't mean to say that he didn't ever do anything, because he always took a brief case home. Many of his nights [he] would be sitting up in bed, because I have been in his bedroom, going through the papers and reports and all that stuff or working on speeches or whatever. But he did insist on getting his time off. He obviously takes care of himself and, not only that, he is a hell of a physical specimen.

Morris: We should all take a lesson--

Beck: Yes, that's for sure. I think he is doing that now, from what I see. He is trying to get out there on the ranch and chop wood or ride horses and so forth, and I think nobody should begrudge him that. They should not have done that when he was governor, because I think he'd probably do a better job if he could get away.

Morris: Was he able to take a day off in the middle of the week?

Beck: Yes, and they had some horses up somewhere around Sacramento, and they would drive out in an afternoon so he could do some horseback riding.

Morris: In working on speeches, does he like to have a rough draft to work with?

Beck: It depends on the speech. If it's a speech to a more or less technical type of audience where he is not waxing the philosophical--

Morris: Do you mean something like the water district people?

Beck: Yes, right, something like that, he would want a draft. He would then take that draft, and he might use most of it; but he would intersperse and he'd work that into some of the other stuff. When he is doing the philosophical type of stuff, very few people can write for him. He would take some stuff, but eighty, ninety percent of it was pure Ronald Reagan, and he worked on it diligently and he spent a lot of time on it. Many times we thought maybe he spent too much time on a speech. I doubt whether he does that now because I don't think he can afford to do that. But I know that he still does not accept what you give him and goes out and reads it. He has got to be comfortable with it, and if it's not right, he may send it back. But he is more or less inclined to not say anything and go ahead and fix up his own.

Morris: And then use a longhand script?

Beck: No, he has--or he used to have (obviously he's got more staff and teleprompters and all kinds of stuff today) these three-by-five cards.

Morris: That's five-by-eight. This is a fascinating piece of information. We use three-by-five cards in our research and they are quite small. That's a three-by-five card.

Beck: He used five-by-eight.

Morris: Would you prepare information for him in a five-by-eight format?

Beck: Sometimes we would, but he'd usually do it in his own shorthand, and it was almost impossible to read it because he would leave words out and he would abbreviate words and make marks and so forth. Sometimes, if you really wanted to get a transcript of what he had said, and you didn't tape it or something like that, you'd get his cards. But, boy, you really had to spend a lot of time and be familiar with them because otherwise they were very difficult to read.

Morris: I'm here to tell you that spoken English is not the same as written English.

Beck: Oh, yes, definitely, and it sounds terrible if you read it.

Morris: Thank you very much. You've been very helpful and I've learned a lot.

Beck: My pleasure. I haven't really thought about it for a long time, but--

Morris: It sounds like it came back.

Beck: I don't think you can forget those days! [laughs]

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TAPE GUIDE -- Paul Beck

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Regional Oral History Office
The Bancroft Library

University of California
Berkeley, California

Government History Documentation Project
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era

Alex Sherriffs

EDUCATION ADVISOR TO RONALD REAGAN
AND STATE UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATOR,
1969-1982

Interviews Conducted by
Gabrielle Morris and Sarah Sharp
in 1981 and 1982



ALEX C. SHERRIFFS

ca. 1973

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INTERVIEW HISTORY

Alex Sherriffs's recollections of his years (1968-1973) as education advisor to Ronald Reagan provide an illuminating view of the governor's office and of the unique position of education in California's executive governmental structure. Reagan was probably the state's first governor to appoint an official education advisor, undaunted by the "anomaly of the governor's relation to education, which was administered by an independent constitutional officer over whom the governor had only budgetary control." Higher education, in particular, was in a turmoil of campus protest which had been a major campaign issue in Reagan's 1966 campaign for governor. Sherriffs's comments on education policy and the governor's office reflect his training as a psychologist and also his experience as a former vice chancellor at the University of California at Berkeley, where he had advocated firm administrative handling of the Free Speech Movement in 1964 and civil rights and anti-war demonstrations later on, which he has discussed in a separate interview with the Regional Oral History Office.*

The first chapter of the present interview with Dr. Sherriffs was recorded in February 1981, early in the study of Reagan's gubernatorial administration. It provided an opportunity to obtain a picture of the physical layout of the office complex and operating relationships between staff members. Chief aides were located adjacent to the governor's personal suite and nearby, with surrounding space assigned to legislative, press, and bill-writing staff. Secretaries of cabinet-level agencies, which were then emerging as an organizational device to coordinate the many executive departments, were located in departmental buildings elsewhere in Sacramento. Gary Hamilton and other scholars have commented on some differences of viewpoint between staff aides and agency secretaries. One wonders if these relationships might have been eased if agency people had been located in the governor's complex and some support staff moved out.

As agency secretaries became more experienced, however, Sherriffs recalls that "we were together so much, they could talk telegraphically." And when "you know from where people are coming--you don't have to wrestle with each bill."

"He wasn't an absentee governor," asserts Sherriffs of Reagan, recalling that he could spend an hour and a half with the governor "to think things through about so much that was going on in terms of budget for K through twelve, the California state colleges, and the university system." The office staff also talked together daily and lunched together, often with take-out in the office and Ronald Reagan present, "cracking jokes you hoped he wouldn't tell anywhere else."

*In "Education Issues and Planning, 1953-1966," Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California Berkeley, 1980.

On the governor's stance toward the State Department of Education, Sherriffs describes a distant relationship at first, with back-to-basics Superintendent of Public Instruction Max Rafferty, and a much closer one from 1971 on with Wilson Riles, the first black statewide official elected in California.* In the June 1982 interview with the project's education specialist Sarah Sharp, Sherriffs discusses negotiations with Riles on such significant issues as early childhood education, bilingual education, and school finance equalization, as well as key aspects of California higher education in the 1970s. Generally, Sherriffs reports, the technical details were handled by experts in the Department of Finance. He saw his role as "the conscience about whether kids were going to get hurt or teachers going to be frustrated" by budget cutbacks. Reagan's view on school legislation was that "he didn't want to tell people that they couldn't do more." But, in line with his belief in local control, "he believes the more often the state says you can't, the sooner it may say what you can and even what you must."

Sherriffs's efforts to get Superintendent Riles's people together with university people on education issues were complicated by campus unrest, which scared parents and citizens and produced several hundred thousand letters to the governor. It was Sherriffs's responsibility to draft letters of response for Reagan and assist him in writing speeches expressing Reagan's view that freedom for the university "was to make it so that the rightful, accountable people were again in charge."

As observer of numerous UC regents' meetings he attended with Governor Reagan and participant in negotiations on legislation to reorganize the state colleges into the California State University and Colleges system, Sherriffs's wry comments convey a sense of the internal struggles within higher education in the Golden State. In spite of continuous, though ambivalent affection for the University of California, Sherriffs became a CSUC vice chancellor as the Reagan administration in Sacramento was winding down.

In this oral history Sherriffs presents himself as a theoretician for education policy and philosophy in California. Throughout the two taping sessions, in addition to commenting on notable episodes involving higher education which occurred during Reagan's governorship, Sherriffs often returns to his own views of what the educational system and teachers should provide to students, whether elementary or college level. He interweaves his experiences at the University of California, in Reagan's governor's office, and in the California State University system to mark the evolution of his ideas.

The first interview session was conducted in Sherriffs's pleasant, spacious office at the headquarters of the CSUC system in Long Beach, from which he retired in 1983. Sarah Sharp conducted the second interview

*See Wilson C. Riles, Sr. "'No Adversary Situations': Public School Education in California and Wilson C. Riles, Superintendent of Public Instruction, 1970-1984," Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California Berkeley, 1984.

in a conference room at The Bancroft Library on the UC Berkeley campus, a lengthy session relieved by a cordial lunch at The Faculty Club where Sherriffs saw Clark Kerr and other UC administrators from his Berkeley days.

Sherriffs reviewed the edited transcript of these interviews with care, modifying some statements and sealing one passage until 1997. Several of Sherriffs's speeches are included as illustrative material and appended to this oral history. The material is drawn from a special collection of Sherriffs's speeches and writings provided by Molly Sturges Tuthill, archivist of the Ronald Reagan gubernatorial papers deposited at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace.

Gabrielle Morris
Interviewer-Editor

Sarah Sharp
Interviewer-Editor

June 1984

I DYNAMICS OF THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE, 1969-1973

[Interview 1: February 13, 1981]##

Opening Notes on Bob Moretti

*Morris: We are just beginning interviewing on the Reagan administration, and I'd like to ask your advice about who you see as important to interview, and about the actual operation of the governor's office, from your perspective as education advisor to Mr. Reagan.

Sherriffs: I think Moretti would be one of the most interesting people in terms of his position as spokesman for the opposition and also the similarities between the parties.

He and Reagan were fun to watch together, and I think Moretti came to have a grudging respect for him.*

Morris: I guess the key thing would be the interaction of Moretti and Reagan on the welfare reform issue.

Sherriffs: On that, I really feel that Moretti's personality and the fact that he really had a grudging liking for the governor, which became less grudging, also had a very constructive effect on the governor's recognition of the importance of the legislature. Now, Reagan knew that it was a force, of course, but I felt he

##This symbol indicates that a tape or a segment of a tape has begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 99.

*Transcript material between asterisks is opening of the interview, reconstructed by interviewer from notes taken before tape was turned on.

Sherriffs: experienced what could be done when people got together across party lines in a constructive way. But not all of his staff were as open to learning.

Morris: The problems could be approached constructively rather than in a confrontation--?

Sherriffs: Yes, and that there is a heck of a lot in common. There is probably much more in common between mainline Democrats and Republicans than there is at odds.

Morris: That's interesting. In what way do you--

Sherriffs: Think that to be true? [laughter]

Morris: Yes, having worked both sides of the fence, you might say.

Sherriffs: Yes, I have worked both sides of the fence. I think that anybody from Mars, that is from a distance, would have trouble telling them apart. Unless you talk about the extremists in each group, for then it's very simple. But Republicans and Democrats are alike in the sense that you somewhat caricature the culture of the United States fundamentally when you combine them. One party has more confidence in the government solving the people's problems and the other has more confidence in the people, with minimal help, solving their own problems. That is an easy generalization. In pure form it fits only a few of the people in the party and those are usually the professionals.

Morris: That sounds like you support the view that when in office a governor tends to move towards the center.

Sherriffs: I think so, but I've only been in a position to see one governor doing it.

Morris: Was that generally your observation of how the governor's office functioned, that that was the view of most of the people on his staff?

Sherriffs: First of all, the numbers are interesting. In offices close to the governor's there were seven of us, I think it was, who had been recently or who still were, I believe, Democrats.

Morris: There were seven of you?

Sherriffs: That's what I recall--George Steffes, the governor himself, me, perhaps Ed Meese--though I'm not as sure about Ed Meese. I guess I wouldn't know what Ed Meese was. He is so issue-oriented and objective that I wouldn't know whether he had been a Republican all of his life or hadn't. But there was also Dick [Richard K.] Turner.

Sherriffs: Anyway, the governor saw individuals in charge as temporary custodians of a party, for example, or of most any institution, and the party or institution was ongoing and something else. He wasn't going to judge all Democrats, by whatever his attitudes were to Jesse [Unruh], for example. After all, he himself had been one.

But with Moretti, the business of talking things through and planning from where you did have common agreement on a given issue and how he, working with those that would listen to him, and Moretti, working those who would listen to him, could go a lot further than they could fighting apart for votes became understood. I think both found that.

Morris: Was the Moretti relationship a more productive one than the relationship with Bob Monagan, who was speaker earlier, when there was a Republican majority in the assembly?

Sherriffs: [pause] That's a good question. My pause is because I'm really trying to search for what I think to be the answer. In some ways. They were both pretty good, but I think there was more learning-- I think there was better preparation for being president of the United States in having worked closely with leadership of the opposition party for a period of time.

Morris: There was quite a lot of turnover. There were four speakers of the assembly during those eight years.

The Office Arrangement and Staff

Morris: There was, it looked like, a fair turnover in the governor's office staff. I wondered how that was to work with.

Sherriffs: I got there the first of January of the second year and the biggest turnover I know about in the governor's office was history when I got there. That was the house cleaning of the executive secretary and his assistant and so on. So I missed that one, but I was where it had recently happened.

Morris: [Philip M.] Battaglia's departure was still affecting the office or still talked about?

Sherriffs: It was very little talked about. There was an amazing discreteness within house as well as out.

Morris: I've come across newspaper references, so I guess it's all right to say that the issue was whether or not there was homosexuality in the governor's office. Nineteen sixty-seven is kind of early on in the social history of the United States to have that surface as an issue.

Sherriffs: That is correct, but it seems to me that the matter was dealt with in a remarkably soft fashion, in terms of public response--or scandal, or anything else, but I say that not having participated in the scene at the time.

I hadn't thought of it as an office with great turnover. It didn't feel like it had great turnover. There was a turnover in the appointments secretary from a highly political person in Paul Haerle [pronounced Harley] to a much more homey political person such as Ned Hutchinson.

Morris: [laughs] That's a nice description! Paul Haerle, did he come from the party organization to the office?

Sherriffs: Yes, it is my understanding that he did.

Morris: I know he was a party officer.

Sherriffs: He stayed in party politics afterwards, too. Ned, after the Reagan years, went towards the independent--whatever that party was called. What's the party that was close to [William F.] Buckley?

Morris: The American Independent party?

Sherriffss: No, not that, the individuals-everything party. Anyhow, Ned didn't go along 100 percent with the regular organization of the Republican party. He eventually went in this other direction. I don't think it was going very well when he died.

Morris: He went into working with that party professionally?

Sherriffs: Yes.

Morris: That's an interesting development.

Sherriffs: The party had a candidate for president this last time.

Morris: Not Ed Clark?

Sherriffs: I think that's the one we are talking about.

Morris: Right, it was the evolving Libertarians?

Sherriffs: Libertarian! Thank you very much! Isn't that terrible? [laughs]
You can see I come by way of education and not by way of politics.

Morris: What was the feeling of the office when you got there, and the physical layout? I think this would be helpful to us.

Sherriffs: All right, the governor's suite was--I guess that's the south.
[drawing a floor plan]*

Morris: There on the main floor of the capitol building.

Sherriffs: Right. You come in the front entrance--I was in there yesterday.
It looked like Third and Market Street [downtown San Francisco].

Morris: That big outer office?

Sherriffs: Yes. You go into here. [sketches on paper] This is not going to be on scale. This is the reception room, three doors. This is a very large room. It could house at once ninety agency heads and department heads and like folks for periodic get-togethers of all the people working--

Morris: In the reception room or that--

Sherriffs: Just through that reception room. You go into the reception room and walk straight ahead. Actually, they leave that door open.
It's part of the public area now.

Morris: There are folding doors that can close it off.

Sherriffs: Right. Then as you went down this hall, the first unit was legislative and that was liaison, one with the assembly and one with the senate. When I got up there, George Steffes was the chief potentate and when I left Don Livingston was, of that area. We had the scheduling secretary who was Pat [Patricia] Gayman, then the outer office for the governor, then the governor--

Morris: On the outer corner of this whole complex?

Sherriffs: Right. His inner office is the corner. The governor is referred to as "The Man in the Corner Office" by legislators and others. Then the cabinet room was attached to that. He had his inner office a

*See p. 6a for floor plan as Sherriffs drew it.

Sherriffs: little beyond the cabinet room. Then the reception room with a receptionist outside of that. This office allowed us to have UPI [United Press International] and Associated Press tickers going all the time, so we always could keep up.

Morris: In the governor's office?

Sherriffs: Right. Appropriately, the next office down here is the press and public information and public relations. Actually, it wasn't public relations, it was public information. Next was legal affairs, extradition and what-all, which Ed Meese was originally.

Morris: Does that also include screening of appointments and things like that?

Sherriffs: I would have to guess yes. But they didn't do the work themselves. They would turn it out to CINI [the Bureau of Criminal Investigation and Identification] or whatever it's called that does security checks.

Morris: Of government agencies?

Sherriffs: Yes.

Morris: Even during the first couple of years when you were there, when Tom Lynch was attorney general?

Sherriffs: You're going to have to interview Herb Ellingwood or Ed Meese. They will tell you. I'm guessing because I really don't know. I don't know intimately how those worked procedurally.

Then we had a large space here with several secretaries. All these people had secretaries.

Morris: But the secretaries kind of functioned in a pool?


Sherriffs: Not up 'til now; each had his or her own secretary. But down here we had two secretaries and a couple of assistants in the legal affairs area. [pause] I'm trying to remember what the title was. Well, sort of a big picture guy was down in this--

Morris: That's a good word. There was a director of public affairs.

Sherriffs: Give me some names. It's been a while.

Morris: The only one in Molly's [Tuthill] record is Jim Jenkins, who came in in 1971.

Sherriffs: Yes, that's who I'm thinking about. A good person.



Morris: Yes, director of public affairs was his title.

Sherriffs: Then as you swung around this area, you came into the bill-analysis group.

Morris: Different from the legislative aides?

Sherriffs: These were liaison people. We depended on them. We all did. In my area alone there were five hundred bills a year, in education, so you can imagine when you add the rest of a governor's functions--the bills were in the thousands.

Morris: That's in addition to the legislative counsel's office and the legislative analyst's office?

Sherriffs: That's right.

Morris: You were all doing the same thing?

Sherriffs: But we didn't trust their analyses. Ours were from the executive's point of view.

Morris: Yes, I can see why you would want to check. Who were the people involved in that?

Sherriffs: Actually, they were people who had done the same thing for the previous governor and are doing the same thing for the present governor. They were just solid citizen types.

Morris: Selfless, nonpartisan, apolitical?

Sherriffs: They had personal feelings about some of the bills and some of the decisions we made and would speak up at times, but they were relatively nonpartisan I would say or they wouldn't have been there. Gene Oleara was one and Bob Williams the other.

Morris: How do you spell that?

Sherriffs: It's funny how you forget in seven years. I think it's O-l-e-a-r-a. When I say "still there," I know he was there when Brown was there.

Morris: He was there under Pat Brown [Edmund G., Sr.] and then also with Jerry [Edmund G. Brown Jr.]?

Sherriffs: That's my understanding. But the more important one is Bob Williams. Reagan offered him a judgeship at the end of his term, the second term. He didn't take it.

Morris: I've come across a Bob [Robert J.] Keyes, a Bob [Robert C.] Walker--

- Sherriffs: Bob Keyes was community relations. He was black, a fine human being. Sadly, he died. You can't catch him, unfortunately. Ned Hutchinson is dead also.
- Morris: So Oleara and Bob Williams, would they have been career civil servants?
- Sherriffs: Yes, definitely.
- Morris: In that category called career executive assignment?
- Sherriffs: I don't know the label. When I started in up there I was so green. I was straight out of teaching sophomores, and to learn all the things that were going on was something in itself, let alone carry on my responsibilities! But I had a chance to learn fairly fast since I was present at all of the cabinet meetings. We had breakfast meetings about three times a week, and we had meetings 'til 7 p.m. about four times a week, and after-hour meetings and so on.
- Morris: At that point, the legislature was making some forays into purely formal orientations for new assemblymen. Did the governor's office have anything like that? Did somebody take you in hand and say, "This is what we're doing"?
- Sherriffs: I would say no. I would say, and Ed Meese has told me his experience was the same, that they thought a long time before they hired you. But once they hired you, they thought you could figure out how you best could serve.
- Morris: Throw you in the pond and if you are what we think you are, you'll swim.
- Sherriffs: That's right.

Appointment as Education Advisor; The Governor's Council

- Morris: You said they looked at you very, very closely before they decided--
- Sherriffs: It took them five months.
- Morris: It was five months from the time somebody first broached the question to you before you came aboard?

Sherriffs: But it was only thirty minutes after the governor had seen me himself.

Morris: Who were your first contacts with?

Sherriffs: Paul Haerle; Jim Gibson, who left the office somewhere in the middle of Reagan's administration.* Gibson had been carrying the mail in my area.

Morris: Carrying the mail--that's a colloquial phrase that means what?

Sherriffs: For instance, on some of those campus things we got up to 200,000 letters and it was a policy that all letters would be answered.

Morris: So he was in charge of handling the response to the letters?

Sherriffs: Until there was an education advisor, and after the first one who was there a short time had left. I never have met him. [Dr. Manuel P. Servin]

Morris: Where had he come from?

Sherriffs: I believe Claremont Colleges, but I have never met the man to this day. Somebody had to see that we were responsive. If people wanted an appointment, we sooner or later got them one and we got more of them sooner than you might expect. If they wrote letters, they got answers. That is not the way it is these days.

Morris: People who wanted appointments: people who wanted to come in and talk to somebody about a problem or people who wanted to be appointed to a--?

Sherriffs: No, I mean to talk. Well, I've just described five months during which I didn't suggest to anybody I wanted the job. I didn't particularly want it in the beginning at all.

I was a Democrat and hadn't even thought about that kind of thing. But I knew that something I thought was an incredibly valuable institution to society was going to pot, namely the University of California-Berkeley. At least in my opinion it was. Its temporary custodians were doing it damage. So if I could find a place where I could work for the University of California, but not necessarily for the people in it, I would like to find it. I was glad to do that on those grounds.

*O. James Gibson, assistant to Philip Battaglia, later research secretary (January 1968-early 1969).

Morris: In that five-month period, did you talk about your views on education and their views on education?

Sherriffs: It was quite interesting, and it will tell you something about political aspect of Paul Haerle. When he first interviewed me-- I'm wrong about the order of events. Jim Gibson had interviewed me first and had gone back with recommendations, and would call every now and again, and would send me things they were thinking about, tuition or one thing and another, and getting my reactions to these things: what I felt was right, how I thought--

Morris: They were using you as an advisor.

Sherriffs: I'm not sure how much Jim was using me as advisor. I think more than I thought, not that I was being used in the pejorative sense--

Morris: You don't mean that in the negative sense.

Sherriffs: No, I'm using "used" in the good sense. I didn't mind. I believed that I was being looked at as to whether I could think straight, and whether I was independent enough of spirit and the rest of those things, whereas I think poor Jim was overwhelmed and needed some support and help in things that were coming up, because the governor was giving speeches on education and like matters, and he didn't have an education advisor.

Morris: His name hasn't turned up before. Was he sort of an all-purpose hand?

Sherriffs: As I look back on it, yes, and I wouldn't want it thought that he wasn't able. He was. But I think he was a very bright person who didn't like to finish things and eventually he went to Pepperdine to teach.

Morris: He got out of the frying pan in the governor's office and went back into the fire of the academic world. He was from an academic background, but he didn't come in as an educational advisor?

Sherriffs: That's right. He came in as a gofer I'd say.

Morris: You said that Haerle's approach was different.

Sherriffs: Oh yes, Paul asked me a couple of questions and I described the education world exactly as complexly as I knew it to be and he said, "Oh, God, you're overqualified!" [laughter] He really did and he really meant it!

Sherriffs: They didn't take education that seriously. They wanted some help, but they didn't want as much as they were going to get when they got me. They didn't realize they needed advice in the area; they discovered they did.

Morris: They discovered they did want and need more advice and supervision on education?

Sherriffs: Bill Clark, Meese, and Reagan himself. Gibson recognized what they needed in information and on the political side. There was a sort of naive notion that you told campus people to shape up, and they'd shape up, and then you didn't worry about education any more. You went back to your other problems, whatever they were. (Remember this was the time of campus unrest--unrest stood in the way of considering true educational issues.)

Morris: You could compartmentalize it and deal with it and then go on to something else.

Sherriffs: I sort of felt that way about Paul. I certainly did feel that way about many of the others. But Paul was the appointments secretary, after all, so that mattered.

Morris: Was there ever a point at which several people sat down with you and talked about education and the administration?

Sherriffs: Do you mean before?

Morris: Yes, in these five months after--

Sherriffs: I was invited to come and speak to the ninety or so agency and department heads whatever they were, in that council room we were talking about. But, to stay with the point, I was asked to be part of the program for the agency and department heads in one of their bi-monthly meetings, as I recall.

Morris: This was what they called the council?

Sherriffs: Yes.

Morris: So those were really fairly structured? They used them as briefing and educational sessions?

Sherriffs: Yes. What are our priorities and what are we facing, what are our challenges, what are our opportunities, problems, solutions. The governor himself spent time inspiring them. He's good at it!

Morris: They were used as pep sessions in a way.

Sherriffs: That's one of the things, and information-sharing. There is something about Reagan's personality which makes everybody feel better and go out and work harder when they have been around him a little while.

Morris: I see you have jelly beans in your outer office now!

Sherriffs: She did [Sherriffs's receptionist], I didn't do that! I wouldn't have done that for \$1 million. I'm trying to keep myself apolitical in this business. But she had gumdrops last week.

##

Sherriffs: So I was asked to give the council my thoughts on the then state of education. They were interesting to me. But let me just go through this.

Morris: Please do.

Sherriffs: I was invited up to, as I say, to explain to these people when they met, why I thought the things that were going on were going on.

Morris: In education or in general?

Sherriffs: The interest was in campus unrest. I by then had delivered my understandings of this, I can't tell you how many times across the state of California. Not the Berkeley thing so much as parents who were so dependent on Spock and psychology that their kids thought the book might be their parent. Parents would imitate the fads of the kids, the twist or teen-age slanguage whatever it was, as fast as the kids would develop them. A kid who needed some independence and to be disconcerting to parents would look over his shoulder and say, "Oh, my God, here they come again."

Morris: Doing the same thing I'm doing, yes.

Sherriffs: And the youth cult generally--I'll give you copies of what I used to think was, and I still believe most of it, the facts behind what was going on.

Morris: You kept a set of your notes for the speech?

Sherriffs: They're in booklet form. I see some of it differently now. I see some things now I didn't see then, but for that time they're not bad.

Morris: Presumably there have been some changes.

Sherriffs: That's true. But anyway, I went to the capitol in Sacramento. I was to speak at 11 a.m.--I got up there at nine because I really hadn't been given enough definition of what they wanted. I had developed an analysis which took me forty minutes. I have had a terrible time at Rotary Clubs with time limits.

Morris: Getting it in before everybody has to go back to the office?

Sherriffs: Right. So I wanted--

Morris: You didn't know how many things were on the agenda and--

Sherriffs: And talking to all of these cabinet people and so on was new to me, and I was not a little impressed and I wanted to see what the scene was. I would like to see the room, I'd like to know how much time they were going to give me and all those things. So I came up to the governor's office, and I discovered to my horror from Mike Deaver, who was assistant to Bill Clark at that time, that I was to summarize what is going on and the problems of campus unrest in ten minutes. Well, being a faculty member I can't give my name in ten minutes. So I said, "I won't touch it. You get yourself another program."

Morris: You were to be the featured--

Sherriffs: The outsider.

Morris: The outside informant?

Sherriffs: Yes. He said, "Well, we only have them there for a full agenda for forty minutes." I said, "I'm sorry but I'm not going to try it. One problem with our society is it is being made too simple and I'm not going to contribute to the problem." "Well, fifteen," [he said]. I said, "Can I figure when I'm going to stop if I have fifteen, like if it's eighteen?" "Yes," [he said].

I decided privately to give my speech and give it in my way and if they wanted to throw me off the stage they could. So I did try to tighten it a little bit in my mind and then I went into the room and was introduced. I just got through the opening remarks, letting people know who I was and where I was coming from when in from a door in the back of the room walked the governor. I had not been told he would be there.

Morris: You didn't expect the governor to be in this council meeting?

Sherriffs: No, and I don't think they did though. I'm not sure of that. But he dropped by, and he stood at the back of the room and he never left. So I found myself talking directly to him.

Morris: He was standing up in the back of the room and you were standing at the front of the room. So you really had each other's attention.

Sherriffs: That's right. So I gave my speech to him and I went, on and on and on and on, and he never left. Obviously, by his response he was enjoying it very much. I could see I had a "nervous Nelly" in Bill Clark who wasn't quite sure what to do with the rest of the agenda.

Morris: Bill Clark was in charge of the meeting and he wanted to get through--

Sherriffs: Well, at the beginning he certainly thought he should get through the agenda! But I finished my speech and felt pretty comfortable that I had made it as accurate and as complex as you could do it in that period of time. Then I sat down. I had left them a little time, ten or fifteen minutes at the most, however. They went on until a little after twelve. Then I was about to go off to find myself lunch somewhere and Bill Clark said, "Can you stick around a little while after lunch. I want to talk to you."

So after lunch I came back. I was ushered immediately into Reagan's office. Everybody left and there were just the two of us. He asked if I would like to work there, just like that. I said, "I don't know. Who are you?"

Morris: Well, good for you!

Sherriffs: Well, I did! I mean I was giving up the University of California career that I had known for twenty-three years and I knew you couldn't work for Reagan and ever go back to the Berkeley campus in those times. I could now, but I couldn't then. I couldn't foresee it then. So I was making a life change that was going to be significant and I wasn't going to make it for some guy that I didn't like.

Morris: When you say, "Who are you?," did you use those words, or is that a form for saying that you'd like to talk with him about what his ideas were and what he had in mind for you?

Sherriffs: He was very easy. He is the easiest person to talk to I know. I don't remember if I said exactly the words, "Who are you?" I might well have because he would have understood what I was saying.

I probably prefaced it with, "Well, this is important to both of us and you've got to know who I am and I guess you figured you've learned something today, but I don't know who you

Sherriffs: are and what you want from an education secretary and what you want from society. He said, "That's fair." So we talked and I liked what he was saying.

Morris: Do you recall a sense of what he was saying?

Sherriffs: The reason I can't recall it as clearly as I might is it was kind of overwhelming. But I know that I was satisfied that his interest and mine alike were that there be a free and independent institution--the university; that he thought that the worst possible thing was the politicalization which was going on both from Sacramento and from some of the faculty and some of the students on campus, and that his goal was to return the university to freedom as he conceived of freedom, which was to make it so that the rightful, accountable people were again in charge of it.

He conveyed clearly enough that he thought shaming people and persuasion was the way you did it. You didn't do it by firing people and the like. But these were people, the administrators and the faculty, that normally had been quite good, so there must be something peculiar about what was going on, and that's, of course--

Morris: Was that your view?

Sherriffs: That was my view as well. No, I didn't think that suddenly my colleague with whom I did research had lost his mind. I knew he was caught up in some sort of a "mob psychology" that was on campus. But, of course, things got worse, and we got tear gas and all the rest of that stuff, and people began to believe what they had been paranoid about in the beginning.

Morris: After you talked with the governor, did that decide it or did somebody also have to go--

Sherriffs: He referred me to Bill Clark to talk about "details." He wasn't concerned about details at all. I found him a thoroughly decent human being in that conversation. One capable of quite complex thought, and one a little more direct and frank, even outspoken, than most, and consequently was easily seen as a hard-liner. But in my mind he was only doing what he believed was necessary for a free society. Well, I closed most of my speeches those days with a plea to parents to start thinking as adults, to stand up as parents, and to be parents; not to be cowed, not to beat children, but to be themselves. It's better to have a position and be wrong as hell and have your kids recognize that, than to be afraid maybe you don't know what you're supposed to be doing (Spock, psychology) and have no position at all. I still believe that, both personally and as a psychologist.

Sherriffs: But my last line was [that] "all that is necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing"--a paraphrase of Edmund Burke. This is basically how I felt we had gotten where we were--the silent generation was the label we used in those days, the fifties. The silent generation was much more than an age group. It was much more than people not intervening to help the underdog when the underdog was being beaten up and so on, but it was also parents who didn't know their own role. If the majority are silent, a small minority dominate the stage.

Perspective on the Work as Education Advisor

Morris: Does that kind of statement of approach characterize the governor's office as a whole, would you say, when you became a part of it?

Sherriffs: Yes and no. There were some more simplistic people than others, if that is what you are getting at. The more they had been party politicians before, and I think I'd say the same thing for Democrats--the more party persons they were, the more simplistic they tended to be, and the more likely they would think you could tell them to shape up or manipulate them to do so--that kind of thing.

Morris: That doesn't correspond to the idea of a party professional or somebody who has worked a long time for the party as somebody who is gifted at compromise and making adjustments to get a bill passed or win an election.

Sherriffs: I was talking from the point of view of education as seen by the people who had party connections and then who chose to work in the governor's office. So the sample isn't necessarily representative of anything. I'm not speaking of legislators, but of professional party folk.

Morris: I was just wondering if there was a transfer in an attitude towards education to an attitude towards legislation in general or dealing with the budget issue, for example.

Sherriffs: I think that education and welfare struck me at the time [as] areas that were prone to divide the people into the complex thinkers and the simple thinkers because they were areas of both practical challenge and ideological question.

On a self-serving bent, I just wish to say that I did go back to see Bill Clark. There were two levels they could offer. One was \$17,000 and one was \$21,000 and at Berkeley I was making \$22,000. I was offered \$17,000 and I said no, so you can see I was just not scrambling to get there.

Morris: Right. Did that make you somebody [who] if you said no, they desperately wanted you to come join the team?

Sherriffs: I don't know about desperately, but they did offer me \$21,000! [laughter] And I went.

Morris: So once you got your feet under you and got a sense of where you were going, what turned out to be the lines of responsibility? Where there groups within the governor's office? Did you work particularly with some people?

Sherriffs: I worked mostly with Ed Meese and with Governor Reagan. I say "mostly" in terms of time spent and in terms of discussing things. I needed to get my head on straight. And it was necessary to think things through about so much that was going on, or what was needed in terms of the budget for K through twelve, the California State College and the University system. I mean we got far beyond campus unrest, of course. And I would invite random samples of students from campuses, take every fiftieth and pay their way up to sit and chew the fat with the governor. He would learn what a range of average students was like. "Average" is not quite right, but what typical students were thinking. This was one reason why he was clear all the way through that it was a small, small group that was making an awful lot of fuss because he kept seeing random sample after random sample of very normal students.

Morris: Did they all come?

Sherriffs: They came in great numbers, great percentages.

Morris: Every fiftieth say from Long Beach at that point would be how many kids?

Sherriffs: By "fiftieth" I mean we asked for students not selected for any characteristics--a sample. Anyway, what we would get was about forty kids, between twenty and forty. We did this often enough. We didn't do this weekly, but we did this often enough so that he knew what students were like. Most of them were as confused about what was going on as we were.

Morris: Yes, that's the normal state for an eighteen-year-old.

Sherriffs: That's right and they weren't bomb-throwing, "stop the classes" types. Consequently, it helped to prevent stereotyping. And it helped when we did the same thing with the faculty, only with faculty we didn't get random samples. Anybody who wrote us a letter, we invited to come up to visit in groups--not "anybody" but as many as we could.

- Morris: So you set up meetings with groups of faculty, too.
- Sherriffs: That's right and the meetings didn't have as a goal some specific thing to be gotten out of them; it had to do with keeping in touch with what the academy really was and, no question about it, let them recognize the fact, as I'm sure anybody who met him would discover, that the governor didn't have two heads. As he often said--I can hear him say it now, "I hope at least, whether we agree or don't agree on any of the things we've talked about, I hope at least you know I don't eat my own children."
- Morris: Would the faculty groups and also the student groups, would any one group all be from the same campus?
- Sherriffs: Each student group would be from the same campus. We didn't get that many faculty writing us from one campus at any given time, though we had quite a few over time. The faculty group was bound to be friendly because they wrote, but they would portray the attitudes they saw in the majority of faculty and so forth, which turned out to be very reassuring. The place (university) hadn't completely lost its (collective) mind.

Cabinet Dynamics

- Morris: Not too long after you came aboard, there was the reorganization into an agency system which cut out that governor's council and replaced it with four agency secretaries plus the director of Finance.
- Sherriffs: Yes, Livermore, Coke, whoever the director of Finance was at the time, mostly Verne Orr or Cap [Caspar] Weinberger.
- Morris: Yes, Verne Orr was the top career man, I guess.
- Sherriffs: He wasn't a career man in that sense. Verne was a car salesman from Pasadena.
- Morris: I have Weinberger coming in March of '68 and then Verne Orr coming in in 1970, I guess, when Weinberger went to Washington. And Spencer Williams?
- Sherriffs: Spencer wasn't as strong as Weinberger or Orr, both of whom I admire tremendously. I like Spencer Williams, but [pause] he was a different league altogether.

Morris: The Resources [Agency] secretary was Norman Livermore who was there throughout the administration.

Sherriffs: Yes, he's a very nice guy; a truly committed environmentalist.

Morris: That's really grassroots experience with the subject.

Did that reorganization change the way the immediate governor's office staff functioned or change their responsibilities at all?

Sherriffs: Well, it made a big change, of course, with the relations with the agencies and the departments. It made it a lot easier to have your facts before you all at one time. You didn't have to get ninety people together. I guess it did cut down a little on the number of meetings we had to have from five to seven and eight and nine at night, because the communications were improved by it.

I can't think of much change except that cabinet meetings were more constructive, which is important. But I can't think of a change in the responsibility or contact with the governor or things of that nature which did matter for the liaison person with the legislature or for me.

Morris: You described the council meeting as being ninety people, plus or minus.

Sherriffs: Yes, but my memory--maybe it was seventy.

Morris: Right, but it's on that order of individual department chairmen and things of that sort.

Sherriffs: Yes.

Morris: Then it changes to a group that is basically--

Sherriffs: Eleven or so.

Morris: The dynamics of that changes. Don't the dynamics of that change?

Sherriffs: Well, I think it's bound to work better because the governor gets to know the strengths and the foibles of those twelve very readily, where it's hard to be sure about a crowd. With the smaller cabinet, when you get into a bull session on whether you are going to give support prices to milk, on which we did go into discussions periodically once a year, you know from where the people are coming. When you are trying to decide whether to flood Round Valley or to keep the Indian reservation intact, you know where Ike [Norman] Livermore is coming from, you know where somebody else is coming from, and the governor is able to be himself.

Morris: Was he at all the cabinet meetings?

Sherriffs: Almost. I would say that once in a while we had preparatory sessions. For instance, the budget. We didn't have him there for the first eighteen hours.

Morris: Those must have been incredible sessions.

Sherriffs: They were, but I have a great admiration for the sincerity of the people, whatever their positions were, and the way they operated in that scene.

Morris: Would he chair the meetings and direct the conversation, or would he listen and wait until it looked like you had arrived either at a sense of agreement or a sense where somebody needed to intervene?

Sherriffs: He was a good chair. Once in a while, Meese, for example, would say, "Gentlemen, it's getting close to four." [laughs] But he was a good chair and he gave the signals loud and clear. He said, "Okay, I have all I need, but I don't know what I'm going to do, and I want to sleep on this one." He felt no obligation to come out with an immediate answer. That's an asset; that's a positive thing I'm describing. It wasn't a lack of decisiveness. He could be very decisive. But he knew when he didn't know enough and he knew when he wanted to mull it. We knew when he knew, and it was respected and understood.

Also, if one of us had a decision go counter to what we really believed the integrity of the administration should put up with, we could appeal and have it presented again at the next meeting, which was usually the next day.

Morris: On the budget, those seemed to be--

Sherriffs: No, I mean on anything.

Morris: There was a cabinet meeting every day?

Sherriffs: It seems like it. Maybe it wasn't [laughs], but it seemed like it.

Morris: How often would people appeal?

Sherriffs: Oh, very seldom. I appealed once. But I didn't lose many either, so I didn't have to appeal very often.

Morris: That's one advantage of a few people each with an area.

Sherriffs: It helps, it helps.

Wilson Riles and the Department of Education

Morris: It sounds as if you would have been in kind of an interesting position because you were representing education, but the person with the administrative responsibility is out there in Rafferty and then Riles outside of the governor's office.

Sherriffs: With Rafferty--

Morris: Did they ever come to cabinet meetings?

Sherriffs: No. Oh, Riles occasionally was invited when there was something that was complex and we felt that the best shot at it would be to have him explain it himself. He would have appointments with the governor, but he usually was quite satisfied with his appointments with me. He recommened for me for my present position and got me into this job.

Morris: How was he as a person to talk to?

Sherriffs: Riles? Exquisite. He is totally honest and open.

Morris: In terms of what we're doing, is he somebody to talk to who would wish to respond and analyze what he was doing, and why and how he saw things develop around his own personal role?

Sherriffs: Yes. Do let him understand the ethics of the oral history process.

Morris: Yes, I think that's important always.

Academicians and Businessmen in Government

Morris: It seems like it would be really valuable to talk to him not only for education, but for black leadership and the mechanics of being the first statewide--

Sherriffs: Oh, absolutely. Right this minute you would hit him at a time when he might be most defensive because he is not sure what he is going to run for.

Morris: So it would be better to wait a while until he has either made the decision or finished whatever campaign?

Sherriffs: I think I would. But I sure wouldn't skip him.

##

Morris: I've been quizzing you from my official Molly Sturges Tuthill list here.

Sherriffs: She's a kick. She's worth an interview herself, incidentally.

Morris: That's what we've been thinking and we've been trying to decide at what point to interview her.

Sherriffs: I can think of arguments either way.

Morris: Yes, because she is in that participant-observer kind of role which is very interesting and has certainly known the cast of characters so well over such a long period of time.

Sherriffs: And knew many of them from another perspective before she went up there, when she was with Republican Associates (which is a research organization of the Republican party) gathering all of their speeches and their this's and their that's. So she knew then when she wasn't "infatuated" [laughs] with the governor who is a true hero to her.

Morris: Well, when you have watched all these things happen, you do get very much of an interest in it.

Sherriffs: Sure.

Shall we stay another half hour or so?

Morris: Yes.

One of the interesting points from a researcher's point of view, is the use of the task forces and the bringing in of businessmen into government.

Sherriffs: Both, governor and president.

Morris: Yes, now we're trying to get a fix on his years as governor.

Sherriffs: But he clearly thought it was a help because he is doing it again.

Morris: Is it a philosophical thing or is it an administrative thing? Is there a businessman's way of dealing with the problem that is different from an academic government service person?

Sherriffs: I have never asked him. I would like to ask him where he got the idea. I don't know whose idea that was.

Morris: I was hoping you'd know because that is one of the things that I have to track down.

Sherriffs: No, I'm sorry I don't. But it is a good idea and I would say it's administrative. I would say that the fact that it's businessmen (this is my guess) would be because of his experience when he ran; the campus issue was so big and welfare was on his mind. He had always been against big government (even when he was a Democrat, strangely enough). I think he would have felt, if you were going to turn loose a thousand people or whatever the number was, who were in all those task forces, you were going to be more fact oriented and make fewer ideological mistakes as a businessman. I would guess that was true.

Morris: Because their concern is more getting out the wash, to use a businessman's phrase, than ideology?

Sherriffs: Remember I wasn't there at the beginning. When Reagan would talk to us, he would be very philosophical and very open. We'd have lunches together.

Morris: You and who?

Sherriffs: The people who worked in that little quadrangle. We would have lunch with him maybe twice a week. We'd sit and eat Colonel Sanders chicken and cole slaw salad.

Morris: In the office with your jackets off?

Sherriffs: Yes. It was always a period when he would just wax philosophical, so you got to know him pretty well. It was also a period when he would tell jokes, and you hoped he never told some of them anywhere else! [laughter] Because if you knew him well, they were fine. But if you didn't know him well--

Morris: They weren't that great?

Sherriffs: He must know 6,000,007 jokes. I never saw anybody like him. I guess those who have been entertainers have a developed memory. I can't remember a joke for two days!

Morris: From the chicken-and-pea circuit do you develop a repertoire?

Sherriffs: I know I didn't and I've been on it myself. It's interesting, when I was on my own mashed-potato circuit, my little crusade, when my little academic world was crumbling--the thing that I believed in the most and thought my own importance depended upon, I guess, was from having been associated with the university. What I found when I talked about the big picture in 1960's society, having to do with really my own field of psychology, was that the response was overwhelming and enthusiastic.

Sherriffs: It's a funny thing about business. They are hard nosed. But they are the soft touches for faddist psychology. They want to believe that there is magic. You've got to be careful that you put in all the caveats, or they're going to believe you too uncritically.

Morris: They want to believe that it's easy to understand themselves or motivations?

Sherriffs: More that there are quick ways to do so. There are Rorschach ink blot tests that can be sold to business more quickly than elsewhere for employee selection or management tuneups, or whatever. I have been a consultant to Standard Oil. I've been a consultant to Colgate Palmolive Peets. I have been a consultant to Stauffer Chemical. As individuals they are not "quick answer" people, but in role they often are.

In a cabinet meeting with the governor, you give the ramifications of bilingual education or you say why you think we should, at that time, give grants in aid to minorities and others for vocational training, in Heald Business School, for example. (I mentioned that I appealed one cabinet decision and I won on the second hearing against Finance. It was a fight of sorts).

Morris: The fight was against who?

Sherriffs: Finance didn't think \$5 million should go to that kind of vocational scholarship. I don't know that I would take the same position on the issue today. That isn't the point. The point is at the time it seemed right to do.

A problem people had with me was the stereotype, the old stereotype.

Morris: Of an "academic."

Sherriffs: Right. There must be something wrong with this guy somewhere! [laughs]

Morris: This is sort of a long term strain in American social life, isn't it, the business versus the academic?

Sherriffs: Oh, sure.

Morris: That's why it's very helpful to have your academic perceptions of those business and legal types.

Additional Comments on the Governor's Office Staff

Morris: How was Ed Meese to work with? How was Caspar Weinberger?

Sherriffs: Ed Meese was a jewel to work with. Ed Meese and Ronald Reagan delegate more widely and wisely with just the right amount of checkup than I have experienced anywhere in the academy. The academy delegates altogether and you may never find the matter again, and nothing may ever happen, or it may get into "fiefdoms," as Wilson [Riles] is wont to say.

Morris: Would they call upon you as the man with the wisdom from psychology to either expand on or discuss the social implications of some of the policies and programs that were being discussed?

Sherriffs: I would say I did have to push myself in, especially at first. It wasn't very hard for I am an extrovert.

At the beginning, I think Reagan's strategy was to be relentless in criticism of the administrations on the campuses, and when speaking to the faculty to point out that citizenship requires that when you don't agree with what is going on, you do something about it, whether it's vote or speak or whatever.

I think this is really what he was trying to do. Remember his education budgets were good. At the same time he was saying unfriendly things about the way they were behaving. It was kind of like the notion of punish the behavior, but not the child.

I think that Earl Coke, for example, who had a long history of agriculture relations with [U.C.] Davis--

Morris: --And earlier work in government.

Sherriffs: Right, but an Old Blue at heart. At heart--I actually don't know where he went to school, but it wouldn't surprise me if it was the University of California.

But at first, for people like Earl, it was hard to be hard-lined enough to satisfy them. Then before the situation had cleared up, Earl, in particular, wanted adulation of the university again. It wasn't quite yet time for that because the campuses had gone overboard to electives by then, and academic discipline had been devalued beyond belief. It was not our business to write the curriculum (we knew better than that) or to get into academic affairs in any way. But it was our business to say what their business was, that U.C. had final responsibility, constitutionally.

- Sherriffs: Hell, I've spent an hour and a half with Reagan trying to figure how we could get the California State University under the constitution too so it could be free from politics to the extent the University of California is. And that was as early as 1970.
- Morris: Was that your recommendation, or the Master Plan for Higher Education?
- Sherriffs: No, it isn't in the Master Plan for California State University. If it had been, I think we in C.S.U. would be working for it right now. But it certainly was mine [pause] and it was his. I'm not sure which one of us thought of it first. I walk a tightrope between the university being part of the public interest, and the university having to be free of the public to be a university. It is tricky and it takes a hell of a lot of understanding.
- Morris: Did you find them more efficient or able to get down to making a decision and avoiding circuitous analysis?
- Sherriffs: The cabinet people? Yes, but I'm not sure that's because they're business people. They knew one another so well they could talk telegraphically. We all could.
- Morris: A kind of a short hand develops after you've worked together for a while.
- Sherriffs: Yes, you don't have to go over the milk supports again [laughs] because you know how everybody has been on that one. So you say, "Yes, I know, but this aspect is new."
- Morris: So as time went on that speeded up the decision-making process?
- Sherriffs: Sure, sure. Five hundred bills in education a year--you don't have to wrestle with each one. When you've got the principle established that you believe in local control, for example, then you have much of your decision made on many bills. You don't even have to go to the cabinet. You just recommend "yes" or "no" and work appropriately.

Working with the Legislature

- Morris: Who particularly was helpful in the legislature on developing a position on these education bills and support as needed?
- Sherriffs: Dixon Arnett, [Robert] Monagan, [Robert] Moretti, [John] Vasconcellos after I got to know him, which was pretty late in the game.

Morris: He was difficult to get to know? He was aloof?

Sherriffs: Oh, I have to tell a story of Vasconcellos and me, but you're never going to get away to San Diego! It's delightful. I have learned to love that man. From what I heard I figured he was a hopeless "reflex" liberal. Liberal is fine; reflex isn't.

Morris: He was pretty hairy in there for a while, I understand.

Sherriffs: Until the last two years, "hairy" in the sense of wearing his hair very shaggy! [laughs] But I considered him as reflex, I admit, and I can guess what he considered me. He and I just had not met face to face until going into the fourth year.

One day his secretary called my secretary and said, "Assemblyman Vasconcellos would like to have lunch with Dr. Sherriffs." My secretary, Susie, said, "May I know the purpose?" She said, "Beats me!" [laughter] So they discussed where we should meet.

Morris: These are the two secretaries that are discussing where you should meet.

Sherriffs: I had Susie tell me carefully about the conversation because this was a big event, finally meeting the powerful John Vasconcellos.

Morris: Right, at his request.

Sherriffss: Right. So it was decided that the ceremonials, as to who went to whose office, would be resolved by the fact that mine was on the way to lunch because I was on the first floor and he was on the third. Therefore, he would come to the reception room .

Morris: That's a nice blend there.

Sherriffs: I was ready five minutes early just so there would be no "accident" of his waiting, even for one minute. Since he had done the planning I presumed he knew where we were going for lunch. I was wrong. Anyway, he came and we shook hands. It was kind of awkward.

Morris: He's a big sort of a fellow.

Sherriffs: Oh, yes, he was very large. He was a tackle in body build; not a line backer. We were going down the corridor, but progress was kind of aimless because I didn't know if we're going to go to the right at the next bend, or left, or straight ahead. Suddenly we each realized we were depending on the other to say where we were going to lunch.

Sherriffs: So we stopped in our tracks and said, "Where do we go?" The governor's office had a charge account at the Sutter Club. He said, "No, they don't have women there."

I said, "That's true." He said, "I know a good place where we can get some alfalfa sprouts and whatnot." So we marched along for about twenty-five yards with not much said. Suddenly he stopped and he said, "I've got to explain why we're having lunch." I said, "I wish you would."

He said, "I hate you." He went on, "I've never met you and I hate you, and that's wrong. I've got to find out what you're really like, so I can know if I continue to hate you or not." Just like that; just like that. Now, I'm not big enough to have done that. I have to be proud of him!

Morris: There is a report that at some point, he got involved in the study of Eastern philosophy. Was this at the period when he was going through that?

Sherriffs: Oh, I think he had always been going through that or something like it.

Morris: All right, it's in the nature of the man. It wasn't something that happened overnight.

Sherriffs: It may well have been that it had occurred to him in one of his readings somewhere that I was one of the people that he didn't like and didn't know. I don't know. But not everybody, I think, who has that experience goes out to have lunch with a person and tells him he doesn't like him and wants to know what he is like in order to test his prejudgment.

Morris: It's also good strategy I would think.

Sherriffs: It ends up that we have developed a relationship in which we'd give each other the shirts off our backs.

Morris: May I ask where you finally had lunch?

Sherriffs: Yes, at the alfalfa place. We had health food.

The Re-election Campaign, 1970

Morris: Let me ask one more general question and then I will depart.

In 1970, did you have any requests to use your understanding and observations of the world and the body politic in relation to the election? Were re-election questions involved in the cabinet?

Sherriffs: It's a very good question and I've got a very bad answer. [I can tell you] the code of the road as you might call it, and this was put upon us by the political pros. I guess regular staff are supposed to give in to the pros during campaigns, without a murmur. We were called together and we were told, "Now, for the next two months it's going to be hell because we're turning over our lives to the election people."

Morris: Was this about September or was this in June or in the spring?

Sherriffs: It probably was earlier than September.

Morris: For the primary then.

Sherriffs: Yes, the political types will remember how far ahead it was. But there almost always develop bad feelings, we were warned ahead of time, between the campaign people and the staff because the staff sees erosion of all the things they've been working to achieve.

Morris: Who gave the warning, do you remember?

Sherriffs: Ed Meese would have given part of it and then he would have turned the meeting over to election people. I'm sure that's the way it was. Ed Meese gave the beginning discussion and then one member of the partnership of Spencer and Roberts gave the second part.

Morris: So they came to a cabinet meeting?

Sherriffs: It was a meeting, anyway. It was probably a breakfast meeting. But I didn't realize how terribly real that was going to be. The campaign people had interviews with students that they put on tape for television. It was PR, I had never heard of the interviews or seen them. I found it discrediting of the sincere work I had done with students.

Morris: They went out and found other students--

Sherriffs: They did this on their absolute own. They did these things on their absolute own. Some of the people involved got a little carried away with it and didn't want to stop after the election was over.

Morris: Did they stay around and help in Sacramento?

Sherriffs: Oh yes; oh yes, indeed. But we finally got rid of them all! [laughs] But it was the worst four months I can remember except for 1964--September, October, November.

Morris: In your other incarnation?

Sherriffs: Yes, but it was just awful.

Morris: Because of the difference in approach and also the extra--

Sherriffs: That and I think it was particularly awful for me probably because we had functioned on a basis of honesty, openness, and integrity to a fault. I sure wouldn't have done it the way it was done. I think he would have gotten more votes if there had been no PR packaging of education by the professional campaigners.

Morris: Was Tom Reed one of the people who was around in Sacramento?

Sherriffs: Yes, Tom Reed was one of those that I would disagree with the most of all politicians I have met in my life.

Morris: That's interesting because wasn't he the first appointment secretary? It would have been before you got there. So he would have had some experience working in the governor's office. So he was really very much involved in the actual planning and operation in addition to being chairman. He was not a ceremonial chairman.

Sherriffs: During the campaign? That's right. I'm proud to say we're as different as night and day. [laughter]

Morris: That's interesting. It sounds like you really didn't hit it off.

Sherriffs: More than that. I think he's everything that I think that is bad about politicians and stereotypes.

Morris: You class him as a politician rather than a businessman who happens to--

Sherriffs: Oh, I don't think he's a businessman. I think he's in love with power and that's a goal in and of itself. I don't think there is an idealism about parties, ideologies, or anything.

- Morris: That's interesting. So his business responsibilities are something that fill in the space between elections rather than taking time from business to work on political matters.
- Sherriffs: I don't know. Maybe he's that way in business.
- Morris: How about Eleanor Ring [Storrs]. Did you have any contact with her?
- Sherriffs: I know her, but I don't know her. I've met her.
- Morris: Do you know where she is based?
- Sherriffs: I don't know. I didn't have much contact.
- Morris: There is a dearth of women in developing--
- Sherriffs: If I were to make a criticism, I would make that one. I think that if you interview Pat Gayman you will get that said loud and clear. She was the schedule secretary and she found herself at noon with everybody going off to lunch and forgetting she existed.

Appointment Recommendations

- Morris: How about appointments to boards and commissions and other things like that? Did you have enough contact with Tom Reed to know if there were any particular women I could track down?
- Sherriffs: I was party to getting some women appointed to things, so I personally didn't have much trouble. Where I had trouble was where there had been promises that were already made-- They'd say, "Yes, sure I'd use a good one. But there is a commitment." I can't challenge that.
- Morris: But you did succeed in having some of your recommendations--
- Sherriffs: Oh, yes, Claudia Hampton, who is black and a woman, was one of my recommendations--more than a recommendation. I took her in to the governor. She talked with the governor. He appointed her a trustee. [starts to throw paper away]
- Morris: Don't throw that in the wastebasket. I want your little sketch of the office.
- Sherriffs: Why don't I make you a good sketch because this one is really all out of proportion. [writes note to himself] "Mail a good office sketch."

Morris: Yes, I would appreciate that if you would enjoy doing it.

Sherriffs: I'd much rather do that than give you this one.

Morris: What did Claudia Hampton--

Sherriffs: She is now Chairman of the Board of Trustees [of the California state university and colleges].

Morris: And you suggested her as a trustee for the state college system?

Sherriffs: Or regent, or whatever opening came up.

Morris: You suggested her as an appointee and she ended up on the state colleges?

Sherriffs: A remarkable person. She was with the Los Angeles school system and was with the NAACP. She was part of my own "personal cabinet," my little advisory group of people when I really wanted advice on things which included the county superintendent, Dick Clowes, who is a remarkable human being, and Claudia, the superintendent of schools, Tom Goodman, in San Diego, a black teacher, and a private vocational college president. And several others at different times.

A Working Relationship with the Governor##

Sherriffs: But I was meeting with people almost all of the time, of course.

Morris: Yes, in terms of the work load it sounds like sort of non-stop meetings. How did you fit in the paperwork--

Sherriffs: I had appointments. I read, I dictated, and I flew. I was in an airplane two or three times a week and did much paperwork in my seat.

Morris: Those kinds of meetings and going out to appointments and people coming in takes a certain amount of preparation and followup. What kind of a work day does that take?

Sherriffs: Very long, very long, but when you go into a governor's office (at least, when we went into a governor's office though I think all would say the same thing), that's all you did--you worked for the man and the office. You were in the governor's office

Sherriffs: when you were flying down to give a speech, when you go back to a national governor's conference to ask them why they're giving the eighteen-year-olds the vote, when they won't let them have alcohol legally.

Morris: Did you go along to some of the governor's conferences?

Sherriffs: A couple of them. Back to the eighteen-year-old vote. Why reward idiocy? Why give the vote when they show little responsibility on the campuses? Why not give the eighteen-year-old vote when they're being calm. Giving the vote under these conditions will give them a strange notion as to why they got it. [laughs] I did not prevail, but I was applauded!

Morris: You did not support the eighteen-year-old vote?

Sherriffs: Not at that moment. America doesn't have a puberty rite and I believe it should have, but I think it should be consistent across the board--vote, drink, marry, adulthood. I don't think--

Morris: [laughs] Thank you, Dr. [Margaret] Mead!

Sherriffs: I mean it! I don't think you should have a puberty rite to entering adulthood which is the vote if the person is yet too young to be able to hold a glass in his or her hand. I think they should have them both at eighteen or both at twenty-one or both at twenty. I don't care which. It's magic. But if society hasn't made up its mind you are old enough to drink how can they say you are old enough to vote for president of the United States? I just don't understand that value system.

Morris: What did the governor think about the eighteen-year-old vote?

Sherriffs: He agreed with me; he agreed with me.

Morris: Why don't we stop there. You've given me just what I wanted, a good sense of how the office functioned and how it related to him. I really appreciate it and it's really filled me on some people that we didn't know about.

Sherriffs: I can't speak for the people there, you'll be able to interview them. But I found that when you have access to the governor at will--

Morris: Which you did have.

Sherriffs: That's right--at home on the phone or in his office. But you know the load he is carrying. Different people were different in their degree of restraint, but access wasn't misused by many of us. [pause] It was awfully nice to know you could go to his office, and it was awfully nice to try to make it so you didn't have to.

Morris: In other words, you felt your relationship was such that you understood his thinking and he trusted you so that in most things you could feel free to go ahead with?

Sherriffs: That's right, more true than anywhere I have been.

Morris: That is a good working relationship. You could call at home if need be.

What about the report that is quite current that he liked to be out of the office at five o'clock and he liked to go home and put his feet up and watch TV, and did not take work home with him?

Sherriffs: He did take work home with him. I know that is so because I put stuff in the folder that had to be ready by five too many times to believe otherwise, and it came back the next day. I've had midnight vigils with him ever present in his office as we waited for the joint conference committee to make up its mind on some thing in the budget.

As a rule, he would leave around five--that's correct--and get there around nine. But when you add the thousands of night speeches he made and television studios he had to go to, I don't think he was lazy.

I think he paced himself very, very well, and he used staff better than I've seen it done on any campus I've ever been to.

That's partly Ed Meese and it's partly him, but the two are a blend. They're an incredible blend.

Morris: A better working relationship would you say than Reagan and Clark earlier?

Sherriffs: I think better for everybody; better for the state. There was nothing wrong with the relationship between Reagan and Clark.

Morris: Yes, I wasn't suggesting that there was. I'm thinking in terms of style--

Sherriffs: But Meese is much more of a fast moving intellectual than Bill. He's the master at being able to put all the things on the table that are involved in a decision and then the governor can make up his mind, and then he would ask, "What do you think, Ed?"

Morris: Is that the way it usually worked?

Sherriffs: Yes. Ed wouldn't say, "Do this." Ed would say, "These are the pros and the cons."

Sherriffs: He'd give him [alternatives].

Morris: Do you mean in presenting what the possible outcomes of different actions--

Sherriffs: Absolutely. The mini-memo was a real challenge. If offices generally could really adopt a procedure where you have to get the essence on one piece of paper--

Morris: Some of those pieces of paper get pretty crowded.

Sherriffs: I know, and you could append evidence, but that's all right. At least you're going to condense it. But the issue is defined, the pros and cons are spelled out--and you've got to get both. Then you can give your recommendation.

It was a very exciting period.

Morris: I should think so, being right there at the node where things are happening and watching that process.

Sherriffs: Yes, it was exciting seeing that it is possible in a society like this for people to be gotten together somehow--and work in a way that is pretty selfless. There was very little advocacy for vested interests that I ever saw.

Morris: It sounds as if the people close into the office and cabinet got involved in the process, the dynamics of the process.

Sherriffs: Yes, and wanted it to work.

Morris: --And solving the problems.

Sherriffs: But you didn't need to discount much what was being said because of a person's bias--not in that group.

Morris: Not even the bias of Livermore's coming from the resources connection and their concerns were going to be different from the health and welfare concerns?

Sherriffs: He had a responsibility to represent that point of view, but it was without emotion, and without distortion, and it's an experience I have not had before or since.

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II FOCUS IN ON PUBLIC SCHOOL ISSUES

[Interview 2: June 28, 1982]##

Transition in the Department of Education: Max Rafferty to
Wilson Riles

- Sharp: I thought that we might start in a general way and talk some about your work with the Department of Education in the period 1968 through 1973. You came in in January, just after the first of the year, in 1968. I wondered how, especially in the beginning and then in 1968 through 1970, you might have worked with Max Rafferty. I thought we might start with that.
- Sherriffs: The Reagan administration had been one year in office. In a curious way I had been brought on the staff. Nobody knew really what to do with me because nobody really knew what an education secretary or advisor, specialist, or whatever--I had all the titles--really was or did. The best I could figure, the person who had been there just before me had answered the mail. I haven't ever been able to figure what else he did. [Dr. Manuel P. Servin]
- Sharp: Who was that, again?
- Sherriffs: If you hadn't asked me I could have told you.
- Sharp: We'll slip it in later.
- Sherriffs: I guess it was about the third day I was there Max Rafferty came over to pay me a visit. What he said was, "I'm in elementary and secondary education, you're in higher education. You keep out of my way and I'll keep out of yours." I think in due time we would have met head on but he wasn't there long enough, and higher education was such a preoccupation for us in the beginning that it wasn't necessary to get in his way. I didn't have time. But it was not a friendly "we" feeling kind of beginning!

Sharp: Had anybody in the governor's office given you any sort of suggestion for dealing with Dr. Rafferty as part of your on-the-spot training when you first came?

Sherriffs: Well, it was made clear--which was obvious, however, to all of us--that he was difficult, that he was rigid, prone to overstatement, simplistic, that he was further to the right than was the administration; and that I shouldn't let my behavior suggest that we were a team--it was important that Reagan's administration not be tainted too much by Rafferty.

Sharp: Did you have any sense of what Dr. Rafferty wanted to accomplish in public school education?

Sherriffs: That is hard because Rafferty was good with the words, or would give out what sounded like common sense, and he was interestingly enough, where we are today, with regard to the basics. But there was always an implication that people who differed from him were bad people, rather than people of a different point of view. He wanted to be seen often in many places. I think Max was a person whose ego was more determined by self-progress than by progress in the area in which he had responsibility.

Sharp: There has been some feeling that he was far more interested in talking with school administrators than he was with teachers.

Sherriffs: I'd be sure that was true.

Sharp: There was a contrast that people draw between Dr. Wilson Riles and Dr. Rafferty, that Riles was more teacher-oriented, perhaps because he had been a teacher himself, and seemed to have their interests more in mind.

Sherriffs: Well, Rafferty was very status-oriented and to him the administrator represented status in the community. I was awfully glad to see him go from California.

Sharp: I think a lot of people were. You must have a lot of company.

Do you have any sense of how Mr. Reagan's ideas on public school education differed from Dr. Rafferty's in this beginning period, when you were first coming in?

Sherriffs: Reagan has been consistent throughout the entire time I've known him--from the first time I met him and talked with him, until today--in believing that the more distant the control of schools, the more risky for the schools and for society; that any time you get to a situation where computers and laws, and regulators,

Sherriffs: have all the schools doing the same thing, you also make it very easy for a free society, during a lapse, to have bad things occur--too much influence from the center. So he was always for primary responsibility as close to the school as possible.

Even when we talked about Senator [John] Harmer's efforts to divide the Los Angeles school system into a number of parts he was philosophically inclined to think that was a good idea. However, since a city is a traditional "local" unit, he wasn't emotional about it. As a matter of fact, I think he finally came down on the side of leaving it alone.

Sharp: Did you come into the position of education advisor with specific ideas for public school education?

Sherriffs: For elementary school and secondary school I would say not too much consciously. As a professor on this campus--Berkeley--I sat in on, probably more than any other non-education faculty member, education oral exams, thesis reviews, and other meetings, partly because I valued education generally. Education is low man on the totem pole in the academic world and many a person would not serve on an education oral examination because it would be beneath him, which I think is a crying shame when you consider that our students are good or poor in preparation depending on how those teachers function.

It's worse than U.C., by the way, in the other four-year education system here, for sure, because many of those campuses were normal schools before. They're embarrassed by their past so they're even more brutal in ignoring their responsibilities to the departments and schools of education. Notice that Berkeley tried to get rid of theirs for a while at a time when nobody can say that we're getting very much in basic skills out of any entering student.

Sharp: In those exams, did you begin to formulate some ideas about what was right and what was wrong?

Sherriffs: At that time my idea was that there was much too much emphasis on "blue chalk 1A," as I would think of it.

Sharp: What is that?

Sherriffs: Procedures, methods. How you use a blackboard and so on. And too little emphasis on each teacher having a discipline in which he or she had a very solid foundation. The laws, while I was in Sacramento, changed, and I suspect went too far, and in part that's why we're hurting now.

Sherriffs: But that's the way with school legislation throughout our history. We swing too far to the discipline side. Then we swing too far to the methods side, never stopping in the middle as we go shooting on through. But I think our kind of society does that in many areas.

I had the feeling, partly because of being second-class citizens, that the faculties of the schools of education were preoccupied with requiring much longer theses than those written in any other field.

Sharp: To become more academic?

Sherriffs: Yes--to seem so. A typical thesis that I had to read was three hundred pages long. I swear to God that there's nothing that takes three hundred pages to say that isn't a treatise on the whole field.

Sharp: Do you have a sense of how the Department of Education changed when Dr. Riles came in?

Sherriffs: I didn't know much about the state Department of Education before I went to Sacramento, one way or another. I only had the generalizations I could make from campus experience with the Department of Education, and several other universities' departments of education, plus the experience everybody has of their children in the schools.

But by the time Riles was elected [1970] I had learned enough to know that there was very little that Max Rafferty or anybody else could do with that department. It was huge. It was tenured in, it was civil service in attitude. People were quite capable in any division of subverting whatever the leader might have wanted.

The bureaucracy was almost in charge, and it left the superintendent more or less in charge of pleasure appointments--a few of the top people--and having a leadership role through speeches and conferences, and the like, which was valuable but not enough. It was a battleship full of people there who were not about to have anything changed.

Sharp: Although with Riles, since he came in from the inside (he had been in the department about eight years or more) he may have been a little craftier about--.

Sherriffs: Well, the degree of craft--. I'm very fond of Wilson Riles and I respect him a great deal. I say that with the bias of a member of a team.

Sherriffs: The day after the election in which Riles became superintendent, Governor Reagan invited him and me to breakfast. He congratulated Wilson and said that he could count on Reagan's support--that they were each independently elected officials of all the people of the state. Reagan respected Riles's authority in his area completely. He thought two leaders, sometimes, could do better working together than apart, to feel free to talk, and that he, Reagan, was going to remove one-third of his, Riles's, staff so that Riles could think through what he wanted to do, and he would return the one-third later, and Riles could put in the people he wanted for the purposes he wanted--which was pretty good!

How well Riles was able to profit from that I'm not sure. There are a lot of old faces still around, but probably some of the old faces were quite good. It would have been a tremendous job to find something like eight hundred people, or whatever it was, in a very short period of time. But it was a good effort. It was a statement of trust and support certainly.

Freedom and Local Options for Financing Public Schools

Sharp: Dr. Riles, because of his roles previously in the department, had a predisposition towards compensatory education. He had been director of compensatory ed earlier. Did you, in this particular breakfast or early on after the election when Dr. Riles came in, talk about the thrust of public school education in terms of compensatory ed?

Sherriffs: No. The only discussion that was specific at all was that we in the governor's office wanted excellence and quality to the level of ability and motivation potential of the child. If there was something that they could do about that motivation, they ought to be doing it. If there was legislation that would help, whether it be in the area of bilingualism or wherever it might be. Reagan was at first a little two-minded about bilingualism, but nevertheless he said that he would at least take a good look.

The governor recognized that without language proficiency the child could not learn, but he was puzzled by how quickly other national or ethnic groups had learned the language of the U.S. Why not the Mexican Americans too? I don't believe we realized the numbers that were crossing the border each month. There were always many who were just becoming acquainted with English.

Sharp: Knowing, of course, that extra programs meant extra dollars that had to come from somewhere.

Sherriffs: I don't think we were thinking terribly much about dollars, especially during that conversation. It was priorities for the use of dollars. It wasn't like today where there weren't any dollars. There was a year where they had a real problem, to be sure, but I don't think we were being greedy to save money as first priority. I don't think that was very high on the list at all. It was that the money be used usefully and that people work out their priorities.

Sharp: My sense is that pretty early on the contact between Riles's office and the governor's office would have really picked up. Just about right away you have Serrano v. Priest.*

Just to give you a little chronology of that, in August of 1971 the California Supreme Court gave the decision essentially saying that the current method of public school financing was unconstitutional and gave the legislature the demand to come up with something new. Later in 1971, Riles testified before a Select Committee on School Finance that had been established to begin to deal with the whole issue. Mid-'72, discussion began on various bills. SB 90, the Dills bill, was passed and signed, I think December of '72. So you have a year and a half that all this is going on.

I wondered if you remember any sorts or discussions between Dr. Riles and yourself, going on in this period, about what was going on.

Sherriffs: I would guess I was in Riles's office, or he in mine--I'm the type that likes to move around, so I was in his more than he in mine--I'd say every other week, certainly.

When we get into finance and what to do about bringing school districts into somewhat the same resources per student, and the like, you have to recognize that the Department of Finance, though with pleasure appointments at its top echelon, is a little like the Department of Education, in that there are lots of folks there

*Serrano v. Priest was a California Supreme Court decision rendered in 1971 which declared that the current system of financing schools primarily by using property taxes was unconstitutional. Mr. John Serrano of East Los Angeles initiated the suit on behalf of his son, John Anthony Serrano, against state Treasurer Ivy Baker Priest. The decision directed the California legislature to equalize the yield from the same tax rate in the schools.

Sherriffs: with Ph.D.s, who think they know better than anybody else. As a matter of fact, there are more Ph.D.s on the staff of the legislature and the Department of Finance, and around and about, than probably on many a campus.

Sharp: Really! That's a misconception.

Sherriffs: Well, the trouble with it is--to divert just for a moment--there's a moment in history when a person gets a Ph.D. when they think they know more than anybody else.

Sharp: I know, but that moment is quickly passed. [laughter]

Sherriffs: It went right by, did it? [laughter]

But at one moment, each of us that gets a Ph.D. does know more about something than anybody else, and it's very easy for the less humble to decide that they're now experts and know more than the "uneducated lay public." The academy is a very snobbish outfit, in its relation to a free society, in regard to war, in regard to economics, in regard to whatever it be, the academy has all the answers and yet the person's Ph.D. may have been on the blight on the Irish potato.

Knocking around on a campus you discover lots of other Ph.D.s who are also a leading authority in some area of life. At least in relation to your colleagues you get into perspective. But put those Ph.D.s up in Sacramento, as chief of staff to a powerful legislator, with the professional morality of a lawyer who would work for either side for pay, and some of the damndest things happen. It's very hard to stay an idealist, unless you're a very bruised one, and work in a place like Sacramento very long.

But back to the drawing boards here. Jim [James S.] Dwight and Ken [Kenneth F.] Hall in the Department of Finance are pros on taxation and financing of institutions and the like. My role was to see that people didn't mess up policy and human values, whether they went for raising the floor in a few districts that were out of kilter, or recognizing some districts in which the income was so high as a small Sierra town that had a power plant in it. It could almost have built a swimming pool for each student.

You get into a philosophical question very quickly, as well as a legal one. The philosophical one is, as long as everybody has an amount that should be really sufficient--not eking along--what if some other community says, "But we want to do better. We want to have gifted classes, and we want to have classes for the

Sherriffs: retarded, and we want to have machines for the deaf and the blind." (This was before some of those things were required by law.)

Should they be prevented? This became the big issue. The big issue was never, "Should we raise the floor?" The issue became, "Can you tell people they can't do more?" Reagan didn't want to tell people they couldn't do more. There were those who wanted everybody to have the exact same amount. There were those that wanted to narrow the gap.

As far as I was able to understand our operations--and I wasn't being kept away from them--we were aiming for the higher floor and trying to preserve the rights of people whose schools these were to do more if they wanted.

Sharp: How did you decide that that was what you were going for?

Sherriffs: In this instance Reagan's principles were involved. He strongly believed it to be right.

Sharp: How did he get those principles of what was right, do you think?

Sherriffs: Well, we'd have to talk a lot about Ronald Reagan. Why does Ronald Reagan fight laws requiring wearing motorcycle helmets? It drives me up the wall sometimes, but he does have a principle. He thinks the state should educate you, give you the facts to know that you're a fool to ride a motorcycle without a helmet, but it should not say you can't. Reagan believes the more often the state says you can't, the sooner it may say what you can and even what you must.

I go with him part way, personally. A little illustration--the present Governor Brown, Jerry [Edmund G., Jr.] Brown, at a California State University trustees' meeting approximately half a year after he was elected announced that too many people were being trained to be teachers. There were more people being trained than there were positions.

Never mind the fact that we're in a teachers' shortage now and it's getting acute, and that looking at demographics and so forth might have told us that. That is not the issue.

I feel differently from Mr. Brown and agree with Mr. Reagan. I think people who want to be teachers should have a right to compete to be teachers. If they don't get the job, it's their right to fail--you shouldn't provide one for one.

Sherriffs: School districts who want to hire teachers should have a right to choose the best, and not have only one person who has been prepared for them. Since the teachers that we are preparing today come from the lower quartile of ability and grade point average, and in too many instances decided they were to be a teacher because they couldn't get anything else by graduation, you can imagine what the preparation of one teacher for one position would mean.

In a way I guess it's minimal government interference. I think Reagan starts with the position that the federal government was put in to provide for public safety of certain kinds--war, floods, famine, disease, and so on. That was its original purpose, and the states have the rest of the things, and got into some things they didn't belong in. I think he sees a free society as constantly in tension between keeping enough away from government so the government doesn't possess you and supporting government enough for the public safety. Also when you think of how many people are employed by government--it certainly is a swing vote in winning elections.

Now I agree with Reagan much more than I did beforehand. I was a pupil at his knee on this particular subject. All I knew when I was a Berkeley professor for twenty-three years was "keep the rascals out." But we thought we didn't have to worry much because the rascals in government gave us lots of good resources. We named a lot of buildings after them, drinking fountains after them, and they continued to give us resources (a little different than today).

Reagan has a very definite set of values. He can make a decision. He reminded me of Clark Kerr. I'm not as fond of Clark Kerr as I am of Reagan, but they at least knew what they believed. They could go into a meeting with very complex issues involved, and nine times out of ten, would be willing to make the decision at the end, instead of having to go out and think about it because they knew themselves well enough.

Sharp: Did Mr. Reagan come into the issue of what SB 90 should say, or at least what should be the answer for Serrano v. Priest?

Sherriffs: We met dozens and dozens and dozens of times. He was with us nine-tenths of the time.

Sharp: I know that Mr. [Kenneth F.] Hall was involved and Mr. [James S.] Dwight as well, but how exactly did negotiations proceed on the bill once the [Ralph C.] Dills bill was selected out as the one?

Sherriffs: The negotiations were being worked out with staff of legislators, and talking with those legislators who knew the area best. Dwight, likewise at the right moment, having Mr. Reagan call on some legislators personally. It always makes a very big difference when the governor drops in in somebody's office. He did it seldom enough so that it did have considerable symbolic meaning when he did.

People worked with people they got along with. The decisions as to what we were for were at meetings of the cabinet. There were meetings with sub-groups; but always the cabinet itself was informed where we were and how we were going.

Sharp: Was Rush Hill involved as your assistant at this point?

Sherriffs: I'm trying to remember what year Rush came aboard.

Sharp: He's there at this point, but I didn't know if he worked with you on this, or he was handling perhaps other matters, or what.

Sherriffs: Well, Rush was a generalist and wherever was the need, he would be there. This one, however, was more in the [Jim] Dwight and [Ken] Hall camp, and I was the conscience about whether kids were going to get hurt or teachers going to be frustrated.

Sharp: Did you like that role?

Sherriffs: I never loved involvement in finance very much. I was an economics A.B., but consider it a living miracle that I graduated in the field.

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Sherriffs: I take it you're asking whether I minded other people having initiative in an area of education. I didn't mind one little bit. For example, Ken Hall is today a consultant on finance to local school districts. Did I become that? No. I'm vice chancellor, academic affairs, for a university--educational policy, educational philosophy, the role of research in our society, and teaching in our society, and so forth. There are several sides to education, and there is need for a variety of experts.

I must have made two hundred speeches on one thing or another for Reagan or on personal invitation. He didn't mind what I said, as long as I was somewhat in his philosophical mold. He never saw what I said, unless I showed it to him.

No, the cutting of deals, political and financially, by and large was done by others. If the finance people trusted me--and some did--we could talk together and understand something better, fine.

- Sharp: I'm trying to figure out how close within the circle of the nitty gritty of the negotiations you might have been involved. SB 90 is selected out as this watershed bill in terms of a confrontation between the California Supreme Court and the then current methods of financing public school education.
- Sherriffs: I'd like to claim credit to be the watershed, but I really was not.
- Sharp: Did you work at all with some of the assembly or senate Education Committee members, to encourage them either one way or the other on the bill?
- Sherriffs: You have to recognize that almost daily we were relating as individuals to assemblymen and senators. Also, we had breakfast together as a staff and sometimes we had others in. We had lunch together as a staff. Usually the governor was present. We had a post-day together at seven o'clock in [Edwin] Meese's office, or [William P.] Clark's before Meese, and we shared what we thought everybody should know, whether that be amusing or interesting, or for working on a problem. I've never known before or since anything like the team work that went on.

Alternative Plans for Educating Minorities

- Sherriffs: I would admit to an element of strain between finance and me, sometimes. It would be when either their Ph.D.s would come up with a new conclusion and there had been no discussion, or there were rulings out of hand for dollar reasons. But it wasn't a "fight."
- In six years we had only a couple of emotional struggles. I had one such struggle with Ken Hall. It was probably the only thing I advocated at the cabinet, for education, and I lost and only for a day. It was to initiate a "scholarship" grant for youngsters to prepare themselves for trades.
- Sharp: Mr. Hall thought this was not worthwhile, or too expensive?
- Sherriffs: Or that it would be a terrible precedent to put that many million dollars into it. It was bad enough that Reagan multiplied the scholarship and loan commissions by over 500 percent. I think he saw this other thing beginning to grow too.
- Sharp: But you advocated it within the cabinet. You lobbied for it. You really wanted this to happen, and it didn't?

Sherriffs: There were several things. I thought we should not continue intellectual exclusiveness to such an extent that we made other people feel inferior. We would cause them to rebel. I wasn't sure whether in the long run it would work. What I was hoping was it would move us in the direction of getting better educated plumbers and carpenters, et al, who, after all, are citizens--and who vote too. Their votes count as much as yours or mine. I hoped that they would have more motivation and there would consequently be more interest in them by teachers if they were to be able to go into this particular program.

Giving people orders or dealing by fiat seldom produces anything constructive. The way you change teachers' attitudes, for example, is to make it rewarding, stylish, or seen of importance to a society, to teach a basic skill, or to get over prejudice about blacks or browns.

Part of the prejudgment is not from hostility, but from expectations based on the past. "They haven't gone to college; why should we put them in chemistry and physics now? They won't bother. I'll put them in general science." And then they can't go on to college! That goes on right now, more than it doesn't, and it was going on then, of course.

Sharp: Would you have had support for this kind of idea (scholarship for students getting involved in trade work) from Dr. Riles?

Sherriffs: Oh, yes.

Sharp: Was there ever a chance for you at some point to sit with Dr. Riles and figure out what were the best sort of ingredients for elementary school education?

Sherriffs: By all means!

Sharp: I know that he was really supportive of Early Childhood Education. That was his primary goal, I would say.

Sherriffs: Do you want me to just go on, following your subject?

Sharp: Yes. I want to get you back to talking some about Dr. Riles, and working with the Department of Education.

Sherriffs: All right. The notion of opening side doors and back doors for people--making admissions exceptions for those who are low economically and those who because of ethnic background or because they were women lacked qualifications for entrance, was all anybody could think about, or had been thought of anyway, when the civil rights movement finally affected higher education. In our state the Education Opportunity Program was advanced.

Sherriffs: When the program began there were no professionals because higher education had really paid no heed--almost no heed to minorities and professionals had not been developed. We paid a little heed at Berkeley, like going out to black ministers and saying, "Can you find some youngsters who if given a little economic and personal support, would have a chance." It was very controversial! This was earlier.

So, the state put in the EOP program. So, people who were not trained at all were put in charge of finding youngsters with potential, of matching them with some institution, of preparing the institution for them when they came, of having tutoring and other services to support them, and of finding out how to administer dollar support. It was trial and error. They discovered if they gave the money by the month too often it was spent for a television set or for a down payment on a car. The EOP administrators learned that they had to give money out a little at a time because most of these students hadn't had the experience of an allowance or of limits to live within at all. They were as anybody else would be if suddenly given a lot of money and no time perspective.

These people also had no experience or training, nor was any in-service training provided, for how to deal with a faculty that has set opinions on remedial work.

Sharp: Does this go back to what you were saying more about the built-in bureaucracy of the Department of Education?

Sherriffs: Oh, no. The education department isn't responsible in this, really. I'm coming to something.

I watched EOP in its beginnings, and I could see that some good was going to come. But I could also see that some stereotypes were going to become even firmer. Here you have people put in classes that didn't have the preparation, and the faculty will have to slow down the class. The students who are prepared will chafe at the bit because they are becoming bored. Some are saying, "It wasn't like that before those blacks were in here."

And yet, as a result of the civil rights movement, there was a strong push against tracking and, therefore, against putting those needing remediation in different classes. Something had to give. Just in the last year and a half it has been possible to institute honors programs for those that can go the fastest on a number of our campuses.

Sherriffs: Back to the matter at hand, I went to Riles and said, "You're interested in Early Childhood [Education]. So am I. Supposing I can get the governor to finance the following program. Would you believe in it, and what would you do about it? Namely, we identify as early as the second grade, youngsters--poverty, black and brown--with good potential. In each school we place them in a common home room. We will do this in a number of schools. Maybe forty to a school--twenty to forty to a school--of the highest potential. We guarantee the parents and the child that if they are prepared when they graduate from high school, they will have the money for tuition and living costs, whether they choose Stanford or San Francisco State, or a community college. Thus we work to develop a different horizon for these youngsters and their parents."

This would directly affect only a few people, but EOP was only taking care of a few people, too. The program if successful should help to smash stereotypes. Not only would it smash stereotypes, but if it worked we'd soon have to do something like it for everyone, and that would be great, because thus the schools would be improved.

Sharp: Very long range.

Sherriffs: Right. Riles was delighted, excited. He worked it out that they'd get the most popular-with-students teacher from each school to be the home room teacher. Then we'd have an education program for those particular teachers on what all this is about. We'd work it out with finance, the attorney general, and so forth, "If we did this, can we commit the state's money ahead to a program like this?" We worked out the best insurance we could for that.

Then we went to the legislature with the bill. It was smashed. It was smashed by the heaviest kind of lobbying effort by EOP directors who assumed that we were going to get rid of their jobs. It is sad, for there was plenty of room, believe me, at that stage of the game and would be for years, if not decades ahead, for both approaches. What we wanted to smash was the notion that blacks and browns are less able, and should be advised differently about their futures.

Sharp: Is that 1973?

Sherriffs: Earlier--but it went on and on. Dixon Arnett carried the bill for us. Eventually he carried his own bill after the governor was gone, and it was beaten time and again. It was beaten by EOP directors and the [California] Community College Board of Governors.

Sharp: Why?

Sherriffs: Well, I was absolutely thunderstruck at the board of governors. We'd appointed them! One of the first things I had to do in Sacramento was to be party to the appointment of the first board of governors of the community colleges. There hadn't been a central board before. I had no input into the appointing of them; that was already done. But I did chair the first meeting of this group.

The last place I expected there to be problems, somehow, was from this board. But there were some members of that board whose fantasy was to rescue somebody who was drunk and under a pool table, and to be able to point to having made his life better, and that kind of thing. They wanted tangible results for their own personal gratifications.

There's no direct credit for prevention. Also, I'm afraid, they thought they might lose some students, and they were dead right. They would have lost a lot if it worked; more better prepared high school graduates would have gone on to four year institutions. Had the program been given a try, its students would have been in college by now at least.

The legislature was an easy mark [for opposition] as long as there were people lobbying against us because, as a number of legislators have said to me, "It's a great idea, but it's long term and these people will not see that it will help them one bit getting re-elected the next time around. They want you to do high school seniors who will be able to vote while they're still in office. And as for second graders, for God's sake!"

So, it didn't have sex appeal to the legislature in general, but it was timely because affirmative action was. It was lost if people wielded the hatchet, and the community college folk and the EOP folk did just that. Now I have working for me a number of those EOP directors who did it. Something like two-thirds of people that were hired at the beginning of the EOP program with little or no training are still heads of the EOP program of the California State University campuses.

Sharp: At least they're working from some experience, finally, perhaps.

Sherriffs: Some are. But sadly most of them fight any change anywhere along their way. They know they could never get the job now without preparation. It's a matter of turf.

As a matter of fact, San Jose State tried to modify its program for the betterment of their students--instead of having peers do the tutoring, having regular professional tutors do the

Sherriffs: tutoring and contract for those services. The EOP directors came apart at the seams. They went to Sacramento. Vasconcellos led the charge even though he knows what the problems are. But he's got a new district that's full of chicanos. They put in budget language that we cannot change EOP (administratively) until 1983 or until a new study has been done on EOP, whichever is later.

Sharp: It's probably sacred until then. It's hard to touch.

Sherriffs: But it has nothing to do with the welfare of their students nor the groups--

Sharp: It didn't sound like.

Sherriffs: I believe. Anyway, I've jumped on the subject of--.

Sharp: No, that's okay. I wanted to ask you about that and it fit in anywhere, really.

Sherriffs: Wilson [Riles] and I have been able to get together on whatever it was, pretty much.

Sharp: I wondered how Mr. Reagan perceived the role of the legislature in terms of his education bills, if you could even put that into words? There is always this tension between the governor's office and the legislature. They rarely agree on everything, so there is some distance.

Sherriffs: I think Reagan changed a great deal during the time I was there. I was not there the first year nor the last year, as you know, but when I first got there, there were "good" legislators and "bad" legislators. The "good" legislators were usually Republican. But then with experience, with some very statesman-like Democrats, very thoughtful ones, and with the experience of some farout Republicans--Floyd Wakefield, [John] Schmitz, and others that embarrassed the governor by being so rabid, and believing in the two-party system, Reagan became less and less partisan. He had to make partisan noises because the right wing in California makes or breaks you.

That's a terrible thing. There are studies done that are in this library [The Bancroft Library] by a very respected professor at Berkeley which show that in California, up to the present anyway, you have to wear the clothes of a right-winger to get to be nominated by the Republican party, and you can't be elected if you are to the right--except in strange times. This is because of the small number of Republicans in California

Sherriffs: compared to Democrats and from the fee from whom the money and the work will have to come. This wasn't a study of Reagan, it was a study of the two parties. I forget who did it but it was a very telling study.

Personally, having been in both parties I tend to take neither too seriously though I'm glad they are there.

Sharp: I wanted to take you back to an earlier point in the work in the governor's office. There was a task force on education, that focused primarily on suggestions on how school districts might economize. It was started in '70 and then came out six or seven months later, in July or August of '71. I wondered if you were involved in that at all? I didn't know very much about it.

Sherriffs: Very little. That may sound unbelievable. When there's an election year, for example, the year before the governor's up for the second term, staff is essentially told, "Do your thing but don't be surprised at what's going to appear in the papers. The campaign team is going to do its thing, and it may absolutely wreck something you've been carefully working on."

Sharp: Was this one of those?

Sherriffs: I thought so, yes.

Sharp: It wasn't very well received, I know, by the school districts.

Sherriffs: If it had been me it would have started out with, "What you are doing isn't enough because communications are imperfect. You in San Bernardino should know that in Redwood City such and such is going on. Develop being a little useful to the people first, before you start worrying about the almighty buck." The last approach is to tell them how to save a dollar. It has an implication of the schools being of lower value anyway. I wouldn't have done it that way.

Sharp: I also wondered about funds coming from the federal government during this period. This was the point, from what I can tell, when there was quite a bit of availability of federal funds. It's also at this point that Caspar Weinberger becomes secretary of HEW [Health, Education and Welfare]. I wondered how California's concerns about funding were represented at the federal level? If you might have been involved in going out from Sacramento to make trips to Washington to see how California was doing in terms of funding? You had ideas for programs--

Sherriffs: It's interesting. Cap asked me about my interest in being the "E" of HEW twice. Thank God I did not chase that one.

Philosophy, again, comes into this one. Reagan was always pointing out that, "The federal government comes out here, takes our money, decides how we're going to use it, and gives it back."

Do they really know better how EOP might be improved? Is it really better to have them involved in the beginning of a program rather than having the schools themselves involved on developing the idea?

Reagan didn't think so. What he could see that was useful was that the feds had a remarkable ability to collect money through the IRS [Internal Revenue Service]. That is a very efficient outfit, relatively speaking. It was because of that that he saw the first step to a better balance to be in block grants. "They collect it so efficiently, let them collect ours too. But give it back, not telling us how to use it."

Sharp: Did you have more access to HEW and giving them some input because Mr. Weinberger was secretary? Did that help at all in working through that concern about the funding?

Sherriffs: Yes, and no. I would say that generally we were not encouraged to go to HEW. We weren't told, "No! never." You'd rather make do with what you got than go to the feds, even if the feds are friendly, and maybe especially. "Cap the Knife" was seen as trying to do something nobody else could do by really cutting down. I don't know if you've seen them but there are volumes weighing maybe--

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Sherriffs: --twenty pounds, which are descriptions of funds to apply for. I mean volumes!

Sharp: But they're tantalizing.

Sherriffs: I'd rather have an idea, then look for resources than say, "Well, the government's got money to spend; how will I get mine?" I guess that's why I'm in administration. I've often wondered, because I enjoy teaching the most, why am I in administration.

I think if I was in the research mode myself (I'm not at the moment), I would be looking at those volumes much more than if I were in the administration or teaching mode.

Sharp: I know that when I talked with Mr. Riles he mentioned that one of the main problems with the new programs that people were wanting to add in elementary education was that there were so

Sharp: many programs. The question was not the money at all, because there was at this point plenty of federal money coming into these various programs. People were applying for all sorts of programs, so that any individual school would have programs and programs piled on top of it. The major question was the coordination of using the money most wisely and not wasting it.

Sherriffs: And having some kind of evaluation so that you knew what you'd learned--having a control school that did and one that didn't that were comparable in socio-economic status of the kids, and so on. There was really much too much getting simply in order to possess.

Sharp: Was there concern in the governor's office, then, about these numerous programs that were feeding into the public schools toward a bottomless--?

Sherriffs: Yes. I have spoken to this in the past.

For two years I counted the number of bills that started on education, that somebody put in the hopper. There were 490 or something like that once, and 510 the next year. I'm fond of saying, "There are not five hundred good things you can do to education."

Since that date they have discovered "budget language," so they can also put in what they want to hamstring you without having to pass a bill. For example, by legislative mandate you can use money for remedial work for people who can't read or write, which is true of 40 percent of our entering students, providing you give them credit for graduation. If you don't give them credit for graduation you can't use the money. All of this because a legislative committee thought this was the way to go--no legislation was needed. Well, our faculty doesn't wish to give high school work and junior high work credit for graduation. I'm just saying there are more than bad bills. Just the sheer number of bills can be bad in itself.

During the period I was in Sacramento the "in" thing was to be innovative. It's now the "out" thing, but it was the "in" thing then. Something like two out of three bills would have the word "innovative" in the first page. They were often things that, in truth, were variations of things long ago thought about. They were old beans refried slightly. But the bill said "innovative." I asked one of the legislators, "This is a variation on [John] Dewey. Why do you say innovative?" And he said, "It's got a better chance to pass."

Sharp: And yet you had ideas for new things, new kinds of--

Sherriffs: Oh, there was a need for new things, but not five hundred new things. There was a need to get a variety of people together and think, and not just legislators or their staffs to get together and think. There was a need to get some thoughtful teachers, principals, counselors and Department of Education people, and together with some thoughtful discipline people.

This is what we're finally doing today. We talk about what should be the role of the school of education. How should we attract the people to go into teaching, and into teaching as it is now? If it's an inner city school the teaching is not what the new recruit thinks it is. It's a whole lot of other things too. Society has put on to schools dozens of new requirements for that captive audience. Most of them good things, but they aren't what the teacher or principal was prepared to deal with-- this is so whether we're talking about curing racial relations that the public can't do outside the school, or VD [venereal disease] education, or transportation, or nutrition, or how to fill out forms, and on and on. Interestingly enough, most schools of education in 1982 don't teach those things.

Leadership and Values

Sharp: I wondered, in your position as an advisor on education in the governor's office, if you felt that you had to provide some sort of leadership for several groups of people? Did you feel that you yourself, personally, had to provide leadership on education for the governor's office, and for Mr. Reagan, with these five hundred or more bills coming through every session? Did you feel that you had to field those and ferret them out for Mr. Reagan?

Sherriffs: Yes. But I did have help. Every bill had to go through a bill control at the governor's office. Anything in danger of passing would be called to my attention fast!

But not only that. There was also the problem of leadership in regard to what was going on. Don't forget that this was a very odd time. Nobody had had experience with whatever this disruption was that was on the campuses. People were scared. Their public sector leaders had let them down. I mean parents, I mean citizens generally, thought this was akin to revolution. The young were taking drugs. There were counterculture behaviors

Sherriffs: all around. It was very hard to understand, twice as hard to stop. In fact, I don't believe anybody or groups of anybodies did stop it. I think it burned itself out in part by finally going too far. Self-correction then set in.

Somebody had to provide leadership in Santa Barbara where citizens were in bars drinking to get their courage up and their inhibitions down to bust in with sticks on a rally that was going on on the U.C.-Santa Barbara campus. We had to save the activists from the citizens, ironically. And there was the reverse situation. The governor had run, after all (with one of his promises) to clean up the situation at [U.C.] Berkeley.

Sharp: I thought we'd talk about that this afternoon.

Sherriffs: Okay, we can. I won't get into that now. But it was a very big distraction. It felt much more than a distraction. There was a very big sore out there that needed somehow to be healed. It was a main event, one of the main events. It would get in your way, when you tried to get good people on the [U.C.] Berkeley campus together with good people in the school district, together with good people in Wilson Riles's office. When we'd have invitations to faculty to come visit us for discussion, as we often did, a number of those faculty members would ask not to have their names released because they would then be very unpopular at home.

Sharp: They wouldn't want to appear getting along with the administration?

Sherriffs: Yes. My colleague, John McKee, in psychology with whom I did research for seven years said, "You know I'd like to have lunch with you, but how could I face my colleagues in the faculty?"

Sharp: That's pretty disappointing.

Sherriffs: That was true even when I was a vice chancellor at Berkeley. It was an odd time.

Sharp: Once you get in the mode of providing leadership for certain groups that role would sort of escalate, I would think. You mentioned that it was sometimes difficult to get Department of Education people together with others, because there was political happenings at Berkeley or the other campuses that got in the way.

Sherriffs: You couldn't be the one that called for the meeting; you could try to get somebody else to call it.

Sharp: Did you find yourself providing leadership to public school administrators and public school teachers, as well, with new ideas or goals?

Sherriffs: Oh, yes. I'm not sure how much impact any of us really have in life. But we like to think we've done some good, but I really don't know how much good I did. I had a little advisory group, totally informal, which had some of the people that I had run across, thoughtful people, people with good ideas, in K-12.

Dick Clowes, county superintendent of schools, was the outstanding one of those. He'd always had a dream that we should have a non-government-related institute for superintendents and associate superintendents of schools, principals, and other administrators, who could afford to admit they didn't know all the answers, to go to in order to learn. [He thought] maybe the government could give funds to it but it shouldn't control it.

As it was, the communities wouldn't understand why their top administrators had to go off to be trained. If we had a statusy institute for new ideas and data, at which the attendees shared experiences, for example, in bringing the minorities into the mainstream and so on--. That was one sharp idea.

In this group I include Claudia Hampton, who is black and who is head of the community relations part of the Los Angeles school district's program, and who I introduced to Governor Reagan and who became a C.S.U. trustee, and is now one of my bosses.

These people both gave me information and inspiration, and I'd go over all the pending bills with them.

And I developed a relationship with the NAACP head, Virna Canson. She's a feisty tough lady, but we both had integrity, and we worked well together. There were several others.

So I heard from a variety of points of view on all bills that had a chance to make it.

Reagan trusted me. This was a heavy responsibility. You couldn't be wrong.

Sharp: Why did he trust you?

Sherriffs: He heard me on many issues; he read lots that I'd written. We had long discussions. When he'd write a speech he'd often write it at home and sometimes I'd go over it with him.

His best speeches were the ones he wrote from scratch. He might provide a skeleton outline, or you would see him and chew the fat about the subject. You would try a draft. Then he would react writing a final speech. I remember one hot day. He sat

Sherriffs: on the diving board comfortably in trunks. I sweated it out in a deck chair. We batted the breeze about where we were and what was important to talk about, important for people to think about and for him to be doing at this stage of the game, and so on. Finally he'd write a paragraph and read it to me. Not bad. Sometimes he wouldn't read for a while and I'd sit there being more and more--.

Sharp: Sweating!

Sherriffs: What I'm trying to say is, he did know me and he knew I would never burn him with bad or selfish advice if I could possibly help it. I would never consciously do something that was in my interests and not his. And I wouldn't! I'd have quit first. He also had made it abundantly clear that the day he ever caught me telling him what he wanted to hear was the day that all that stopped.

Sharp: It occurred to me that you thought similarly on many public school education issues.

Sherriffs: It's true that we both had been Democrats for many years before we became Republicans. But I had voted against him when he became governor. I was a Democrat when he appointed me, but I'd even been against him in the primary! So it took some building up of trust nonetheless. But it was easy with him. He's an intuitive--I don't know if you're familiar with Jungian terms ever but he is in their conceptualizations a "feeling intuitive." My wife too: "I don't like that person. I'll figure out later why, but I know I don't, or I do." She's right, almost 99 percent of the time.

Sharp: We haven't really mentioned this May 14, 1973 paper to the California School Boards Association that I sent you a copy of.* That talks quite a bit about values and the emphasis on grades, the emphasis on merit and discipline in learning. I wondered why those values are important, first of all?

Sherriffs: A psychologist is a terrible person to ask that question because he's going to give you an answer. I had been teaching a course of my own making here, at Berkeley, for about twenty of the twenty-three years I was on that campus. It was a course for non-majors in personality development and particular emphasis

*This is "The Public and Its Schools: Some Less Often Discussed Aspects of School Finance." See appendix for full text.

Sherriffs: on the life crises and self-identification tasks and the like, of the student age group. I did research on the material covered, added findings to my lectures, and I kept the course alive. I did a lot of reading, obviously, because this course had an average of approximately 540 students--what 2000 LSB [Life Sciences Building] held. I taught it three times a year. (It feels as though I've taught half the people in California! I keep bumping into ex-students, anyway).

During the fifties particularly the course lectures couldn't always be the same, things were changing. One way I knew things were changing was when I realized that if I said last year's things again I would be wrong. But in the fifties we had worrisome things like 2 and 3 percent of the students voting. We had incredibly outrageous behavior, for safety if nothing else, in the rooting section. There was no self-discipline. Nobody dared to speak up in relation to anybody else. It was the precursor of the sixties, with "do your own thing," and nobody has the right to judge anyone else (such "illicit judges" were symbolized as being "over thirty"). But you didn't have the right to hold anybody else to values no matter how old you were, really, in the sixties.

Anyway, I did an awful lot of thinking about what was going on. One of the things that was going on was that the mental hygiene movement, of which I'd been a part (I was a member of the Berkeley Mental Hygiene Association; I was president of the Alameda County Mental Hygiene Association), had left people, in many instances, much less well off than before they'd ever met with us. They got the notion from us that there was a right way to do things, there were wrong ways, they couldn't count on being natural about things.

The tremendous popularity of [Benjamin] Spock's book on baby and child care resulted from an attitude of "We've got to ask the experts." You've read some of my stuff about what I think happens if parents have to look up in a book to see how to behave with their children. I'd rather be wrong, personally, than stand for value impotence in my kids' eyes. We're castrated when we think, "I've got to be right before I act." At least I'd like to be a decent role model, accepting error as part of human life.

I really felt that a lot of the stuff that happened in the sixties, I still believe it today, was a result of the public's trying to absorb psychology, fascinated by it from The New Yorker to Spock, but paying a heavy price. Their children had parents who intellectualized their values rather than having

Sherriffs: them--in many too many cases; I don't care what their value is as much as that there be one. I'm not a conservative in value or a liberal in value; I'm for a value with a meaning. Kids need that in adults.

III HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE

Tuition at the University of California##

Sharp: For the rest of the afternoon I thought we'd be talking primarily about higher education. It seems, at least from what we've been talking about this morning that one of the major questions for public school education was certainly financing and the variety of programs that could be funded. I wondered how or if that carried over into higher ed concerns? The focus on funding and the focus on new programs and all the innovative programs you were talking about.

Sherriffs: I can think of several things that are related. Let's see where they lead us.

One is tuition. Before I had gotten to Sacramento the Reagan administration had taken the position that tuition was the right way to go; that California was not only the only but odd in being the state that didn't have any. It's interesting. His arguments with me in private were not because the state needed the money, but were essentially you don't value something you haven't given something to get. Now, I might have been more surprised by that argument and more doubtful about it had I not had an experience of my own which, if I may, I will tell you very briefly.

Sharp: Go ahead.

Sherriffs: I, as every other member of the Berkeley faculty--or every one I was aware of--was against tuition. It was obviously a bad idea. Nobody ever asked me why it was a bad idea, so I never had to think about it. Just everybody said it was a bad idea.

Part of the subculture of the academy at Berkeley is, "Tuition is a bad idea." People didn't talk about access, or who wouldn't get in, or would. As a matter of fact, Berkeley was an elitist

Sherriffs: school and the families of Berkeley students were of the same income distribution as were the parents at the Claremont Colleges. They could afford to pay their way. But I was against tuition, as were my colleagues.

I was invited to Canada, to Winnipeg, to discuss certain things about higher education as a faculty member and an administrator at Berkeley. This was before Sacramento. It was forty below zero, snow such as I'd never seen. But outside the campus and inside the campus were students handing out leaflets of protest. I thought to myself, wherever you go! This was after 1964. The protest was quite vigorous, but different in that it was civil. It was done with very good manners and with the effort to persuade by the arguments rather than by burning Wheeler Hall and the like.

What was the protest about? The protest literally was, "We protest this administration removing tuition without consultation of students. We have tried to explain to them that, number one, you do value more what you give something to receive. Just because California doesn't have tuition is no reason for it to be a model. Some people use parks and pay user fees for parks. We have toll roads in this part of Canada. Why shouldn't we as students pay for an education that gives us a greater income later on?"

Sharp: It strikes me as very odd.

Sherriffs: I listened to this and I said, "Which is wonderland? Where I am, or where I've been? Is this the U.S. culture that I'm contrasting with the Canadian, or is this California, or what?"

I was there for three days. I spent much more time with the students than I'd expected.

By the time I got back here I no longer thought it was a black and white issue at all. If access is protected by insuring that those who cannot afford tuition have grants, loans or whatever, then I no longer see the argument against tuition. But I had thoughtlessly held to a position for all my life, until that time--which doesn't mean that everybody else who holds to it is thoughtless. It really isn't a religious issue, and it's treated in California as though it is.

Sharp: Very much so.

Sherriffs: Tuition relates to finance nonetheless. If there was tuition the state would have less it would have to expend on higher education, even with grants in aid and waiver of fees, which fees we would waive now and would have then. That came up.

Sherriffs: The faculty work load came up, in irrational as well as rational ways. The faculty had an awful lot of salaried time, the governor thought, which members were using coaching the students in doing the protesting they were doing in the sixties.

What was happening to the classes? He had an analysis made of how many hours faculty were in class, granting it was a research institution. He got figures that were closer to six than five [hours] but they were between five and six, and he discovered that (whatever the number was then) the six, seven or eight Nobel Prize winners taught a total of four units combined a year. Yet the faculty were making the argument, "You're better teachers because you do research and good teaching is the reason we shouldn't worry about how much time the faculty spend in research."

There are really good reasons for research, like society progressing, cancer being defeated, and so forth. Obviously. But research for teaching became an emotional thing between the institutions and the governor's office.

Sharp: I know it took basically three years (and you came in halfway between those three years from 1967 through 1970) for tuition, called fees, to be accepted by the regents. Mr. Reagan started pushing it in '67 pretty quickly after he came in and it was not accomplished until '70. You're just telling me that you're one of the people who was persuaded that tuition was acceptable.

Sherriffs: Definitely, provided that no one would be kept out because of the expense.

Sharp: Tell me how Mr. Reagan went about enabling the regents to accept this tuition idea, fees idea.

Sherriffs: They never did accept the tuition idea, and haven't yet. However, many are now asking the legislature to put in tuition, for the wrong reasons I suppose, because they're trying to prevent layoffs. The student's costs aren't the issue now!

Sharp: But it certainly was some sort of conversion experience between '67 and '70 to accept the fees idea?

Sherriffs: No. The public went along with the Reagan position, especially since they were so upset by the campus unrest. The regents gave as little as they could. What they did they called "educational fees," they didn't call it tuition. They kept the fees low. They used them for support of other students and for buildings. They wouldn't use it for instruction.

Sherriffs: Philosophically I believe that it is tuition if it's used for instructional costs, and then the student has an investment in how that course is taught and is much more likely to suggest that keeping office hours is a good thought, and preparing your lectures is a good idea. If he's here for a free ride he's got less reason to argue.

Sharp: I wonder how you might have worked with Mr. Reagan to enable him to work with the regents, to get them to accept the fees idea at any level.

Sherriffs: Well, there were a number of regents who were friendly to Reagan. It wasn't that you had to start from the outside. It was important to supply statistics to those regents.

Sharp: To give them some good arguments?

Sheffiffs: To give them the facts, reporting on the situation in other states, whether enrollment had dropped there or not? Whether tuition had continued to increase and how much? Was there a tolerance limit? What states did insure access by providing grants and waivers, because that was, in part, the beginning of the Reagan statement--that he wouldn't put tuition in if those things could not be done. Generally, giving them the pros and the cons of the issue. Reagan himself would go to the meetings.

Sharp: How were those meetings for him?

Sherriffs: At the time it didn't bother me that he went. I guess because at that time the campus had nothing to gain but respect. (The public was disillusioned and wanted leadership.) I can imagine situations today where I'd wish a governor would go. But generally I wish the governors wouldn't go.

I believe, at least as much as Reagan, that politics and education should be as far apart as humanly possible. What's academic freedom meant to insure? Not tenure, but to be able to speak to what's believed true and not suffer for it. Politics endangers that.

Sharp: And yet, the regents at this point were dealing with pretty difficult issues. There wasn't anything easy that the regents or Mr. Reagan had to deal with.

Sherriffs: No, because the visible faculty were speaking things that weren't true, or were their own "truths."

Sharp: But the campuses were certainly especially polarized at this point.

Sherriffs: It was a very difficult thing. I don't know whether Reagan, if you asked him, would say he thought he brought tuition to the University of California or not.

Sharp: When I was trying to do the research to figure out when things were happening, it was still very unclear what the progress of deciding that fees would be allowable was. Even the language that people used to talk about fees and tuition is very unclear, because nobody likes to say this is the day in 1970 that--

Sherriffs: If I were to take a day it would be one day of a meeting with the board of regents. I cannot tell you the year.

Sharp: Well, tell me about the meeting. We can fit in the year.

Sherriffs: Even though the words were all couched in "this ain't tuition" terms, as I recall the meeting, the forces that had been able to hold it off before didn't that day. Even though it was not for the purposes Reagan had in mind, which was instruction costs-- in part to make the faculty more responsible, in his mind, and in part to have the students feel this was for their education, not some building or forced charity for somebody else, even though it didn't come through on principle, it did come through in a symbolic amount--thirty dollars, wasn't it, or something of that nature.

Sharp: It was pretty low.

Sherriffs: It was a breakthrough, nonetheless. A majority of the regents accepted an education fee.

Sharp: How was that majority accomplished?

Sherriffs: Partly by the appointment of new people. Partly by the wearing down--. I'm not aware of any deals like, "I'll do this if you do that." I don't know what private conversations he may have had. It's not his usual way, "You vote for my budget, I'll vote for yours."

Campus Unrest

Sherriffs: As I said very early, I don't know if anybody in this world did anything as effective in stopping [the campus unrest] as the guy who blew up the car full of dynamite that killed the graduate student studying in his office in a campus building in Wisconsin. I really believe that was the symbolic beginning of the end, because

Sherriffs: by the end of that summer the "unrest" was gone, that student symbolized to every faculty member himself. We've all been graduate students working far into the night in a campus building. (There's sort of a pride in the agony of all those extra hours we spent.) And then in this case a Wisconsin graduate student's own peers blew him into bits for an undefined cause.

A lot of people involved had authority problems of their own. After all, [Mario] Savio's speeches were set up for him by Professor John Searle and others. He'd come to Dwinelle Hall and, "Where's John? What do I do on the plaza for the next hour?" The microphones were in the history department's office. They weren't in some left bank office down on Telegraph Avenue.

As far as I'm concerned, the phenomenon of the sixties was basically a "young Turk," young faculty production. Students had their own ideas as to why they were in it. It wasn't a plan. It grew out of a whole lot of things, like oversupply of jobs. The young faculty were in a position to demand fewer teaching units. They could demand more research assistants. They could come and soon leave for a better offer. Their loyalty was not to the institution. If ever the guy on the make in business had a parallel, it was the young faculty in those days.

Sharp: Things were really changed.

Sherriffs: They have, haven't they? For both.

Sharp: There is this push to get an acceptance of fees on the part of Mr. Reagan and on the part of the public. There is also a push on the part of the Department of Finance, Verne Orr most notably, to get the university to deal more wisely with the funds that they had, become more economic, more efficient. The same sort of thrust that was part of the administration's way in dealing with the public schools, that we talked about before we broke for lunch. That task force idea.

Sherriffs: Verne Orr runs a tight ship, there's no two ways about it, wherever he is. I forget what ship he's running now, but I'm sure it's tight.

Sharp: Secretary of the air force.

What I'm asking you to do, I guess, is to put together the administration's several views. Because there were several views about how they were looking at the university as an institution. They were looking at campus unrest as more an element, but the university as an institution, it had to go on. Financing was part of it.

Sherriffs: We were in a very peculiar situation. What we wanted to do-- we didn't know it couldn't be stopped without a shock such as blowing up somebody in Wisconsin, if in fact I'm right on that. I have a couple of other symbols. Wayne State and Jackson State were both places students died. Those who died happened to be black at Jackson State and nobody knows where Jackson State is anymore, and it's never talked about. The hypocrisy of the liberal somehow came back to smite him with the blacks. The blacks pulled out of the movement pretty much. So there are a lot of little pieces in the puzzle. Again it wasn't a plot. People got into this almost like a mob situation. It's disturbing and very strange.

What one knows today is not what one knew then. One didn't know then how it was going to come out, even that it was going to come out, what would work. None of these things. All we knew was that places were being burned. Classes were being disrupted if they didn't preach some party line of the New Left, whatever it might be. [Edward] Teller's life was threatened. Wheeler Hall burned. People were dropping rocks off of stores on Telegraph Avenue on people below. People like Professor William Peterson were driven off the campus. Colleagues in his department told graduate students if they worked with him on their theses they wouldn't pass their orals, and so on. These are the facts. Marty Lipset decided that he couldn't take it any longer either.

Somehow, this has got to stop. So one thing thought about was the fearfulness of the administrators, the most glorious living example being Clark Kerr who we met this noon. When he told Chancellor Ed Strong, "You be tough and don't let them speak on Sproul Hall steps," while in the meantime he was meeting with the New Left saying, "I'll meet your five points if you'll do this and this."

Clark Kerr related to the university not as a precious institution in a free society, but took it as one position in a labor negotiation--in which he was not the president but was the negotiator, and set others up to take gas later. He still attacks Strong today! For what he told him to do! I was there and I know it. But Governor Reagan knew this and I knew this. Lots of people knew parts of it.

So, how do you ask administrators to say, "No," while being undercut? So, a lot of rhetoric was produced, and people liked each other less when it was all over.

When I was on the Berkeley campus, the campus duplicating machines were available to the New Left. They were not available to the Students for a Responsible Society and the various defense

Sherriffs: groups that formed at the same time. When some of the residence halls students and some of the Greek groups decided to come down and say, "Let go of that hostage police car," they were the ones that were turned back, while nobody dared touch the activists surrounding the car.

They should have been turned back or you'd have had a riot. But if you could turn them back, you could have turned away the four hundred people, at the most, that were ever involved, around the police car. Those statistics are accurate ones.

In any event, Reagan would work cooperatively on something and he would be let down. It was not a two-way street at all.

Heyns called--I want to be sure. We changed chancellors so fast. I believe it was Roger who called and asked for the National Guard. We'd been used so many times by then! Mr. Reagan said, "Only the sheriff can ask for the National Guard." The statement was made that, "The sheriff is with me, as is the president of the university, as is Earl Bolton, vice president of the university." I think it was Roger.

The sheriff got on the phone and the governor said, "Send up a messenger with your request. I have been told I am a militaristic son of a bitch so many times for having called the National Guard when I've been asked to, that I want it in writing. You get the National Guard when I have the letter. If you fly up here, that's fine. If you come eighty miles an hour with a police escort, that's fine, but not until you come up here." So they sent Bolton.

Bolton came up and they called the National Guard. The next day there was a telegram jointly signed by the campus chancellors to the press, protesting the arbitrary and militaristic use of troops. You know, it was very hard to love these people even if you've been one of them. Maybe especially if you've been one of them.

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Sharp: There are these other layers of activity as well--the use of the legislature for certain bills.

Sherriffs: I presume you know of what you speak. I didn't have any part of any of those bills that were to keep people who had been violent off campus. The state university trustees, because of the San Francisco State situation in the late '60s, put in a rule themselves to that effect, and asked that it be made--I don't know whether it was the Education Code or Title V, but anyway--to give it the authority of law. The trustees two months later, meeting in

Sherriffs: Sonoma--I was there--voted to remove it because of faculty pressure. In short, somebody who was kicked off the campus for cause could come right back on again, as far as they were concerned.

Ed Meese was the man in charge of how to deal legally with these problems and of police activity as well. He was deputy district attorney. As a matter of fact he tells me he met me at a meeting that was full of people, which had to do with the purging of sit-ins in Sproul Hall.

A Wider View: Legislative Bills, Visits from Campus Representatives, Interest from Congress

Sharp: I won't ask you about the negotiations for the bills, then. I'll wait to ask Mr. Meese about that. But those bills that Mr. Reagan signed, how did they represent Mr. Reagan's attitude about campus unrest?

Sherriffs: You'll have to remind me of the bills. Since I wasn't in on them I didn't study those.

Sharp: I had picked out these three that were signed in September of 1969. There was a Committee on Campus Disorders that was appointed by assembly Speaker [Robert] Monagan and headed by [Victor] Veysey, and it recommended these particular bills.

Sherriffs: Monagan's a fairly reasonable human being. So is Veysey.

Sharp: But since Mr. Reagan signed them, AB 534--

Sherriffs: I can understand that one.

Sharp: It strengthened laws against disruptions on campuses by making it a misdemeanor for persons ejected from a campus to return within seventy-two hours.

Sherriffs: You'll recall that they emptied Sproul Hall--spent all night doing so--and they were out of Santa Rita and back in front of Sproul Hall before the afternoon was even underway the next day. I'm sure that somebody observed that this is saying that there is no way to enforce anything. But I don't know. After all, they can come back in seventy-three hours, so I don't know that it does any good either. Stull is a more law and order man than Reagan is, so he may well have done that all by himself. I don't know. Somebody else would know. I don't know.

Sharp: Then the [Carlos] Moorhead bill--.*

Sherriffs: I know nothing about that.

Sharp: What I'm trying to get you to do is to tell me about Mr. Reagan, and how he tried to deal with all of this. The evidence I have is the bills that he signed. Yet what does that signing of these bills mean in terms of how Mr. Reagan felt about the whole thing?

Sherriffs: You remember the Genovese case in New York, where people watched as the woman is stabbed to death and it took three separate stabbings to kill her. Nobody carries out a citizen's role. It's hard to believe that many people didn't give a damn, but it may be. But it's more likely people are unclear what a citizen role is.

I use an example to parallel that, which you may or may not have encountered, but we sure did. On a San Mateo school ground a big kid gets a little kid on the ground and kicks at his eye for a lengthy period, and finally the eyeball rolls clear. Not one individual of eighty classmates there went for a teacher, said, "Stop," or when interviewed had guilt--they said, "I'm not my brother's keeper," in their own words.

Both of them represent a breakdown of how a free society is supposed to take care of itself. You don't have to have a policeman on every corner. You don't have a policeman on every school yard. You don't have to, as today, have every high school in Los Angeles with doors chained shut and a security guard at the front, and every teacher with a walkie-talkie to call for help.

The first step is when the citizenry itself functions, and normal expressions of praise and shame work. The second is, you go for the logical next authority, and that stops it. Then what do you do?

When a society doesn't, through their own means, cope with its problems is when the police are called. When the normal means, like you take a person down to the station house and take his prints, and say, "Look, bud. This is on your record. Don't get drunk again, and drive," or "Don't break the windows on the Berkeley campus again." That used to work, too.

*This was AB 1022 which tightened statutes prohibiting unlawful assembly by closing legal loopholes that prevented successful prosecution of militants involved in illegal demonstrations.

Sherriffs: But then, when you arrest people and they come back as soon as they get out, and do the same thing they just got arrested for doing, then you say, "Now what do we do?" It's better to tighten laws I believe than some other ways I can think of that other people have tried, such as physical confrontation, which citizens of Santa Barbara were on their way to do.

I'm sure, since Reagan believes in minimal restraint by law (and he wasn't even punitive about [John] Hinckley, personally*) that these weren't steps he took with great pleasure.

Sharp: To what extent do you think the student unrest helped to shape Reagan's ideas about education?

Sherriffs: I don't see how it can not have. I don't know how to have to be preoccupied with that many people who seem like idiots and seem to have total disrespect for truth, for other people's feelings, sensitivities, safety and so on, could not affect you. It's one reason that I had samples of faculty and random samples of students come in week after week after week to talk about many things. So, he would discover--and he was very quick to say it's some tiny minority of people, and say after that--that there were many more people on those campuses that were afraid of what was happening and didn't know what to do either. They either didn't know what to do, or they had some ready answer which wouldn't work, like the chancellor should fire someone out of hand.

We had many faculty trying to prevent the development of stereotypes. Not only for Reagan, but for his cabinet, for the legislature--

Sharp: Was there some resistance to the cabinet members meeting with these representatives from the campuses, that they didn't want to deal with them or they didn't want to talk to them somehow?

Sherriffs: Not to my knowledge.

Sharp: What sorts of questions did they have for the campus representatives?

Sherriffs: From Reagan, or from them?

Sharp: From the Reagan cabinet. What did they want to find out?

*Sherriffs refers to an assassination attempt made on President Reagan by John Hinckley, Jr., in Washington, D.C., on 30 March 1981.

Sherriffs: They didn't meet "as cabinet." As individuals they would come in from time to time. It was much better when Reagan was there, unsheltered and independent, and they knew how able he was without any help. I had to bite my tongue since I like to join in. He wasn't coached and they should know it.

I think that probably one of the first questions was, "How would you represent your campus to people who are upset, people that are uncomfortable, people that are active and inactive? What's the campus like?"

I think every campus but [U.C.] Santa Cruz was represented as a great majority being totally unstrung and not knowing what to do. Some would think, "If only the chancellor could call us together. "There're many more of us than those guys. Give us some guidance and some leadership." But chancellors and presidents were having the vapors, even heart attacks across the nation. It was--

Sharp: --a rough time.

Sherriffs: Nothing they'd been trained to deal with either. One thing Reagan learned, one thing he asked was, "What's the climate? What are the students like?"

The new left had a strike while I was on the campus. Students had to push through pickets. My classes met. Arthur Goldberg, activist leader, came around and tried to bust up my class. He was gently carried out by my students. Not roughed up, but just removed.

A lot depended on whether students knew where you were on the issues. They were a little frightened to express themselves, for faculty opinion varied a lot. I was identified because I was a vice chancellor. I didn't have to say anything.

Sharp: At one point in March of '69--this was before Berkeley really opened up and had its most severe problems of April and May--Mr. Reagan went to Washington to testify before a subcommittee on education.

Sherriffs: I did.

Sharp: Oh, you instead of Mr. Reagan went. But by this time, from what I recall, there was a lot of unrest on several of the campuses. It strikes me that it might have been embarrassing, among other things, to be coming from California and people expecting you to somehow say something to help them understand what was going on. I wondered what that experience was like.

Sherriffs: Do you have that testimony?

Sharp: No. All I have is a note that--

Sherriffs: I don't know how easy it will be for me to find it, but I didn't throw anything away. I've got one of everything, someplace.

Sharp: I have it was March 1969 that Mr. Reagan went to Washington to testify.

Sherriffs: I went to testify for Reagan. This is Edith Green's committee?

Sharp: I'm not sure. It's Subcommittee on Education from the House Committee on Education and Labor. That's what I have.

Sherriffs: That's where I went.

Sharp: I was intrigued to know what it was like to do it.

Sherriffs: Well, in the first place Cornell, Columbia, Iowa, Wisconsin, Michigan--we were far from alone. I wasn't embarrassed. It was just we had a big problem that none of us seemed to be able to solve. Edith Green, I think one of the things she was trying to figure at that particular hearing was whether federal grants should go to students or to the institution, which would be better in terms of the problems we were in, or was there any relation whatsoever. But it was the Pell grants versus her philosophy at the time. I remember [Philip] Burton came in for three minutes.

Sharp: But what did they want to know from you, besides your thoughts about the grants?

Sherriffs: What I understood of what was going on, and why. I may be surprised by my own testimony. I haven't looked at it for so long.

Sharp: We can get it out then.

Sherriffs: But I would imagine what I did was talk of the societal scene and unsure adults, spoiled faculty youngsters, and no single answer, and that it was serious.

Professor Frank Newman, then at Berkeley, by the way, came in to listen. I don't know whether he went back to Washington to listen. That's what I believed at the time, but I don't know that it's true. He didn't say hello. He didn't come up. He just sat back.

Sharp: I just have one other question on this student unrest. Then I want to take you into some other higher ed matters. I wondered if you felt at all guilty about the student unrest?

Sherriffs: Only as a psychologist. I really did think that my profession had not thought through what it was doing.

It's interesting. Spock, in his introduction, says it's less important to know what's in the following pages than to do what is right for you. What he was saying was that it's not right to spank or to not spank. It's whether you do it from hostility or from the family pattern or--. The safest thing, other things being equal, is to be yourself.

(No student ever reads an introduction unless you ask questions on a test about it. I guarantee you one in a million people who buy Spock because they're having a baby reads the introduction. One in a million. So, the disclaimer isn't there.)

What other kind of guilt might I have had?

Sharp: I don't know. But I asked that, I think, from my own generation looking upwards rather than your perspective.

Sherriffs: Well, I was embarrassed by my peers who kept pursuing their childrens' fads and fantasies, and who tried to capture their own childrens' youth for themselves. Whether it was learning the Twist [dance] or following the kids' language, or whatever it was. And making it so the poor child would really think, "My God! What's after thirty? Do I start imitating my children?"

But I, personally, don't feel guilty.

Sharp: Did Mr. Reagan, do you think, feel guilty about student unrest?

Sherriffs: I can't imagine why.

Sharp: It just struck me that since he was the governor he was in a nebulous position of having some power, and yet having no power to really work.

Sherriffs: He couldn't feel guilty about having started it, because it was underway when he got there. The thoughts that were presented in some of the campaign literature are terrible!

Sharp: The first time?

Sherriffs: When I look at how--the outsider looking in thinks that all you have to do is tell them to shape up and things are going to straighten out! But that's what people thought. So, he had a hell of a lot to learn, quick.

You know, I'm really amused. I keep thinking of Paul Haerle saying when interviewing me for education advisor: "Gee. You're over-qualified."

"Over-qualified for what? Nobody could be over-qualified for what's going on, because it was going to take a miracle to stop it."

IV NOTES ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGE SYSTEM

The Coordinating Council and Post-Secondary Education Commission

Sharp: I have a set of questions about the coordination of the state colleges and the universities, which is not really unrelated. When you met with Jim Rowland from our office you talked about the Master Plan for Higher Education.* So I thought we could move to the next step and talk about the Coordinating Council for Higher Education. Maybe you could just give me your thoughts about the coordinating council and what you envisioned that it was meant to do?

Sherriffs: I believe the coordinating council, which was a product of the master plan conferences, was to see to it that the various aspects of that master plan were carried out, and that people had a place to communicate. I'm not quite clear how much of what was expected of it was really stated in its original charge, but [also] it was to serve as a buffer between education and politics, to serve as a two-way communication, too, between government and education, which is after all an agency of government, though I hate to think of it that way.

It was doomed to a short life because it was almost entirely made up of representatives of the education institutions. Therefore, the legislature never trusted it. It was seen as an

*See Sherriffs's interview, "The University of California and the Free Speech Movement: Perspectives from a Faculty Member and Administrator," in Education Issues and Planning, 1953-1966, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1980.

Sherriffs: excuser, as a lobbyist. And the University of California paid little heed to it. Actually, the University of California usually pays little heed to anything in Sacramento because of its constitutional status.

Pretty soon the anger that would be directed at the University of California for not doing this or that, or answering this or that, showing up at this or that, came down on education's head. And thus pretty soon the target became the coordinating council. I was not part of that onslaught. I was not for getting rid of it at that time. I thought that there was nothing wrong that a different kind of leadership couldn't have cured. But Assemblyman John Vasconcellos, who wanted the legislature to have control over all of us, including the university, and Assemblyman Frank Lanterman, who wanted some control over the University of California specifically (he was carrying the burden of anger) started on a project to remove the coordinating council and substitute a new body.

I got to Reagan, and Reagan got a couple of legislators. It was decided the executive branch should have a representative, so I got in on it too. So there were three of us. My goal was to develop an agency which could provide a buffer between us (education) and the legislature, from start to finish. I did it as best I could. And the final product didn't look too bad.

Then came the day that we introduced the Post Secondary Education Commission to its members.

Sharp: When would this have been? I'm forgetting now.

Sherriffs: I'm awful on dates. Probably '72. It may even have been early '73.

Anyway, each of us showed up to give our parental advice to the people who were going to be members. My speech to them was why politics and education don't mix. Just as politicians can expect a campus not to officially take a position on a candidate or a proposition. We expect the legislature to be equally restrained in politicizing education.

Anyway, I made that speech and Vasco[ncellos] got up and said, "The people (legislature) need some control over these institutions." So the new members had mixed signals, and off they went. Since I've left Sacramento the legislature has managed to reduce the number of representatives from the education institutions by half to give themselves even more control. But they've got an awfully good director, now (after a couple of disasters). Pat Callan is a very good person. An exceptional person.

Sharp: How exactly were the coordinating council and the Post Secondary Education Commission different?

Sherriffs: The coordinating council never had teeth, really. It was us! We in higher education, at our own peril, might put in a new curriculum with which the coordinating council never agreed. There was little cost. Now, the peril is greater with appointees being some from the legislature, some from the governor, and we in education being a small part of the group. Lots worse things can happen to you than the frowns of colleagues! The roof can blow off! So, they have teeth, effectively. They also have been given assignments. Part of them were in its original charge, but they've been supplanted by laws which mandate [that] they shall annually check on affirmative action programs and report to the legislature. The educational systems do that too, but now we've got an auditor.

Sharp: Yes. So that's a real check.

Sherriffs: Ditto handicapped students, ditto this, ditto that. I think, frankly, that thus far it's done more good than harm--quite a lot. There are precedents which come back to bite us, but we've asked for them by not doing the job ourselves.

Sharp: But even in attempting this coordination of the state colleges and university, that's still sort of a major step and you're going to make mistakes--

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Sherriffs: I mentioned at lunch [today] the education roundtable. It was [David] Saxon's initiative that the heads of all the segments of higher education plus Wilson Riles and including the private sector meet periodically on the significant issues that are before us. The presence of the Post Secondary Commission almost assures that we're going to have meetings of our own and see what we can do on our own. Actually, we invite Pat Callan to those meetings. He isn't excluded. It isn't a secret business. It's just that we, on our own, can get along and touch base with each other. We haven't been willing or able to do so in the past.

Sharp: I had seen this one--I think I sent you a copy of it. It was a speech that you had given to the Constitution Revision Commission members in 1969.

Sherriffs: It's almost prophetic. I would give the same one again.

Sharp: Just re-date it. But you emphasized the need for a change in the membership of the coordinating council.

Sherriffs: Yes, but I wasn't thinking of that part of it. When I said prophetic, I was thinking about extending the term of the trustees. If one reckless governor has appointed every one of them then we're in terrible trouble. And it has happened.

Sharp: But with this other part of it you seem to be lobbying for more people from the general public, that they should--

Sherriffs: No, they were thinking, the Constitution Revision Commission was thinking of taking off the boards at that particular time all ex-officio members. So Riles would have been off, the ex-speaker [Moretti] would have been off, the governor would have been off, the lieutenant governor would have been off.

For ordinary times I'd prefer that too. The trouble is, when you construct a board for the immediate situation you're in, you sometimes make some grievous errors. I suspect that when the board's constitution was made up there was no reason any of those ex-officio cats would go to meetings, and they generally didn't.

Sharp: Sure. It's one less thing to do.

Sherriffs: But when the campuses are burning, as the phrase goes, and nobody seems to be doing anything about it, and there is anger in the community, and the community is starting to come in on the campuses, then the governor can say, "Look, I'm on this board. Give us a chance," it's quite different from saying, "I agree with you. They're all wrong." Because he does, the minute he's on the board, have some responsibilities--that you were referring to as guilt earlier.

So, in a way it can be an advantage to education at times. I think it's a miracle the public didn't do more damage to us as educational institutions than they did. I think if you'd had a governor who was saying, "Oh, this is just being kids! Sure they burn each other up every now and again. Sure they do this and that," the public would have closed the campuses down, one way or another from frustration. I know Reagan had to make more angry noises than he felt at times in order to protect the institution.

Sharp: Was this coordinating council, then, in a particularly vulnerable position because of the issue of campus unrest?

Sherriffs: I don't think it was blamed for campus unrest specifically; it just speeded up the inevitable.

Sharp: It was just the way it was constructed and what they had to do?

Sherriffs: Well, the legislature referred to it as the fox in the hen house, yet it was supposed to see that we were cost effective and not stealing each other's students. If one system goes out to recruit, it shouldn't recruit somebody that belongs elsewhere. The outreach person should tell potential students what all campuses are like and let the high school graduate choose what's best for him or her. We should recruit for each other as appropriate.

Sharp: I wondered, in your role as education advisor how, on a weekly or monthly basis, you might have worked with the council? What you were supposed to do in terms of the council.

Sherriffs: I can't even remember that I went to a coordinating council meeting.

Sharp: That's what I was wondering, too.

Sherriffs: Luncheon meetings with the leadership. Occasionally.

Sharp: Did you have certain tasks you were supposed to accomplish with respect to the council?

Sherriffs: I would meet periodically with the director [Al Knorr] over what was going on. Should scholarships be raised for students because of inflation? I have been in a couple of formal meetings with them, now I come to think of it. They were meetings where the University of California was to share information with others. Everybody else gave information but the University of California, and we couldn't do anything because we didn't have complete information. I can't remember what the subject was. But it was a common pattern.

I know that the typical coordinating council meeting was pretty much a waste of time, too. I went to all the regents' meetings, and most of the trustees' meetings. Those were useful. But I went to community college statewide meetings which were a total waste of time.

A Sidelight on U.C. Regents' Routine and Meetings

Sharp: In terms of the regents' meetings, I just wanted to get back on a note about the issue of the fees that was important between 1967 and 1970. I wondered what perspective you have now on the regents' meetings, the topics that came up and how they were handled?

Sherriffs: [pause] What I'm meditating about is that under ordinary circumstances I wish, as I have said, that governors wouldn't go to regents' meetings. I do believe that the governor, during the time of '70-'71 and before that, could not have avoided going to regents' meetings when all the campus disruptions were in Life and Time--radio, newspapers, television. A million kids in community colleges taking home school papers, 311,000 kids in my system were taking home their school papers, and 98,000 University of California students were taking home their school papers. The violence, and the "filthy speech" movement were well known. The parents were aware there were problems. I think if the governor hadn't gone to meetings they'd have thrown him out of office! They would have assumed he wasn't trying. So, in retrospect I guess he had to be there.

I suspect that he could have had better effect having regents and trustees to dinner.

Sharp: Having the regents to dinner?

Sherriffs: In small groups. You're not allowed to have an executive session if you have a quorum of the board.

Sharp: Yes.

Sherriffs: In small groups, and just chew the fat about what the hell we are facing here and what can we do about it. Whether that would have worked or not, I don't know.

He was a Republican, therefore certain people--Fred [Frederick G.] Dutton, Norton Simon, [William] Coblentz, and several others just simply had to make a partisan Democratic thing out of it. So they got all crossed up.

Sharp: What particularly did you have to do at the regents' meetings in this tough time?

Sherriffs: Observe everybody. Be informed up to the minute that I got there whether Columbia, for example, had closed or hadn't. This could have been a consideration of this meeting. Be informed by some regents who were colleagues of mine of any way that they thought the governor could be helpful--in either staying away, or in bringing up issues--such regents as Catherine Hearst or Glenn Campbell or Dean Watkins.

The problem only sometimes was whether we had enough scholarship money. It was much too much, "How are we going to get this place back to being a university again without destroying it in getting there?"

Sharp: It strikes me that you have a unique perspective on attending the regents' meetings because of your connection with the campus. Also, because of your role as education advisor, you're going to all these meetings with all these other administrators, trustees and so on from other college situations. I can't even imagine what was going through your mind, jumping back and forth from the frying pan into the fire, as it were.

Sherriffs: It was very seldom between the frying pan and the fire!

Sharp: One or the other.

Sherriffs: Nobody can be counted on for their own self-judgment, I know. But I believe most people, whether they like me or do not like me, would consider me an idealist in regard to a university--probably too much so. I really think a free society wouldn't stay free very long unless each generation could stand on the shoulders of the one that went before and see further and add to human understanding. I'm not discounting the high schools and the elementary schools in their role, but some people need to go far beyond that degree of knowledge.

For me the threat of politicizing a university or closing one, or the giving of grades for doing precinct work for the political party of the professor, are moral crimes. I may well regret having ever put it on tape, but I have got to admit that the experience of being in as many parts of higher education as I have been, and then seeing higher education in relation to the rest of education from Sacramento, has not caused me to respect the people who run higher education more than I did before, rather, considerably less.

I see more selfishness, more decisions being made about how a campus should operate for somebody's ego rather than on the basis of advancing education. I'm sorry, but I think sometimes I'm the one out of step. Apparently that's the real world. There are very few heroes, practically no statesmen, and I'm not sure if I wrote a book about higher education, who the audience would be.

Now, this situation too may be like the Free Speech Movement--one of those swings of our society. Maybe now, because there is a need, statesmen will arise and stateswomen. Maybe, after the integration of a number of our citizens who were left out before has gone a bit further, we won't be schizophrenic about quality and access (quality in the one hand and access with whatever preparation in the other) but we'll see to it that the under-represented are qualified for access, and deal with the problem where it began--in the neighborhood, in the home, in the street, and in the elementary school.

Sherriffs: But I speak like I'm speaking now because you have brought back many memories. Ordinarily in my position I'm trying to solve problems.

Sharp: Yes. On a much different level.

Glenn Dumke, Chancellor of the California State University System

Sharp: Is it at this point, when you're working with the coordinating council, that you began to work with Glenn Dumke, or had you known him before?

Sherriffs: Dumke and Harry Brakebill, who was his executive vice chancellor, came to Sacramento often. Looking back on it, the thoughtful words and the words that convinced the governor's cabinet and so forth were Harry Brakebill's. But everybody assumed that Harry Brakebill was speaking for Glenn Dumke. I did too. I assumed that Glenn liked it that way; his chief of staff made the statements and he'd pipe in once in a while. But that isn't exactly the way it turns out to be. But that isn't what you asked.

The perceptions I had of the state university and college system then was that it had lost its way less during that period than had the University of California. I suspect that also that was because the University of California and Columbia were a much bigger coup for activists than was a state college. Who would get their name in the paper and their picture on television if they closed Stanislaus State College? Stanislaus has 2,800 students; few know where it is. Now San Francisco State's better known, is a little different, and they tore it apart.

The state college people made the right noises. They voiced concern and so forth. They publicly supported the same positions we were supporting. They weren't saying, "Go to it, governor!" That would have been folly because the faculty would have all gone home. But they were, in their own way, working for the same ends. The University of California was strangely silent. So, at the time there was sort of a feeling of being allies. It isn't as simple as this I found when I took a position there at the state university and college system and found out myself what it's like.

Sharp: I wondered if Mr. Reagan and Mr. Dumke met together to talk over state college matters?

Sherriffs: Just the two?

Sharp: Yes.

Sherriffs: Doubt it.

Sharp: Was it a matter of you meeting, or how did it work?

Sherriffs: Well, on an ongoing basis I was meeting, as were people on finance, with the vice chancellor for faculty and staff affairs, vice chancellor, business affairs--. You know, chancellors often don't really know enough of the details to be of any use for detailed decisions. They have attitudes and philosophies and they either do or don't enforce them. They also have the fund-raising responsibilities and like matters.

When Dumke would meet to make a special plea for this or that, it would often be to the cabinet, he would bring Brakebill. Brakebill would do most of the talking and Glenn would say, "Right," and everybody said Glenn was great. [pause]

Sharp: I wanted to bring you up to 1973 and Dumke's assuming the position of first chancellor of the new state university system.

Sherriffs: Which I fought tooth and nail when I was in the governor's office.

Sharp: You fought--?

Sherriffs: The change of names. And I would again, too.

Sharp: Why is that?

Sherriffs: In the first place, most of the campuses are not, by any definition I've ever seen, a university. A university, in my old-fashioned way of looking at life, includes several colleges and is heavily engaged in scholarship and research. It gives the doctoral degrees. In the second place, the desire for the title university, which has swept the nation, and most campuses achieved the title--campuses that were not universities are now called universities. You have to depend on the reputation of individual institutions to know which is really one and which is not, in scholarship, Ph.D. production, and research faculty.

The state of California, in the master plan, stated that the now nineteen state college campuses could only do research on teaching or that was related to teaching. The state couldn't afford twenty-eight public institutions, all of them to turn out topnotch research. After all, something like half the budget of the University of California is in research. Try that with nineteen more. Quite consciously this was to be the institution for undergraduates and for master's degrees, for educational

Sherriffs: breadth for citizenry, for nursing, for education, for certain fields, agriculture on two campuses as so described, architecture on the same two, and so on.

This was the master plan for how the resources of California should be handled. That's when educational needs were motherhood issues. Since then motherhood issues have expanded to include energy, atom bombs, space, welfare, health, mental health, crime and the economy. They all compete and it's not easy to say who's on top at any given time, and where the public should put its resources.

In comes a legislator from San Diego, which is poetic justice, since the San Diego State faculty, many of them, had long since printed their own stationery calling their institution a university, quite against the rules of the game. So Assemblyman Barnes comes in with a proposed law. Barnes had seen Reagan before I saw Barnes, and some of the legislators that he'd gathered together were with him and they sold the fact that--

Sharp: --it was a good idea.

Sherriffs: --that San Diego deserved a "university" and that it was a good idea, and it would make them feel better, and besides, they were "already a university."

When I discovered this, I was very unhappy. I told the governor why I was unhappy. He said, "You should have seen me first." He said, "But my commitment does not say that I will work to have it happen. I just said if the bill ever came to my desk I would sign it. So your job, Alex, is to see that it never gets to my desk."

And I tried, and I tried, and I tried, every way I knew.

Sharp: Who did you have on your side?

Sherriffs: Oh, a lot of elected officials. The dictionary! [laughter] And a lot of legislators who don't happen to have a state college in their district, or maybe do happen to have a University of California campus in their district. They didn't win by much when they finally won.

I bite my tongue even today when this celebration of the anniversary of what we call the university status [comes]. I had argued, "If you're going to do it, call all nineteen of them universities. Don't pretend you can differentiate between them. That's really silly. Really, if it's a working title to

Sherriffs: make some people feel better, give it to all. But let's not pretend this one's a university and this one's a college. Harvard's quite proud to be a college, by the way. But people who sit in the shadow of the University of California are not.

Sharp: It's a very emotional, hot issue.

Sherriffs: Yes, it is.

Sharp: Except there isn't anything that I've asked you today that hasn't been a very hot issue. I struggled to find something, an un-hot issue, that was not controversial. But I didn't find anything!

Sherriffs: I've never been very uncontroversial, or in uncontroversial affairs, as far as I know.

Assisting Dumke

Sharp: What all led up then to your leaving the governor's office and going to the new state university system?

Sherriffs: About three-quarters of the way through the seventh year of an eight-year officeholder a phenomenon occurs which is known as "bailing out." The governor is by then essentially a lame duck. He's not going to accomplish great things in the time that's left. As a matter of fact, he feels a heavy responsibility not to leave unemployed people behind who he took away from some employment. So there's delight when somebody finds a job somewhere.

As we discussed in earlier parts of this interview, I had a close working relationship with Wilson Riles and high mutual respect. Wilson Riles nominated me to the board of trustees (without asking me, by the way) to fill a vacancy that was about to occur in the position of academic vice chancellor. Then I was invited to compete. I thought about that, a long time. Twenty-three years at the University of California is very hard to throw away. Six years in that governor's office, with what had gone on before on the Berkeley campus, would have made it very hard to come back. Not now, but then it would.

I'd been a Democrat all my life and I formally became a Republican. I knew my father would have been pleased, [laughter] but, sadly, he was dead. For a while changing parties bothered me some, until I really decided that though both parties are vitally necessary they are really umbrellas that are so wide, that the overlap exceeds the differences. I can't salute a political

Sherriffs: party flag for love or money. When I think back on it I'd always voted for the person, and I think one should anyhow. I'd been a worker in the Democratic Grass Roots club in Berkeley. There was some experience even in the organization which [Alan] Cranston established, which now is rigidly too liberal for me, (and for the Democratic party, too).*

##

Sherriffs: It was a very difficult decision when President Kerr got Chancellor Ed Strong fired, when [Martin] Meyerson fell on his face, and when Roger Heyns was about to come in. I was seen as "hard line" which meant I criticized the so-called student movement, with its microphones in the history department and the speeches from the philosophy department.

When I left the chancellor's office [at U.C. Berkeley], then, I became vice chair of the Berkeley Department of Psychology, and then co-chair when the department split into three parts. So I wasn't totally an outcast with my peers. However, I'd had too many people visit me in Sacramento and say, "I hate you," from Berkeley. I even stopped trying to explain that maybe at times there may be other ways of saving a place than just putting up the flag and shouting. I finally said, "Well, at least a vice chancellor position at CSU will be a new experience. Let's try for it. Besides, I might not get it." I did. It's been an interesting experience.

I thought I would probably, because of the Reagan background, have the most trouble with the faculty. The opposite was true. I am the faculty's respected administrator. I take great pride in that.

Sharp: It certainly is a large and diverse system. The campuses are so different from one another.

Sherriffs: Cal Poly at San Luis Obispo has the same distribution of grades and aptitude, and parents' income as [U.C.] Davis. One campus in the Los Angeles basin has 41 percent people who couldn't get through the admissions requirements and are in by exceptions. Forty-one percent! Those are different campuses!

*Sherriffs refers to the CDC, the California Democratic Council.

Sharp: I xeroxed out of the California Roster the trustees. This is the first set of appointed trustees and ex officio trustees.*

Sherriffs: When?

Sharp: This is '73.

I wondered if you could tell me a bit about the organizational structure that you and Mr. Dumke then had to work with in this new configuration. Just set it out.

Sherriffs: These folks?

Sharp: Yes. Who are these people?

Sherriffs: If I had ten-year moratorium on some of these remarks I'd tell you exactly who they are. I wouldn't otherwise. For instance, I persuaded the governor to agree to transfer one person from a board on which he or she served and was totally disrupting to this one. This one could absorb the person constructively. Things like that. You don't need to know all of that, I guess, but there were some efforts made to make the boards work. I don't mean work for us; I meant work.

Sharp: Together.

Sherriffs: Work together. Right.

Reagan usually went to the meetings. I'd say I briefed him or my associate briefed him about as much on the board of trustees as the board of regents. The regents were always sorry to see him come. The trustees were always glad to see him come. This was from the beginning, whether he had made any appointments or not. There were individuals who were keenly glad and keenly sorry in either case. Overall it was pretty much a welcome in one case and a contest in the other.

Sharp: Was that because with the trustees of the state college and university system there weren't as many controversies that Mr. Reagan would have to be hard about, or why?

*Appointed trustees in 1973-74 for the California State University and Colleges were Charles Luckman, Winifred H. Lancaster, Frank P. Adams, Robert F. Beaver, Mrs. C. Stewart Ritchie, Daniel H. Ridder, George D. Hart, Edward O. Lee, Gene M. Bennedetti, Roy T. Brophy, Karl L. Wente, Wendell W. Witter, William O. Weissich, Robert A. Hornby, Richard A. Garcia, and Dean S. Leshner.

Ex officio trustees were Ronald Reagan, Ed Reinecke, Bob Moretti, Wilson Riles, and Glenn Dumke.

Sherriffs: I think the reasons are three. The first one had to do with the departure of Clark Kerr. Mrs. Chandler and two other regents waited on the governor (you no doubt have this from other sources) after he was elected and said, "We are going to do something about Clark Kerr, but since you have been criticizing him in your campaign, it would look like you had too much to do with it. So we're going to postpone it 'til later. But we want you to know it's not going to be dropped."

He replied, "Ignore me. Do whatever you'd do if I wasn't there."

That's proper, but it was expensive because people still think he fired Clark Kerr. The L.A. [Los Angeles] Times has had the whole story out. You must have a copy. If not I can give you one--that told who voted how, and so on. He did not fire Clark Kerr. Clark Kerr had resigned once too many times. They took him up on this one.

But, for political reasons Chandler, and [Edward W.] Carter, and a number of other very powerful figures, kept the idea afloat that he had fired Kerr. So the faculty saw him [Reagan] right off the bat as moving in and interfering politically, moving in and changing the leader. This was the worst thing that could have happened to him. But it happened.

Secondly, the regents are to trustees what the University of California is to the state colleges. They are the bluebloods in this state. They are the people who have built opera houses and have had them named after them. The trustees are people who are striving to be those people. The [California] Community College Board of Governors have yet further to go. It's just a fact.

There is no way you could offer a regency to a trustee and not have him take it. There is no way you could offer a trusteeship to a regent and have him take it. No way!

These are people who are used to having their own way on the board of regents, used to winning. They have often found it convenient to put campus chancellors on boards of directors of corporations. That maybe isn't a conflict of interest, but it feels like one to me. There have been histories of rotation between two awesomely powerful people as head of that board. Entirely different. They're not very much impressed by governors.

Sharp: Even Mr. Reagan?

Sherriffs: At the time having been an actor, even Mr. Reagan, yes. Now I don't know what it would be, for them to deal with President Reagan.

They have put people in and put people out of office. They believe they know all the answers, and the world often acts as though they do.

Critical Issues for the System

Sharp: Beyond the creation of the state university and college configuration with Dumke at the head of it, and you slightly below, what were the hot potatoes in terms of the issues then that you had to begin to work on immediately?

Sherriffs: Oh. We're taking it into the state university and colleges now?

Sharp: Yes, very briefly.

Sherriffs: I think the biggest hot potato for me was to discover I was in a highly impersonal bureaucracy. It was really based on the federal civil service. There was no way you could give merit credit for somebody without changing the classification they were in. You couldn't simply say, "My God! This person has broken his or her neck doing a gorgeous job." Thirty years of total devotion or something. You can't do it unless you change what they do. No way! Nor, if they were lazy or incompetent, could you get rid of them, unless you developed a long, long itemized record and proved it. Tenure has nothing on civil service.

Their motivation has to be tapped in a variety of ways and according to human relations and management books. But there are few teeth to an order.

Sharp: So dealing with this huge bureaucracy when you came--

Sherriffs: It first came to me and bothered me that there was no way to promote for merit. It was seniority. There was too much of that with the faculty, too. I think that's why collective bargaining had such a much better chance there than in the University of California.

During the sixties education generally had gotten very lazy about quality. The average grade became a B rather than a C.

MEYER STATEMENT ON KERR DISMISSAL

Theodore R. Meyer, chairman of the UC Board of Regents, made this statement in Berkeley Monday concerning contradictory published reports as to whether Dr. Clark Kerr asked for a vote of confidence at the Regents meeting last Friday.

Dr. Kerr's status has been the subject of discussion and speculation for several years. His relations with the regents were adversely affected by his handling of the Berkeley campus disorders in the fall of 1964. They deteriorated further as a result of his action the following spring in announcing his intended resignation to the press without prior consultation with, or notice to, any of the regents. Some subsequent events did not improve the relationship. The resulting uncertainty and controversy have been harmful to the university in many ways.

Several regents suggested to me that Dr. Kerr's position be discussed at the regents' meeting of Dec. 6, 1966, and again at the meeting of Jan. 19-20, 1967. I took the position in discussions with these regents and with Dr. Kerr that the matter should not be brought up at this time.

Meet With Dr. Kerr

A few minutes before the convening of last Friday's regents' meeting, Mrs. Dorothy Chandler, board vice chairman, and I met with Dr. Kerr at his request.

He told us that he could not carry on effectively under existing conditions and that if the question of his continuance in office was likely to come up at any board meeting in the near future he thought the regents should face up to it and decide it now one way or the other.

We expressed our doubts as to what action the board would take and our concern as to the consequences and asked him whether he would be willing to tender his resignation. He said that he would not do so and that it was the board's responsibility to make the decision.

About noon Friday I suggested an executive session of the board with only regents present. Dr. Kerr left the meeting having previously told me that he would prefer to do this if he was to be the subject of discussion. I asked the regents whether they wished to discuss Dr. Kerr at that time and Mrs. Chandler and I informed the board of our conversation with him before the meeting, including his statement that he would not resign.

Matter Discussed

The board discussed the matter for approximately two hours, concluding by a vote of 14-8 to terminate Dr. Kerr's services as president.

A number of regents who voted with the majority expressed regret that the parting had to come in this way. At the board's direction Mrs. Chandler and I again met with Dr. Kerr, informed him of the board's action and told him of the board's hope that before it was made public he would reconsider his refusal to resign. He said that he would not do so and that the board must take the responsibility.

Mrs. Chandler and I then returned to the regents' meeting and told the board of Dr. Kerr's position. The chancellors and other university officers were then called in and informed and an announcement was made to the press.

Under these circumstances the question whether Dr. Kerr requested a "vote of confidence" or a "clarification of his status" appears to be more a question of semantics than one of substance.

No one appreciates more than I Dr. Kerr's great contributions to the university or regrets more than I the manner in which his departure had to come about.

Sherriffs: Grades, which are the coin of the academic realm, tell the person how they're doing, they are the meter readings. If I don't know if I'm doing it right, I don't know I should do it differently.

So, to excite the faculty into becoming not only better teachers, but into giving cues so students know how they can be good students, recognizing at the same time the vast range of student ability and the need to approach different students differently, with dignity at all costs, and so forth, became a very exciting challenge.

There was the initial shock of a legacy and an accepted ongoing condition of campuses driving for autonomy and the central administrator trying to grab it. Neither was right. There are some things that should be centralized; some should not. These things are matters of degree. Campuses want everything; the chancellor wants everything. That's why I'm nervous about what is going to happen and even whether I'll want to stay on.

If a new person who really doesn't know people here is going to have to count on nineteen presidents who've been "brought up" wrong, and have to guess for herself who of those are dependable--.

Sharp: Sounds very difficult.

Sherriffs: I'm not sure how she 'can do it.* If somebody could tell her who's who in the zoo, then I think she could.

*Shortly before this interview occurred, Dr. W. Ann Reynolds was selected to replace Glenn Dumke as chancellor of the system, who had retired.

V SUMMING UP

Leadership and Ronald Reagan

Sharp: Now, I have a few summing up type questions for you.

From your writings, just the few that I've been able to see, and from Mr. Reagan's speeches, which I have read quite a few of, it seems to me that leadership of the state was something that he took extremely seriously. I wondered if you could just respond to that? You've mentioned it only by implication, by his actions and how you have observed him working. But I would like you to address it.

Sherriffs: I'll take a chance on what I think your question is.

Reagan is an idealist about a free society as I'm an idealist about a university. He thinks a free society is the greatest experiment than man ever tried, and that it's fragile, and that it's a one-way street. You can't give it away and get it back. He is very much a sentimental, romantic idealist--and what he believes is real.

I don't think he ever thought he was going to be governor in his wildest dreams. But I think he intended that the freedoms of this society be at least as much there when he left office as when he got in, and preferably more, if he did his job. I don't know of a case where he didn't believe in what he was doing.

There are areas in which he didn't have a hell of a lot of experience--the environment, for some reason. I don't understand it. He loves the outdoors, rides horseback. I was also an advocate of the environment, on the side.

Sherriffs: You know, on long trips to the regents' meetings or other things, sitting in the back seat of the car, you get tired of talking about regents after a while and you start talking about other things.

[The following portion of text is under seal until June 28, 1997.]

Sherriffs: True, he got for his secretary of the environment [Norman B.] Livermore, who is a devoted environmentalist. All you have to do is ride a pack train with Ike and you know damn well the environment is going to make it if he has anything to say about it. We didn't flood Round Valley, and Reagan believed we shouldn't.

So it wasn't a closed mind. But in the experiences he'd had he just hadn't had experiences that made him as conscious about the environment as about education. Living in Los Angeles pollution, it's hard to understand. Maybe you get used to it. I haven't been there long enough yet to have had that experience. But I'm just saying he's human and he's got a few things I wish were a little different, and so many things that I'm so proud he has.

I don't think he'd had an awful lot of experience with minorities in his life, but he was a pretty quick learner in that. Just as we had visits by professors, we had ethnic groups he went out to and groups that came in, not pre-selected to be people saying those things Reagan "wanted to hear." It was the message I heard loud and clear when I first came aboard. "Tell me like it is." It's one reason I took the job. I liked what he said.

Sherriffs's Own Speechmaking and Teaching

Sharp: Also about your speechmaking. I sensed that it was something that you really liked to do. I wondered why you liked to do it?

Sherriffs: My wife will tell you I talk too much and she gets tired of the barrage, so I have to go out and tell somebody else. [laughter] I would give a great deal to teach Psych 33 again. When I was in the governor's office I taught a seminar at [U.C.] Davis. This was during the period of innovation and experimentation. For the first couple of lectures some of the faculty would come with beady

Sherriffs: eyes to see what I was doing to their children. I've never been political in the classroom, and I never will be. I will never put a bumper sticker on a car that indicates what I'm for as long as I hold a position that's related to a university. I never will!

While at Berkeley I taught a huge class, as we've mentioned. I've also taught seminars. But I actually enjoyed the big ones most. What I enjoyed about it was trying to find out how to make it feel individual and small. I did research on teaching as I was going along. For example, I took every forty-eighth student on the roll--they didn't know it--and after the first midterm--I had both objective and essay questions--I then announced that I was going to invite a number of them (I couldn't, in one semester get through all of them) in to learn more about why they were taking the class, what they hoped to get out of it, to help me as a teacher.

That was true, but it was only part of what was true. I then checked with the forty I'd chosen, after the first midterm, with the rest of the class. They were the same in performance as the others. I'd taken a representative sample. I invited them in. I spent fifty minutes with each one. We never talked about the class at all except, "Why did you take it?" No coaching. "Where did you come from?" "Why did you come to Berkeley?" "What do you want to do?" "Why do you want to do it?" "What kind of things bother you the most?" "What kind of things are you pleased with?" (I was a clinical psychologist, too.)

When they left I would, on a five-point scale, rank them for security/insecurity, which is a fairly easy one to rate. I've done a fair amount of psychotherapy in my day. Also, their ego needs for achievement (whether they were grade-oriented, excellence-oriented, and so forth). I did all this and then the class took the second midterm, and later the final. The ones that had been called in averaged a letter grade higher on the second midterm than on the first, and a letter grade higher than the class. It still showed up but less significantly on the final. The more insecure they were, the more the interview had effect. The higher achievement need they had, the less it was true.

I would share this with the classes from then on. I would say, "You see, the problem is not do I keep my office hours? The problem is whether you use them." It isn't magic. If you think somebody knows who you are, you are not going to be quite as comfortable about flunking their test. There are a lot of simple-minded explanations.

Sherriffs: I would hold discussions during ten minutes of the lectures. I would keep track of people who put up their hands. If you choose the person whose hand got up real quick, it's almost sure to be the question that a lot of others have. Those that have odd questions tend to be tentative--they go up like this [gestures by raising hand slowly into air], and you really should see them alone.

I pointed out to them, "You notice I called on so-and-so. Now fewer of you are asking questions. So I must have answered the questions of a number of you. So now we're in communication." It was exciting. They liked it and I liked it. I miss it.

And I enjoyed, as a creative thing, the governor's office very, very much.

Sharp: That really was creative, you thought?

Sherriffs: I thought so. There were so many ways things that could have gone bad during those perilous times.

Sharp: How so?

Sherriffs: Institutions of higher education could have lost all support.

Sharp: There was that much hard feelings?

Sherriffs: There were episodes on campuses in response to which we would get forty thousand pieces of mail in three days. Forty thousand pieces of mail!

Sharp: People saying, "Shut them down"?

Sherriffs: Yes, some were that. Like, when Wheeler Hall was burned, and when the activists were back on the steps.

The fact was we did have to save student meetings from citizens--mobs, really, in their mood.

It was very important that the public think somebody knew how bad it was and still hadn't panicked, who said, "No. Let's not close it."

When Reagan did close it for a short while, the hardest part was the possible symbolism making it easier to do it again.

Sharp: The precedent.

AhweeuddaL Yes. That was the main reason he didn't want to do it even though so many advised that he should.

You soon find that everybody in Sacramento is an expert on education--because they went to school. Everybody!

That's why we're in such danger of being legislated to death in this crazy milieu, because they've all been to school!

Sharp: Well, that's all the questions that I had.

Reagan and the Governor's Office Staff

Sherriffs: Got any that you wish you'd asked, or were too kind to ask?

Sharp: Let's see.

##

Sharp: I still have a question about the governor's office from all the interviewees I've had. It is about where Mr. Reagan ends and the office people begin.

Sherriffs: I think that's a brilliant observation. Reagan accepts a person, figures his limitations and, honest to God, delegates. You are Reagan, within certain limits. You rise to heights you didn't know you could rise to when somebody else's neck is on your shoulder that much.

We were together so much! I mean it. Breakfast, lunch and dinner! Every issue was wrestled with so much.

I think about Ike [Livermore]; he trusted Ike, so Ike didn't have to go back for orders all the time. We were subtly getting them anyway because we were together all the time. It's hard to get very far off base when you've seen him yesterday, or it's Monday and you saw him Friday. He wasn't an absentee governor; he was around.

The various people were doing the best they knew how. What he wanted was your expertise which he needed. He wanted it explained.

You would go to a meeting of administrators of high schools. They are curious about what the Reagan administration was saying. I didn't say, "Well, you'll have to ask him." I'd say, "I'm quite sure that what he'd say is X." Maybe that's partly what you're feeling.

Sharp: Yes, I think it is, although I think it changed. I have talked with Mr. [Vernon] Sturgeon and also with John Kehoe, and they're very different. They're very, very different.

Sherriffs: For good reason.

Sharp: Mr. Sturgeon at the beginning of the legislature-governor's office relationship, Mr. Kehoe in '70-'72. Mr. Sturgeon was '67 through '69. The role of the legislative secretary is very different in it. There are a lot of reasons for it but one of them is, it seems to me from the outside, that the decision making changed from the beginning of the administration at least through '72.

Sherriffs: I think that would be more true of legislation probably than anything. But I think we're going to get into personalities with that.

Sharp: Oh, yes. They're very different people.

Sherriffs: Some people have their own agendas first. All of us have our survival first, I guess. But some of us see nothing wrong in using a situation a little bit for ourselves. Pretty soon people learn that and go for a different kind of hold on it. How they lobby will be different. And who they lobby will be different.

The hardest position to get somebody you can count on all the way through is relations with the legislature. The name of the game is to get what you want. They're interesting. Some of them are fascinating. But what they have to do to survive.

Bill Clark was good; in fact, he was remarkable. I never would have thought of him doing what he is now doing, but on the other hand it doesn't surprise me. Meese is a genius. I expect he will die young because he does everything. He does it himself until he finally drops.

Under Clark there would be a certain style. There was more regular feedback. Meese, kind of like Reagan, figured who he could trust. He'd just say, "Come right in anytime you want, but I'm not going to look for you." I could be gone for a month. The other you checked in with every other day. Meese knew where his problems were, and that's where he'd be. Then you'd try and get through when you needed him and it was hard sometimes because he was totally busy.

Sherriffs: I think, in terms of growth, I probably didn't really grow up until Berkeley in the '60s. That disaster taught me that it wasn't a shame to have somebody not like you; that if you're anybody some people aren't going to like you. If you believe in anything some people aren't going to like you. You can be wrong in the eyes of the majority and turn out right. A nice thing. For me, I was lucky to have been in that terrible position. I never would ask for it again! I was scared at times, outraged at times, disillusioned many, many times. I was used. But I have a sense of humor about it, and I don't mean comedy. I mean, I can see that some people couldn't have been any different, even if they had tried.

Sharp: You probably didn't come by that very quickly--the sense of humor or perspective.

Sherriffs: No. There were months when I wasn't laughing much.

Sharp: Are we done?

Sherriffs: I guess so.

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APPENDIX I

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EXCERPTS OF REMARKS BY DR. ALEX C. SHERRIFFS,
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE GOVERNOR FOR EDUCATION
BEFORE MEMBERS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION
HILTON HOTEL, SAN FRANCISCO
MARCH 28, 1969

I am pleased to be one of those asked to speak with you concerning some matters regarding higher education which relate to your important mission.

I will begin by making some observations from the particular vantage point of the Executive Branch of state government. My own thinking is influenced also by over twenty-three years as a member of the University faculty, with half of those years devoted in part to University administration.

As we are all aware, considerations of constitutional revision at this time take place within a climate of crisis in higher education.

For generations, members of the academy found self-esteem and high purpose in dedication to pursuing the truth wherever the truth might lead.

Subjectivity in scholarship was highly suspect; evidence was demanded. The greatest status tended to accrue to those disciplines where objectivity was the highest.

There was pride in an educational community within which all points of view, even unpopular ones, might be heard.

The people of the state were educated to believe in the importance of these academic values. The people learned not only to tolerate, but to take pride in the open environment on the campuses. Why not? For basic cultural values of free speech, fairness, and truth were represented at the University almost in pure form. But recently, at some of our most renowned institutions, the pursuit of personal ends has been substituted by some for the pursuit of truth. There has been a silencing of moderate and conservative voices and hostile response to those who differ with the ideological posture of the day. There has been emotion and even violence where before the rule of reason held sway. Though the rupture in the fabric of academic values is the responsibility of only a minority of the faculty and on only some campuses, the general climate reflects the attitudes and the will of the day.

It cannot be surprising that many faculty members are disturbed today. It cannot be surprising that a public, which founded and generously maintained its institutions, is hurt, outraged, and now demanding.

When correction is slow or absent and excuses are quick and plentiful and when no solution is in sight, there may be a tendency for a demand for change almost for change's sake.

This is a difficult time to contemplate revision of the Constitution as it affects the University. You are to be commended on the care and thoughtfulness with which you are carrying out your most important responsibility.

In California, we have developed what has not only become a viable University over the past century, but also a University that ranks with the very best of public institutions of higher education in the world. Are changes contemplated in order to improve that situation, are they technical, or are they intended to cope with present frictions, problems, and unrest? I suggest and I hope that you agree with me that constitutional changes will do little to help cope with current problems of unrest. Rather, consideration of change is in order to ensure greatness.

There is, of course, a delicate balance of interrelated factors which determine any final effect on higher education. The modification of any one of these factors will likely influence others. I will briefly indicate our thoughts regarding certain areas which you have under consideration.

1. The Constitutional Status of Higher Education:

Not only is the history of excellence in higher education at the University a testimonial to the wisdom of establishing a Board of Regents within the Constitution, but it strongly suggests that the State College Board of Trustees should have like status. The benefits of essential autonomy and flexibility are clear, but further, as Chancellor Dumke has noted in his remarks to you, "The fact that one of California's great institutions of higher education is established in the Constitution while the other is not, implies a differentiation and inequality of dignity, stature, and equity." A constitutional definition of the state colleges might profitably indicate a primary mission as different from that of the University. The Board of Trustees has had its shakedown cruise under statute. We believe that we are ready now to give a more permanent statement of charge and authority.

2. Terms of Board Members:

We believe that the terms of the members of the Board of Regents are too long and the terms of the Board of Trustees too short and suggest that both be set at either ten or twelve years. The sixteen-year term for Regents presents two problems. Many fine citizens, thoughtful and wise, dedicated to the welfare of higher education within the values of our society are not considered for appointment to the Board of Regents solely because of age. A vigorous person in the prime of his life is often removed from consideration solely because in sixteen years he will be of an age when energies, accidents of health, and flexibility become unpredictable. It may also be true that a sixteen-year term places those representatives presumably accountable to the people in a position where even psychic accountability is absent. On the other hand, an eight-year term for the Board of Trustees makes possible the appointment of an entire Board by a two-term Governor. Despite the wisdom of a particular Governor, and even though he acts consistently to keep partisan politics out of his appointments, there can result an attitude of dependence, or even the debilitating belief that such an attitude exists.

3. Tuition:

It is clear that the cost of higher education continues to increase and it is equally clear that there are extreme difficulties in providing funds to take care of this increase. We have almost reached, if we haven't already, the end of our ability to find adequate funds without injury to other necessary state responsibilities. As it is now, primary and secondary education and other state responsibilities are suffering because of the financial needs of higher education. California has long prided itself on "tuition-free" education. The time has come, however, when we must join other states of the Union in finding some of the source for finance from those who profit most by the higher education provided and by those whose life incomes are so improved because of it.

4. Ex officio Members of the Boards:

In a body established to represent the public interest and which was intended to remain free from partisan political influence, the reasons for having a large majority of the members protected by long appointments is clear. The need for a means for responsible expression of immediate public concern is likewise clear. And especially is this true when the structure of the Board includes the President of the

University as an ex officio voting member of the Board with all the resources of his staff at his disposal. The Board has the important responsibility to represent the interests of the public who founded and maintain the institution and at the same time to understand and to work for the best interest of the University so that it can be the institution that the public desires. Usually these ends are one and the same and there is no conflict.

I suggest that if the body politic did not have representatives on the Board of Regents directly responsible to it, the public response would have been more impatient, more from frustration, and considerably more devastating than it has been during the past five years.

5. Coordinating Council for Higher Education:

There is a certain lack of coordination of higher education in the State of California. There has been increasing concern regarding the Master Plan, and the Coordinating Council itself. There is a growing belief that the Coordinating Council, which is charged with the responsibility for planning the orderly growth of higher education in California, has not been as effective in its advisory role as it should be--this in good part because its membership of eighteen includes only six representing the general public while twelve represent institutions of higher education. The Council is, by its makeup, and notwithstanding the sincerity, the maturity, and the responsibility of the persons who represent segmental interests, prevented from taking strong positions in the public interest on such matters as duplication of high cost programs, proliferation of programs, and the like. Though the Coordinating Council is not a constitutional body (and as it is presently constructed I would not suggest that it be so included), the strength of that Council and its ability to provide an independent audit has bearing on determination of other issues before your commission.

6. Political Influence:

All of us value a considerable autonomy for higher education. There are those who ask for a strengthening specifically of the stricture against outside political influence. We should be clear on two matters:

a. While there is agreement that partisan political influence on the University would be destructive and counter to maintaining a quality institution, we should recognize a vital difference between partisan political influence and appropriate expressions of concern by the body politic about their institutions. We should note that a Governor who represented, in relation to a University, a single political party would constitute a negative influence. However, a Governor who represented all the people of the state is simply meeting his responsibility to the society whose institution the University is.

b. Current problems in the relationship of the public to the University did not come about because of "whatever social, economic, or political philosophy is fashionable " as someone has suggested. Rather, political and coercive actions on the campus and by members of the campus, to achieve political objectives, exploiting the facilities and resources of the public (including wages and tuition-free education), aroused the public. The public is reacting to attempts to distort and disrupt its institutions, and society.

Again, I suggest that if the public had no immediately accountable representatives, their response would be heightened by frustration and anger.

I suggest, then, that partisan political involvement of the institution by its administration, faculty, or students should be avoided as much as should outside partisan interference.

The long-standing Regulation 5 of the University of California anticipated clearly the relationship between partisan activity within the University and public response:

"The University of California is the creature of the State and its loyalty to the State will never waver. It will not aid nor will it condone actions contrary to the laws of the State. Its high function and its high privilege, the University will steadily continue to fulfill, serving the people by providing facilities for investigation and teaching free from domination by parties, sects, or selfish interests. The University expects the State, in return, and to its own great gain, to protect this indispensable freedom, a freedom like the freedom of the press, that is the heritage and the right of a free people."

I thank you for this opportunity to share our views. We will be happy to answer questions at any time that your commission shall desire.



APPENDIX II

THE PUBLIC AND ITS SCHOOLS:
SOME LESS OFTEN DISCUSSED
ASPECTS OF SCHOOL FINANCE

by

Dr. Alex C. Sherriffs
Education Advisor to
Governor Ronald Reagan

May 14, 1973

THE PUBLIC AND ITS SCHOOLS:
SOME LESS OFTEN DISCUSSED
ASPECTS OF SCHOOL FINANCE

I am a psychologist. I am an educator. I have been a university administrator. And I am now an executive. From my experience in these four roles, I believe that the often referred to "financial crisis in education" is much more complex than matching dollars to demands.

There has been a financial crisis in education--in some districts, at some times, and for a variety of reasons.. The crisis has not always been simply a matter of lack of public dollars nor has it always been just an excuse used by embattled educators to explain the confidence gap in which some of them find themselves. It is many things, and I intend to speak little about budgeting, optimum dollars for ADA, or even the horror stories of some truly suffering school districts. Others have done this often and well. What I wish to do is share a perspective as to why we are where we are today, and just where that is.

First, I would note that there is much talk these days about innovation--especially in education. Even the word "innovation" is an innovation of sorts. During the past five years, a substantial proportion of legislative bills affecting education in California have included "innovative" or "experimental" in their language. There seems to be little relationship between use of these terms and the newness of the idea. One legislator explained that bills described as "innovative" or "experimental" are more likely to pass!

Further evidence of the pressure to change in recent years is found in an annual average of nearly 500 education bills before the Legislature in California. I would observe, parenthetically, that regardless of the present state of education and regardless of society's preoccupation with change, there simply are not 500 good things that can be done to or for education--not in one year, and probably not even in a hundred years. I can't avoid observing that it is not only University faculty members who subject themselves to the principle of "publish or perish"--legislators do so as well.

But the tide of change rolls on. Why is it that we hear so much today about vouchers, performance contracting, early childhood education, even earlier childhood education, a variety of year-round operation schemes, open classrooms, open campuses, merit systems, and challenge examinations? A number of these individual proposals have promise, that is true. But what does it mean that there are so many before us at this time? Why the preoccupation now?

There are many arguments for and against each of the new ideas suggested. However, I believe that primarily we are considering them for reasons other than merit. I will mention some of these reasons; combined, they add up to an expression of a general discontent with where we are now...they are part of a general demand for change.

1) Quite directly related to financial issues, we should note that for many of the nation's schools, there have been

fewer dollars than district officials believed were needed. Money has been tight, inflation scary. For some time now, citizens have been concerned about their own livelihoods. It is also true that even where there have been dollars, they have been badly distributed between districts, between schools, and, in some cases, even between programs within individual schools. We need only note the traditional underfinancing of vocational and career education courses, staff, and programs.

And there is strong and new competition for our tax dollars for programs of high human value--for health, for the aged, for public safety, for protection of the environment, for eradication of pollution, and on, and on.

2) There also are many other factors, factors which affect confidence in and support for education. They relate to the financial status of our schools just as surely as does the state of the economy. For example, today many of us are confused about our society and culture, about the relationship between generations, about the true implications of freedom, and about the role of values for the individual and the role of values as the cultural glue which holds society together. This confusion, however, has been most acute in the "intellectual community" and among those of the teaching profession. The general public maintains more confidence in our traditions and is less prone to the roles of cynic and critic. It feels less confused and has open concern about a number of new attitudes and programs in education's approach to today's challenges.

3) Also related has been the understandable uncertainty of school personnel about just how to cope with today's new dilemmas and new and abrasive rhetoric. Many who operate our schools and classrooms have lost confidence in themselves and in their goals. When the experts are uneasy, the public which depends upon them senses this and becomes uneasy in turn.

There are many tensions within the schools and within the public which result from the increasing number of assignments to the schools of responsibilities not previously theirs. Almost without warning, the schools have found themselves responsible for nutrition, health, and the resolution of problems of drugs and venereal disease. Schools have also become the central arena for working through society's difficulties in regard to race relations. Often the schools have not been prepared, nor have they had time to become prepared, to deal with these matters. The ideological differences in these areas within the population as a whole carry deep emotion. The schools are often caught in the middle. They not only have problems to solve, but the public they are established to serve is divided both as to goals and as to means.

4) Adding to the challenge and the tensions, our schools are being asked, at last, to educate segments of our population which have, for the most part, been neglected. Ethnic and economic groups which in the past have been deprived motivationally and educationally are represented in our classrooms today to a degree not true before. Because of lack of training

and experience, many teachers, no matter how well meaning, are unprepared to teach a number of the students who are in their classrooms.

5) Even in regard to perhaps the most fundamental challenge of a free society--how to ensure freedom for the individual without his freedom impinging on the freedom of others--a few of today's high school teachers and college faculty are confused. Clearly, for there to be freedom, there must be restraint. Self-restraint is preferred and is implied by the word "responsibility". Of all the professions in our society, we most need teachers who are thoughtful and mature in regard to the fundamental base of a free society.

6) The desired and legitimate goals of equal opportunity and equal dignity too often, in the minds of the simplistic and shallow, become synonymous with homogenization, egalitarianism, and a fear of merit. We note widespread pressures to change grading procedures, always in the direction of removing standards and challenges: "A, B, C, D, but let's not have F's", "pass/fail", and then, later, "let's remove fail". Some have even gone so far as to substitute credit/no credit, with "no credit" a choice for the student to make up to the last day of the course. We hear less these days of the value of reward in learning, the importance of grades to the student as "meter readings" to help him know how he is doing, and we forget the personal satisfaction of a job well done.

On the basis of a pseudo-egalitarianism, groupings according to learning readiness of students have been abandoned in

many districts. There is a widespread attack on aptitude and intelligence testing as education aids. This has often resulted in increased boredom on the part of the most ready and increased frustration and loss of self-esteem on the part of the least. The result is general dissatisfaction, lack of eagerness and excitement, educational mediocrity, and another step toward homogenization.

7) By no means is all criticism of our public and private schools fair. Primary and secondary education have suffered in esteem as a result of "guilt by association" with the antics of universities and colleges during the '60s. When any part of education acts or speaks, all are seen as somewhat responsible. Also, the verbalizations which for ten years have come from the universities and colleges about youth, its relationships to adults, and its relationships to cultural values, have been off-base, dogmatic, arrogant, and glib. They are just now being discredited from both within and outside the institution.

It will be hard to forget that highly verbal faculty members lectured to the world about a "new breed" of undergraduates described as instant adults, wise and compassionate. Parents and more objective observers, however, found youngsters needing to go through the normal storm and stress of adolescence, as always--their growth made much more difficult by the popularized and erroneous conceptions of them, conceptions more satisfying to the fantasy lives of sociologists than to the adolescents themselves. In January of 1970, I summarized the research on youth as follows:

Though better trained intellectually, they are found on the average these days to be more isolated as individuals and more lonely. Their friendships are shorter in duration and more superficial in nature. David Riesman reports finding that, during the past ten years, youth on the average has fewer friends each year. They lack the experiences to mature socially and emotionally as rapidly as generations did before.

Researchers also describe youth as including individuals more prone to avoid risk, to fear error, to be less capable of postponing gratifications, and less able to tolerate probabilities and shades of gray, and more demanding of absolutes (with anything less than absolute considered as hypocrisy).

Investigators generally agree that youth as a group is having problems with authority, and, as one of the investigators noted, how could it be otherwise when they have had so very little experience with it. Too many parents act with permissiveness not born of a theory of child rearing, but rather as a response to uncertainty and fearfulness in their own roles as adults.

On college campuses, there was preoccupation among deans and younger faculty with a "generation gap" for which parents and other adults were supposed to accept blame and to feel guilt. Teachers-in-training in graduate schools were affected by the prevailing belief systems around them.

On closer examination, the generation gap turned out to be, in fact, an old human condition--adolescence. And adolescence, we know, is a necessary experience for all children on their way to individuality, independence, and maturity. Misled by these emotionally based interpretations of adolescence and unaware of current responsible research, many parents (and other adults, too) became permissive out of uncertainty. Uneasy about their roles as parents, many developed a pattern of emulating their young. The resulting aping of adolescents' dress, hair styles, and language by their parents and other elders did not "close"

the generation gap--it created embarrassment and contempt in youth for those older than themselves and, in some, a fear of growing up.

From within higher education, the public also heard about a new and prevailing "morality" among youth. The belief was carried to the point of advocacy. Yet as late as 1970, we find no evidence in research of a marked change in the fundamental sexual behaviors of youth--only in preoccupation with and in conversation about the subject.

The myths came from those who were expected to provide the truth. Few thoughtful citizens now can believe that youth's behavior will continue on in the past cultural tradition for, on all sides, representatives of society have been acting as though things are (and should be) vastly different. Misinforming our young and verbally seducing them to new behaviors should not be the way to obtain whatever changes should occur--if, as a society, we could agree on those changes.

8) Another important factor affecting the impulse to change and the readiness to provide dollars has been a strong element of disillusionment with education within the public. I think "disillusionment" is the correct word...there has been more than simple anger, disappointment, or fear. To understand we have only to remind ourselves that the teaching profession has long been one of our society's most highly valued professions. Even the feelings of parents toward teachers have been quite personal. Historically, teachers have almost been members of the family and, as happens to other family members, they have been

taken for granted. We were late in providing appropriate salaries, we imposed standards on them which really were not our privilege to impose--standards about dress, the right to marry, the right to become pregnant, the right to attend or not attend church. Teachers were so much part of the family that we forgot some of their needs and private rights, and we forgot to raise their allowances to meet their growing legitimate needs. In the past few decades, however, most of these things have largely been corrected, and correction came about in such a way that the quite personal feelings of affection and respect toward the teaching profession remained.

The present movement toward collective bargaining, complete with compulsory arbitration and the right to strike, is an effort to wrest away the public's authority to make its own educational policy decisions. This movement has gone a long way toward depersonalizing and cooling society's relationship with educators who in the past have carried such a large responsibility for continuing our culture. It is hard for the public to accept behaviors by teacher organizations which are self-serving, power-seeking, and demanding of an ever-increasing percentage of education dollars for salaries--at the expense of programs for students. The people of a free society know it is they, through their elected representatives, who must determine the purpose and policies of the school. Tests of the authority of the people in our democracy through predictable confrontations are with us now, and will be with us for at least the next decade.

9) Another factor causing disaffection with the present

status of public education is the growing belief that schools should prepare children and youth for the world of work and for self-sufficiency. In most districts across the land, children are taught as though the only goal is entrance into college. The schools' success or failure is measured by the students' progress toward higher education. Nonetheless, large proportions of our children choose not to go on to college or are, for whatever reason, unable to go. Our schools have done little to prepare them for any alternative. At the heart of our problem is status: there is less prestige in preparing for work; there is less prestige for teachers who teach vocational education courses; and there is less prestige for institutions with vocational orientation. Representatives of business and industry and representatives of local, state, and federal government are speaking with increasing conviction in favor of preparation for entry to the world of work. With notable exceptions, such as the Los Angeles City Schools in California, those in education are lagging behind and resisting change.

10) In recent decades, federal and state governments increasingly have interfered with community control of our schools. Mandated programs by the score have reduced the ability of local school boards to make decisions on priorities. Just last year in California, it was necessary to pass legislation at the state level in order for a group of youngsters and their teacher to travel out of state, though the trip had been approved by the local board and local officials. As the ability to make important decisions is reduced, the percentage of citizens

involving themselves in school board elections or in attending school board meetings reduces also. Further, those who do vote or who attend meetings are less generally representative.

I have mentioned ten things which relate to the public's attitudes toward schools and their willingness to tax themselves for the support of those schools. I believe that these factors are of greater significance in the turnout for school elections and in the outcome of those elections than are traditionally considered factors such as financing formulae, the degree of reliance on the property tax, or even the extent of inflation.

I would like to talk about some of the things that we might do for our schools, or which our schools might do for themselves, which would improve their position in the public eye and their access to the public purse. First, however, I should state that it is my belief that on the whole the public is ambivalent about the schools--not for them, not against them, but filled with mixed feelings. The public doesn't know, by and large, whether our schools are doing better in 1973 than in 1963, or whether they are doing worse. I have observed speakers stand before groups and lacerate public education. They have referred to our schools as failures and worse, and the speakers have received standing ovations. I have also observed speakers before similar groups singing the praises of the schools, pointing to the difficulties the schools have had to overcome and to the remarkable success they have had in overcoming them. These speakers have also received standing ovations.

Let me make a small case for our schools: we hear often

that youth is better prepared--for college--than ever before. Many of us know firsthand that our own children find themselves bored during their first year of college because they are not challenged--largely because they have had the same subject matter in high school. Perhaps the result of an experiment at San Francisco State University should not surprise us: entering freshmen were allowed to take by examination those courses normally given during the freshman year. This was a common-sense experiment; students who could pass a course by examination before taking the course would receive credit and be allowed to engage in some other learning experience. Eight hundred and seventy-three took the examinations--331, or 38% of them, passed the examinations in every course and thus were able to begin college as sophomores; only 51 individuals failed to get credit for at least one course. Although this was an isolated experiment, these figures argue against the proposition that our high schools have failed, at least insofar as teaching specific subject matter is concerned.

If education is to be returned to its position of high esteem, there are some areas to which a number of us--educators particularly--should turn our attention. I will indicate some of these briefly. I am sure we could develop each of them at some length.

- 1) We must work quickly and energetically to return a maximum amount of authority to the local districts. Decisions should be made wherever possible by those representatives of the people known to them and accessible to them.

2) We must see to it that our schools satisfy both vocational and academic needs. Perhaps the best way to overcome the status problems attached to vocational education is to see to it that our schools prepare each child--whether going on to college or not--for entry into some kind of work upon graduation from high school.

3) Conditions must allow for the highest quality of teaching. This is more than a trite statement. In many states, promotion and continuation of teachers depend very little upon merit. We are fortunate that the kinds of people who have chosen the teaching profession have included so many who are dedicated, creative, and responsible. Nonetheless, because of tenure, it is very difficult--sometimes impossible--to remove a teacher who falls below a reasonable standard. An average teacher in most districts cannot be replaced by a higher quality teacher applying for the job. We all know of individual teachers who have lost their zest for teaching or who even have developed aberrations of some sort. Yet the incredible hassle required to bring about a change causes most school principals to move a problem teacher or promote him to a less visible position--or, worse, do nothing at all.

Now that we face collective bargaining, with its demands that all of a given rank be treated alike, ignoring ability and quality of performance, we can no longer shrug off the occasional poor teacher. Unless we can find a way to deal with the problems created by the current demands by teachers' unions, there is only one way for the quality of our public schools to go--down.

4) In a number of states, including California, our schools have ignored the plight of pupils who speak limited or no English. In a number of schools with a sizeable percentage of foreign language-speaking children, there is no adult that speaks that language. Ignoring the necessity for effective bilingual education creates tensions--personal and between groups, it affects the entire social and learning climate within a school, and it is not hard to correct if only we will.

5) Much of the development of our physical plant and our patterns of hiring personnel have been based on the assumption of a population explosion. We are now more than a decade into the birth dearth, with the significant drop in school-age youngsters now into the seventh grade. Thoughtful planning and creative use of our progressively less crowded and sometimes emptying facilities is very much in order.

6) Too much effort to solve problems or to meet challenges is taking place at the level of distant government. The nation's teacher training institutions have largely been silent and seem caught in their traditional ways. Today, there is a great need and a unique opportunity for these institutions to reevaluate their roles and to provide greater and more creative leadership.

7) Nationwide, the responsibilities of school administrators have changed dramatically from one year to the next. Almost no one has been trained specifically for the job that he finds before him. In California, creative people of goodwill within the education establishment and within government have been working together to develop a model for professional development of

administrators--a continuing education program from which they can, while on their jobs, be brought up to date on such matters as working with children from a variety of ethnic groups, bilingual education, collective bargaining, and even coping with violence.

I have described a number of factors which enter into determining the public's attitudes and confidence in its schools. The readiness and appropriateness of financial response is much entwined with such factors. I have suggested a few of the constructive things which could improve performance and confidence. Now, in closing, I return to my initial point--"the often referred to 'financial crisis in education' is much more complex than matching dollars to demands."

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Government History Documentation Project
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era

John Tooker

DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH,
AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT,
1967-1974

An Interview Conducted by
Malca Chall
in 1982

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INTERVIEW HISTORY

For seven of the eight years that Ronald Reagan was governor of California, John S. Tooker was a member, often close to the top, of the governor's administrative team. Tooker began his government service in 1968 in the Resources Agency as special assistant to the administrator, Norman (Ike) Livermore, working primarily as legislative coordinator for thirteen units in that agency. In 1971 he was tapped to be the first director of the Office of Planning and Research, established by the legislature, in 1970, to be the state's planning arm in the governor's office. Two years later he was appointed the governor's legislative secretary, in which post he remained until the end of the Reagan term in 1974.

What makes this account particularly significant is that Tooker spent five of those seven years dealing with that highly complex and persistent issue, broadly subsumed under the heading environmental quality. Those were years when Californians, regardless of party affiliation, focused major attention on air and water pollution, and on conservation of San Francisco Bay, of the coastline, of wild rivers, of farmlands, and of forests. Those were years when regional governance and local boundary revisions were also priority items in debates on environmental protection.

Control of pollution and conserving the state's natural resources brought forth a spate of special legislation requiring guidelines, land-use planning policies, and ultimately, regulations. These were Tooker's areas of concern from 1968 until 1971 when as legislative secretary, he turned his attention to all legislation.

Tooker came to the Reagan administration with a background in practical agriculture, and encountered both resistance to a farmer heading a planning office and apprehension about what the Office of Planning and Research was trying to do. In a three-hour interview in June 1982, at the conference table of his consulting office in Sacramento, he reflected easily on the difficulty of implementing new ideas in government, often chuckling at the ironies he had observed. In the process, he provides a pragmatic look at how environmental planning moved, and could be expected to move, notwithstanding who was governor. His recollections of the differing points of view on environmental goals and guidelines, eventually enacted as the California Environmental Quality Act (1970), and ill-fated administration efforts to reorganize local government provide a good look at Governor Reagan and his cabinet in operation.

A lightly edited transcript of the interview was sent to Tooker for review. It was mislaid in his office for a few months, but was returned with only minor revisions. He did delete a few passages about subjects on which he preferred not to speak for the record.

Malca Chall
Interviewer-Editor

June 1984

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

(Please print or write clearly)

Your full name John Sparr Tooker

Date of birth October 9, 1924 Place of birth Alameda, California

Father's full name Joseph Enas Tooker

Birthplace San Francisco, CA.

Occupation Chief Clerk - Pacific Fruit Express

Mother's full name Esther Anna Sparr Tooker Donovan

Birthplace San Francisco, California

Occupation Homemaker

Where did you grow up ? Oakland - Bay Area

Present community Fair Oaks - Alameda County

Education K-12 - Oakland Public Schools; Graduate of Oakland

Technical H.S.; 1½ yrs. U.C. Berkeley; 3½ yrs. U.C. Davis; M.S. Degree
in Animal Science.

Occupation(s) Management levels on poultry ranches in No. Calif.;

Sales representative - animal feed supplements; Legislative and

planning positions - Calif. State Gov't.; presently Lobbyist with

George R. Steffes, Inc.

Special interests or activities 1. Sports - Football, Basketball, etc.

2. Education; U. of Cal.; Little League Coach

I THE BACKGROUND

[Date of Interview: June 4, 1982]##

Chall: What I wanted to know first of all were the steps that led to your interest in the environment and in planning--in terms of education and other influences like people, or politics, or your social life. Whatever influenced you to get into this field?

Tooker: Oh, boy!

Chall: Just briefly, but I do want to know what they were.

Tooker: Okay, my educational background, I'm a native Californian and am very proud of that fact. I am a fourth generation native Californian. In fact, I have relatives who were born here before this was a state. My great grandfather was born in California in 1832. I am a graduate of the UC [University of California] system. I am a graduate of UC-Davis with a degree in animal husbandry, animal science. Actually, my major was poultry husbandry--avian science, as they call it now. They have gotten more sophisticated over there.

Chall: Where did you grow up, in what part of California?

Tooker: I grew up in the East Bay--in East Oakland in the Oakland hills. In fact, when I grew up in the Oakland hills, we had neighbors that had both cows and horses. Of course, now it is wall-to-wall houses. My playground during World War II was what is now Mountain View Cemetery and an adjacent quarry. It is the quarry that they took the fill for part of Treasure Island from. So because of my firsthand experiences as a youngster growing up, I got to see a little bit about planning and what happens when you do or don't. Urban sprawl, I learned about it real quick.

##This symbol indicates that a tape or a segment of a tape has begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 77.

Tooker: We had very close friends that had property in Walnut Creek and we used to go out and spend a lot of time out there and go to the creamery, and suddenly it was wall-to-wall houses instead of walnut trees. My parents--my mother now--still lives in Walnut Creek.

So I saw what happened to the East Bay and what happened to California. My parents had some very close friends that have family ranches in Siskiyou County in the extreme northern part of the state. My father, who worked for forty-five years for the Southern Pacific, made the comment before he died that the first time they took me on the train I was so small they put me in the little hamper you used to put shoes in in a Pullman, if you remember those.

Chall: Yes, I do.

Education and Early Career in Agriculture

Tooker: We would take a train from Oakland, either the Sixteenth Street station or sometimes we would take it at Berkeley when we moved up in the Oakland hills (it was closer), and go up to either Dunsmuir or Montague when the train ran to Montague. I would spend my summers on the ranch up there. So with that kind of exposure I announced at a very early age I wanted to be a farmer or a rancher.

I raise those two points because I was raised in an urban atmosphere in Oakland attending Montclair Grammar School and Oakland Technical High School. I spent a year and a half at Berkeley, took my first real ag course at Berkeley, believe it or not. I took a poultry husbandry course from Dr. Grau at Berkeley. That is when they had twenty thousand chickens up behind the Memorial Coliseum there. They're all gone, I understand, now. In fact, I think there were more than twenty thousand. They were doing a lot of poultry work up there at that time. The poultry department was still at Berkeley and in the mid-fifties, it moved to Davis.

With summers' exposure to the livestock industry, I had an interest. I started out wanting to be a veterinarian and the second round of grades quickly showed me in college that I wasn't going to have the grades to get into veterinary school. So I decided that I was going to do something in agriculture, but I didn't know what. Of course, I had no land base, so I was going to have to work for somebody.

To cut through all that, my father had a heart attack. I was about to quit school and go to work when this poultry operation, Kimber Farms, volunteered, if I would change my degree to poultry to assist me financially in getting through school. They were great about doing this. I finally graduated from Davis.

Chall: What year?

Tooker: Actually, I graduated in January of '57. When I changed majors, I had to go back and pick up some courses. Unfortunately, Davis was small enough then that they weren't always offered when you wanted them, so I had to wait and take four units one year. [laughs] Actually, I had to take sixteen to stay out of the draft at that point!

Chall: Oh, yes, the Korean War.

Tooker: But during the middle of that, it was the fall semester of '56, I was approached by a friend whose family had a ranch out of Placerville. He had recently become married. His father had been in the poultry business for about twenty years and was tired and wanted to retire, and Jim wanted to take over the ranch. His father had gotten rid of all of the chickens, and they wanted somebody whom they felt was responsible to come up there and actually run the poultry operation in conjunction with his dad because his parents wanted to spend time away. Also I looked after my friend's teenage brother when his folks were away--making sure he got to school, and that he milked the cow. It was fun and, again, from the urban atmosphere, living on a ranch about twelve miles outside of Placerville--actually, I was very close to Coloma--just south of Lotus. It was very interesting and a lot of fun. I enjoyed that.

I had firsthand experience about ranching then because I was it; I was responsible for ten thousand laying hens and we had about a hundred and ten or twelve sheep. He had, I think, about eight or ten hereford cows. It was really good.

From there, after about eight months on that ranch, I went into the army and the ag background persevered there, too, because when I was at Ford Ord and they were processing me out, they were going to make me a glorified infantryman until they discovered that with my glasses, they were afraid I might shoot the wrong side, particularly if I ever lost them! So they were trying to figure out what to do with me and this sergeant, looking through my papers, said, "What is this animal science degree that you have?" I said, "It's poultry." He said, "They are small animals?" I said, "Yes, they are small animals." He said, "Good, we'll make you a dog handler."

I got up to Fort Lewis, Washington, and about thirty days before they were deactivating their dog platoon, I met a colonel and he said, "Why in the world"--he didn't quite say it that way--but "why did they ever send you up here?" I went through this story and he said, "Poultry? Then you know about eggs." I said, "Yes, I know a little bit about eggs." Because Kimber Farms had been involved with my

Tooker: education, I was leaning in the poultry towards breeding and incubation because that was where I knew I probably was going to be working for them managing their multiplication flocks and doing genetic research.

Suddenly I found myself on a bus on my way to the Vancouver barracks, which is right outside of Portland, in a very small unit there. I was candling eggs and going through poultry processing plants and going through meat packing plants. I was an assistant beef grader and I worked on the kill floor and in other places in the Armour plant and in the Swift & Company plant in North Portland for about eight months, I guess.

Chall: Is that because they wanted to insure the quality of the food that was going to the army?

Tooker: At that time, the army was the lead agency for the military in purchasing food items. The Department of Defense has taken all that over now and I believe they have civilian personnel doing it. But we would do the purchasing and we graded our own meat. It was interesting, the Safeway meat buyers would follow us through. We would be in there at 5:30 in the morning when we had contracts; buying.

Technically, I was a witness because I was learning. What the army did at that point, when they found somebody with some kind of background like I had or fellows who had graduated in food science, sometimes--if you'd sign up for extra years, like a career, or a minimum of three to five years--they would send you to a school. But if you were only a draftee like I was, they wouldn't send you to school. It was too expensive. They would just capitalize on the training we had gotten on our own and then give us OJT, on the job training. So I spent a lot of mornings in a cooler in these meat packing plants with this master sergeant. He literally had to go through and tell me how you grade animals and then we would do it, so I never did it on my own. He was always there or the major would come in if the sergeant was sick or was out. But they wanted a third party there in case we would get into disagreements as to "this should be choice" or "this should be prime." They wanted a third person and so I was it.

So it was really great. I really enjoyed it. We wore civilian clothes half the time. It wasn't like being in the military. But again, the ag background, and I got to see a lot of the Northwest. Then I went from there up to Seattle.

I got out of the army, went to work for Kimber Farms. That was in '59 and to make a long story short, to jump through a number of years, I stayed in agriculture. But by 1962, I had been a traveling salesman and I had recently been married and I was getting tired of

Tooker: traveling through southern California, Arizona, and that area. I had just come out of the Pacific Northwest where I had three states. I worked out of an office in San Jose, but my territory started in Marysville and I had Oregon, Washington, and Idaho. I'd get home every third week for about four days, do paper work, and then go back on the road. I was getting tired of traveling and I was kind of disenchanted with what I was going, although I was spending a lot of time in feed lots and on poultry operations.

Chall: Was this for Kimber that you were doing this?

Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce: Manager, Department of Agricultural and Natural Resources

Tooker: No, this was for a company then known as Commercial Solvents Corporation (CSC). It's a part of International Minerals now.

Then I heard about an opening with the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce in their agricultural and natural resources department. I joined their staff in 1962 about two weeks after the man who had been manager for a number of years and only the third manager in the history of that department had become the chamber's assistant general manager. I was so young that I went for about eighteen months before I even got to sign my name to a letter. It was always somebody else's signature block because it was unthinkable that someone under the age of thirty would manage such a prestigious department.

But this is a very important point because here I was working in seventeen southern California counties with agricultural commissioners and the agricultural community. If you know anything about agriculture in southern California during the early sixties, there was still a large dairy concentration, the milk shed there in Artesia, Dairy Valley, Cerritos. Cities actually had zoning laws that prohibited you from having anything but a single dwelling, a milking shed, and a corral on twenty acres.

Now, that has all been changed. Those are all subdivisions now and the dairies are gone. But I got to work a little bit with the people down in that area--Dairy Valley, et cetera--on their problems, sanitation problems, the dairy manure, what are they going to do with it. They had a mountain of it down in Artesia that they had to get rid of because of the odor and problems. They were trying to sell it as fertilizer and I got involved--a fun project.

Tooker: To show them how you can be innovative and use it, I got about six ten-pound boxes of it and gave it to people as Christmas presents, people who lived in apartments. They got word back to me that it was great because they would have potted plants or flower boxes and there was a little package they could get of organic material--it wasn't synthetic that they could use on their plants. So they started to market this.

I first met a man named A.J. Haagen-Smit during that point who the L.A. Chamber and others had helped fund with some research projects. Apparently back in the fifties, some of the people who I dubbed as the freeway farmers--people who raised vegetable crops and berries, a lot of strawberries, along the various freeways, the San Diego freeway, at that point the Long Beach freeway, and the Harbor freeway down in the Long Beach area--were noticing that their plants, particularly leafy green vegetables were getting funny yellow spots on them and sometimes actually holes. There would be yellow or white concentric rings and holes.

Haagen-Smit was an organic chemist and a fellow at the arboretum in Los Angeles County brought him in. If you know anything about Dr. Haagen-Smit, and unfortunately he is now dead, he was the man who came up with a lot of theories we have on the air pollution problems in Los Angeles. It was because of the work with the agriculturalists, that a lot of the problems caused at that point by the refineries, have been cleaned up. But they still have problems. The automobile does a lot of that. So I got exposed a little bit to air pollution and there is a reason I am bringing this in, too.

So, as I said, I was working in seventeen southern California counties with agriculture and with their problems. Some of them were zoning problems. We had a feed lot out in Walnut that they were trying to shut down. There was a beautiful area out there. It was zoned for light manufacturing. There were two feed lots right on the main line of the Southern Pacific and Union Pacific railroads and suddenly people in the Pomona area, and just west of Pomona, and the city of Walnut were registering complaints with the Los Angeles County Health Department about the flies and the odor.

So we tried to get in and help them with that and later found that it was an open pit dump just down from them that was really causing the problem. But then we got into a zoning problem where somebody came along and purchased the property adjacent to these two feed lots and applied for a zoning change to R-1.

There were two hundred acres involved, if my memory is correct--and he was going to put in almost a thousand small, inexpensive homes. I referred to it as an instant slum. I really got my eyes opened and

Tooker: a little disillusioned because we fought it with the Planning Commission of Los Angeles County. It went all the way to Board of Supervisors and obviously lost. This man had bought it for, I don't remember the price now, but for a reasonable sum. He had filed the appropriate maps, and he had got the zoning changed, and it was ideally suited for manufacturing. Owens Illinois Glass was there. They were fighting it, too. There were a couple of manufacturers--Link Belt or somebody like that. There were two manufacturing plants and my feed lots.

As it turned out, after the guy got it zoned, he doubled the price and he walked out of there with around a million dollars net. He sold it back to the railroads. They finally bought it and it is now light industrial like it should have been. But that opened my eyes with my ag background to what happens. I got very calloused about planners and government.

Chall: Why would this experience make you calloused about planners? Might not the zoning decision have been made by elected supervisors and their appointees to the planning commission, rather than by staff members? There could even have been collusion in a deal like that.

Tooker: Many of them are constantly pontificating on the need to save this for the environment or that, but wave a few dollars under their noses and they will quickly draw you a plan that does just the opposite of what they were trying to save. Then they'll defend their plan even if it (the plan) is not practicable.

The Ronald Reagan Connection

Tooker: We're winding into about 1966. One day, a friend of mine that ran the women's division of the L.A. Chamber said, "We're having a big luncheon and we're having this candidate in the primary for governor come to talk to us. He's coming right off a movie set. Can you watch out for him and get him into the office and then take care of his car because he won't be able to park around here. It will be crowded."

So I was out in front and this car drove up and there was a man and his wife there. He got out, he still had his make-up on. It just happened his name was Ronald Reagan. So I first met the governor, now president, by parking his car! [laughter] He never remembers that, I know, but anyway, I listened to him and I was quite impressed with the man. Shortly thereafter he won the Republican primary. I didn't support him in the primary. I was a George Christopher man, which is kind of ironic.

Chall: A dairyman.

Tooker: Right. Some friends of mine approached me and said, "Look, you're in a good position with all of the resources you have in your files and stuff. Can you help us?" So I put together some papers for some people who were supporting Ronald Reagan. This was one of the groups --Farmers for Reagan or something--and I got to know some people. I was very nonpolitical. It was strictly on the ag issues and on things he ought to look at.

A lot of people like George Steffes. He came to Ronald Reagan through the Los Angeles Junior Chamber of Commerce and it just so happened their office was two down from my office and people like Phil Battaglia, and Neil Popiano, Steffes, others, were in and out of there all of the time. I had a nodding acquaintance with them but really not even a speaking relationship with any of these people.

Ronald Reagan got elected governor and about six months later another friend called and said, "Have you ever considered coming back home to northern California?" I had been in southern California since about '62 and I am a northern Californian. At this point, I had just gone through a divorce and met a young lady that I was attracted to and was about to get remarried. I said, "Yes, I'd be interested."

So they had me come up. Gordon Luce was secretary of business and transportation; that's where the Division of Highways was. He was looking for a secretary of the Highway Commission, and so I came up and brought my resume and all this and that and filled out all of the papers. I was talking to Gordon Luce and in about five minutes it was obvious that being secretary of the Highway Commission was not what I was interested in doing. I had heard about a California-Chile project, which was being scuttled and I had talked to somebody about that and they said, "There is nothing there, we're going to get rid of that."

Chall: California-Chile?

Tooker: Right, there used to be a joint project that the state of California and the government of Chile were involved in. It was an exchange program. I'm sorry, not chilis you eat--the country! [laughter] So I talked to him about that because of my ag background I knew an ag researcher who had gone to Chile and I had talked to him at length about his experiences. In fact, the man was killed down there a few years ago in a terrible jeep accident.

But anyway, when I was up here with Luce we both agreed that the job I was up there to interview for was not for me. But he said, "While you're here, why don't we run you through all of the process, so that if something else comes up, it won't take so long." So I

Tooker: went over and talked to Paul Haerle, the governor's appointments secretary, and they did all of the background checks on me to make sure that I was okay, and this and that. Now this was 1967--probably in May or early June. I was married in August.

Nothing happened until one day in November--right after Thanksgiving--I got a phone call from another friend. In fact, I had known him since a kid. I had gone to school with his sister. He, at that point, was a committee consultant to the assembly Agriculture Committee. He is now a lobbyist and consultant whose office is right down the street.

Chall: What is his name?

Tooker: Bill Geyer. [spells name] Ironically, Bill called and I talked to him.

I should back up a second. During the '66 election, I also got involved with some people. There was an open space amendment to the constitution. The Williamson Act had been passed in '65 and I had been very interested in it, and thought that was a great way to go. Then the constitutionality question was raised and they used me in southern California to give speeches to various groups. I talked to Soroptimists, and Optimists, citizens groups, Rotary Clubs, Kiwanis Clubs--anybody who would put a small group together and would listen to me talk about the friendly green giant of California, and that's agriculture. I used that to tell people how we really needed this amendment to the constitution on open space to make the Williamson Act constitutional. It passed.*

But I got to know some people who later on, as it turned out, started getting appointed in various places in the Reagan administration. One fellow, Ford B. Ford, was then a consultant to the senate fact finding Committee on Natural Resources. He was running around the state and I met him at several panels. I got to know him just briefly, but we were both doing the same thing on the open space amendment and he got appointed as the assistant secretary of the Resources Agency.

Geyer in his phone conversation with me said he had played golf that Saturday before with a guy who was a deputy administrator to the Resources Agency and they were looking for somebody. They were looking for somebody that had some kind of background in natural resources

*Proposition 3, Open Space Conservation, won by a margin of 592,000 votes.

Tooker: --not necessarily planning, but natural resources. They had had a guy in there--I've got to be careful about how I phrase that--who was more politically inclined, let's say, than having the technical background, and they wanted more of the technical background. He said, "Would you be interested?" I said, "I think I might be. What would it entail?" He didn't know, but the guy who was looking was going to be in Los Angeles next week, so I was told to be at the hotel where there was going to be a meeting--a state chamber meeting. I was going to go to the meeting anyway, and I was listening to Senator Kuchel when a mutual friend walked up and tapped me on the shoulder and said, "Kirk West is out in the hall and wants to talk to you."

So I went out and we had a drink and then we went to have lunch together and listened to John Rhodes, who was governor of Ohio. It ended up by his saying, "I think the boss would like to talk to you. Can you come to Sacramento?" I said, "I probably can. Mondays are usually pretty slow and there is, I think, a midday plane. How about if I fly up in the afternoon?"

I got off and I flew into Sacramento on something like a two or three o'clock airplane. I got off the plane and who is getting on the plane to go back to Los Angeles but a fellow who headed the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, Joe Jensen, and two or three people that I knew quite well. In my duties at the L.A. Chamber I had not only the chamber's agricultural committee, but I had their water and power committee, and I was secretary of the Southern California Water Conference. So my exposure had been much greater than agriculture because of the L.A. Chamber. I was into water and the need for planning for water needs and all kinds of things. So this was developing the planning interests and the planning--I won't say expertise, but knowledge, let's say.

The first question I was asked when they saw me get off this airplane: "What are you doing in Sacramento?" I just told them I was here on personal business which was easy to write off because my family is up there. I have cousins in Grass Valley and in Sacramento, and so that was no problem. They just said, "Oh, okay!" [laughs]

So I went over and I don't remember if I took a bus or a cab. Anyway, I got over to the resources building and I had my appointment at like four o'clock or something with Ike [Norman] Livermore, the secretary of Resources, and who was sitting there but Ford B. Ford and, of course, we greeted each other. We talked a little bit and then we went in and talked to Ike, and they had a lot of questions.

They were having problems with a group down on the Colorado River. I had been very closely associated with those people because they were part of my water committee and part of the Southern

Tooker: California Water Conference and I knew a little bit about that. They just had some animal created that they didn't know what to do with. This is in '67 now. In '66 there was something called an Air Resources Board created by the legislature and they were about to have a meeting and they didn't even have anybody on Ike's staff that knew what they were going to do and who was going to handle it and they weren't overly excited. Most of the guys were northern Californians and they weren't overly excited about air resources. I knew a little bit about that from the ag background.

So they asked me some questions about how to do this and what I thought about that and I told them a couple of things which they asked about. I said, "I think you are going about it the wrong way." I figured I'm really not looking for a job; if it works, it works. So I told them what I felt. Okay, it was over rather quickly, maybe half an hour or forty minutes.

I looked and there was time to get on a late flight. So I got a ride back to the airport, got the six o'clock flight and by seven-thirty I arrived in Los Angeles, called my new bride and said, "I'm home, do you have anything to eat in the house?" She said, "Oh, yes." So I went home. She said, "Well, do I pack my bags?" I said, "Don't bother. They asked me a lot of questions and I told them what I thought, that what they were doing wasn't the right way to go; I was very critical and I am pretty sure that they are not interested in me. People don't like to be told that they are doing something the wrong way."

So we didn't think any more of it. Joannie, my wife, worked at the same place I did, the L.A. Chamber. I stole one of their secretaries! This was on a Monday. Wednesday we came home and the phone was ringing. We lived in Redondo Beach and worked in downtown Los Angeles. The phone was ringing, so I parked the car and she ran in and opened the door and came back out and said, "The phone is for you, it's Kirk West." He said, "We were very impressed. We like your honesty and we think that we want somebody to do it the way you think it ought to be done. How soon can you start?" [laughs] Well, I had never told anybody at the chamber that I had even gone up. So we worked it out.

January 2--because January 1 was a Sunday--January 2 of 1968, my wife drove me to L.A. International Airport. I got in an airplane. My mother was down visiting for Christmas. My wife drove my mother back to Walnut Creek to where she lived, and then my mother decided that she wanted to make sure that we got settled okay, so she came up here and stayed with some friends. We had some long time family friends here in Sacramento.

Tooker: So that night at seven o'clock, I met my wife and my mother right down the street at the Capitol Tomale for dinner. Then we got in a motel and we started looking for a place and except for two years that we lived in Denver, we have been here ever since.

II THE RESOURCES AGENCY: SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR,
1968-1971

Tooker: I started out in the Resources Agency with Kirk West doing legislation. You probably have his name on that list.

Chall: No, I don't. But that was one of my questions--with whom were you working?

Tooker: I worked under Ike Livermore but directly under Kirk West and Ford B. Ford. My title was special assistant to the administrator, and for that first year in '68 I really was a paper pusher. I was learning the process because legislation was really new to me. I didn't testify. All I did was coordinate. We had thirteen units in the Resources Agency--fish and game, parks, all these people. I worked with them, assigning bills to be analyzed, coordinating positions if there were two conflicting positions, and I worked with the governor's office. But I was mainly a paper pusher. I got to know some young fellow by the name of George Steffes, who was the governor's legislative secretary, and George and I seemed to get along pretty well. Even though I wasn't doing much testifying, I worked with George on a lot of things. I was the coordinator basically for the Resources Agency in '68--legislative coordinator, I should say.

Chall: I see. Was this the year that the Republicans were in control of the legislature?

Tooker: No, this was the election they won in November, but they took over in '69 and '70. [Robert] Monagan was not speaker. Jesse Unruh was speaker at that point.

Chall: Was the point of view of the Reagan administration and the Resources Agency different from that of the legislature with respect to legislation on the environmental issues being considered?

Tooker: Like anything in this area, you are going to find my answer is going to be probably pretty close and that is there are things we agreed with and things we disagreed with. A lot of people have been

Tooker: very critical of Ronald Reagan over his environmental stands, but I would like to remind people that--and a lot because of Ike Livermore --of the many good things we did accomplish. When we get to a point can I take a quick break, run down and see if I should attend to anything? When we get the tape done, while you're switching, I'll run down.

The Dos Rios Decision, 1969

Chall: You were just telling me that some bills, some legislation, you agreed with, some you didn't.

Tooker: Oh, I was about to tell you about the Dos Rios decision, which I think was one of the most monumental things probably that happened in the early days of the Reagan administration, on the Eel River--the decision not to build that dam. It's something that Ike Livermore--he's quite a guy--was responsible for. He was concerned that-- He was very biased. He didn't want the dam built and he was determined he was going to show the governor why it shouldn't be built, why the Eel River should be preserved. But he didn't want anything to taint any of his staff in case he was wrong and he had to resign or he decided to quit. He was very protective of us. He did it all. We would do projects for him, but he took the lead, he was the spokesman, he was very vocal. I know Ford B. Ford was sweating blood in cabinet meetings, but Ike prevailed and the governor made the decision not to build the dam.

Chall: That was based finally on economic issues rather than environmental as such, I think.

Tooker: I think it was a combination. I don't think you could say it was either one alone. Then, if I can remind myself, I came up with a little--I'm great for cliches and things, but I got one when I was over in O P and R [Office of Planning and Research] that I used a lot. In fact, some of the people I see around that used to work for me or that I knew in those days still throw it at me, but something called SEE that I will get in there when we get there.

Chall: S-e-e?

Tooker: S-e-e, right. You can write it down so we don't forget! [laughs]

Chall: I had wanted to find out whether you were in the agency there when the Dos Rios issue came up.

Tooker: Yes, I was there.

Chall: So you all helped gather the information, is that it?

Tooker: Right, we were sort of resource people to help him, but he actually insulated us as much as he could, so that if there were any repercussions nothing would happen to us. He was just a tremendous guy in that respect. He did most of it himself. Obviously, he used the multiplier effect using us to do stuff for him, to get the material.

To go on a little bit, in '69 I in a sense graduated. That's when the Republicans took over and that's when there was a change in the Department of Finance and Verne Orr, who is now the secretary of the air force--No, I'm sorry, it wasn't Verne--Cap Weinberger came in.

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Tooker: I am trying to make sure I get everything tied in together for you.

Chall: Good. All right, when we left off, Cap Weinberger had been appointed the director of the Department of Finance and you said that he knew Kirk West.

Tooker: Right, and Kirk West went over and became his deputy director in finance which left another opening in the Resources Agency, and a fellow by the name of A. Allan Hill, who is now the chairman of the President's Council on Environmental Quality--isn't that interesting? [laughs]--came in and became the other assistant. Actually--what do they call it?--deputy administrator, I think. I remained a special assistant. I didn't necessarily move up. I stayed where I was and they brought in somebody else, which was fine. Al is quite a guy and a good friend.

But Al was more a speech writer and had some more of a political background than he had at that point in natural resources. He had some, but he was not the technician. As a result then, I changed from being the paper pusher in the Resources Agency to actually coming over to the capitol and working legislation. This was 1969.

Legislation for the Permanent Bay Conservation and Development Commission, 1969

Tooker: Now, an incident occurred that ties into all this and that was that at the same time in '69 the BCDC [Bay Conservation and Development Commission] legislation, which had passed previously, was expiring; it terminated at the end of that year. If the legislature was going to make BCDC permanent, they had to do it in the 1969 session for it

Tooker: to become law. Al and I were assigned to the Republicans and others who were concerned about getting the bill through, and we wanted a bill that was fair and just.

We looked at all kinds of alternatives, all kinds of things, and we got involved with helping rewrite the bill. It ended up being a Knox bill, as you probably know, but there were a couple of other people who had bills in, and one in particular was Milton Marks, who is now a [state] senator from San Francisco and ironically running for Congress.*

We were told to see what we could do about helping him put some things together. Well, there were a lot of hearings, a lot of debate, thousands of petitions filed. It was obvious we were going to do something. We had a problem with a lot of landowners: What do you do? Do you just downzone their land and literally confiscate it? What do you do about that? It was a real problem, particularly with the marshlands just west of the university campus--Emeryville, Albany, and Berkeley.

We went through all kinds of machinations on that and there were other problems, too, but one particular one that I got a little involved in was this: It just so happens that during all this my wife was expecting and we were coming to a very crucial point in two major things in my life. One was on this bill and the other was my wife was about to deliver our first son--just about thirteen years ago today. We had pretty much decided on the Knox bill. It was in conference. They were trying to put the bill together in a finished form. Still, we had this problem with the Santa Fe Railroad and other landowners in Albany, Emeryville, and Berkeley. What do you do with these marshlands? There were others around the bay besides these people--Leslie Salt and others.

I made a quick trip to the hospital and brought her back, as these things happen, and about noon on that particular day, I was eating my lunch in the Resources Agency cafeteria racking my brains, trying to think what can we do about this problem. I was getting a germ of an idea at this point, when I was told, "Get home, your wife is having pains. They are five minutes apart."

*See interview with John Knox, "Bay Area Regional Organization, the Environmental Quality Act, and Related Issues in the California Assembly, 1960-1968," in Four Perspectives on Land Use, Land-Use Planning Volume III, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1983.

Tooker: So that afternoon I got my wife back out to the hospital and while my wife was going through a very long labor, I was laboring, too, and shortly before my son was born, I got the brainstorm. Why not take the Williamson Act and expand it to include marshlands and wetlands, and if the owner wants to put his lands under contract, to keep them in open space, give him a break to encourage him to do that if the local entities are willing.

So while my wife was wheeled down into the delivery room, I went to a phone and called Marks's office and bounced the idea off of him. He thought it was good and today that provision is in the BCDC legislation. It was my idea to expand it to the marshlands and wetlands. It was funny. I always like to tell people this story because I gave birth to the idea the same time my wife was giving birth to our son.

Chall: Did that permit them to sell their marshlands or their lands after whatever the number of years, ten or so, and put it into development?

Tooker: Some of those lands were never put under the act and those were the ones where the development occurred. But what I was trying to do was come up with a way to keep them as marshlands. I don't know what you know about the Williamson Act.

It's a ten-year self-perpetuating contract. One of the reasons that people were balking and having a problem was they kept throwing tax bills at us. They would say, "Look, we're paying taxes on this and it's expensive. We want to do something with it." That's where I got the idea, okay, if you want to keep it in open space and keep it in marshland or wetland then put it under the act and give the guy a tax break. The public then gets to see that for hopefully almost perpetuity in open space. Not all the lands involved were put under the act and some were developed unfortunately. There were some concessions made.

Chall: The concession was Emeryville primarily.

Tooker: The concession really was more to the city than it was to private landowners. They had plans. There were things they wanted to do. Some of this stuff was already on the drawing board.

Chall: In order to get the bill passed, that was one tradeoff?

Tooker: That's right. Isn't it ironic that the hotel there in Emeryville is called Watergate? I always chuckle about that! [laughs]

Chall: What about the Leslie Salt people?

Tooker: That included salt ponds. They had problems and this allowed them then to put their land under the Williamson Act and there were other negotiations, too. They at one point had their own bill that Senator Dolwig offered and that bill went by the wayside very early on.

Chall: Senator Dolwig had a change of heart somewhere along the line.

Tooker: Yes, I think there was something like twenty or thirty thousand petitions delivered to him one day. It was very interesting. I felt very sorry for him. I went to a very bloody hearing. I was strictly an observer. He brought his witnesses in and somebody hadn't bothered to brief them. He had an attorney representing Leslie Salt. This is funny. It was a lengthy night hearing. It was about ten or eleven at night and he was in front of the committee. The witness began to not only antagonize a member of the committee, but argue with him and, oh, that was terrible. Things just went boom right downhill from there. It was just terrible.

It was a lesson I learned because I was just beginning to come over and work in three or four committees and I learned you never say something you don't think is true in front of a legislative committee, and you never antagonize a legislator or argue with him. I have done that. I have argued with them. But I always do it in the privacy of his office, not on the witness stand. But that was a good lesson for me to learn and it was a hard lesson for some others. There were other things that went into it, too, and I'm trying not to go through all of the other stuff.

Chall: I would like to know as much as you can recall on that because we may do a study on BCDC. Either that or I'll come back and call on you for some background.

Tooker: If you do, if you are interested in learning more, particularly on the Leslie Salt situation--I'll get to him in couple of minutes--there was a young fellow who was one of their planners that I stole from Leslie Salt and brought up to Sacramento when I got into O P and R [Office of Planning and Research]. His name is John Passerello. He now works for the California Conservation Corps and I see him every day. He's my rider. I drive him to work every day. He does get to the Bay Area, too. In fact, he gets to the Berkeley campus a lot because he is in a doctoral program through USC and he comes down there on weekends.

Chall: He was a planner with Leslie Salt?

Tooker: Yes.

Chall: What was your contact or relationships with the Save San Francisco Bay people in this whole BCDC legislative battle?

Tooker: Okay, during the BCDC legislation while, of course, I was exposed to some of them, the people that I worked mainly with were Mel [Melvin] Lane, who was the chairman, and Joe [Joseph] Bodovitz, the executive officer of the commission. They were the people that dealt directly with the administration.

Chall: How did they relate to the administration and vice versa?

Tooker: They got along quite well. I think there was pretty much a meeting of the minds. There was one place where we had a major difference of opinion, and I think even Mel Lane went along with this. At one point there had been a proposal and some documents and some of the people in the bay had talked about literally coming in and purchasing some of the lands that they wanted to protect. We did a real quick and dirty cost check on that and when we got to something like \$6 billion, and we had less than a third of it covered, we knew that would never fly. The money wasn't there for that. That was another reason why I kept trying to rack my brains to see if we couldn't give some incentive-- I had a lot of luncheon meetings with people like Santa Fe Railroad who owned a lot of property in the East Bay. I never had any direct dealings with the Leslie Salt people, but it was basically the railroad people that I talked to and a lot of the county and city people, trying to do something about those lands-- save them and yet encourage the landowners not to develop them.

Chall: Were the Resources Agency and the Reagan administration in general sympathetic with the idea of BCDC as a concept?

Tooker: Yes. My instructions were to get a bill we could all live with. It was not to be a developer's bill or a banker's bill. It was to be a bill that did the job, but didn't contain a lot of onerous restrictions and a lot of downgrading. There was a concern on a lot of our parts, and it's a valid concern; I see it today in some areas. You just don't walk in and take somebody's property.

When I got into the Tahoe area problem with Ike Livermore--and I was just on the very fringes of that because I was gone when that really came up in his office--that was a concern that I had. The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency began to downzone. There were people, a lot of them, they weren't elderly but in their fifties or sixties who had bought property with the thought of moving up there and retiring or doing it as an investment. Well, you buy property at-- let's just use an arbitrary figure--\$1,000 an acre, and suddenly it's worth \$300 an acre--that's their savings out the window. You've got to take that into account. A lot of these people are blue collars. The Dollar family and the Schilling people with the money I may not be as sympathetic to, but it's the working stiff, because that's how I grew up, when they try to advance themselves and do something, you

Tooker: don't just wipe out their investment and say, "Sorry, fella, it's good for the environment." You've got to look out for that guy, too.

Chall: That's part of the problem.

Tooker: The problem has never gone away and it won't! [laughs]

Chall: I guess it has to be reconciled somehow before the land disappears, the open space.

Tooker: That's true; right.

The Environmental Bills, 1970: The Office of Planning and Research;
The Environmental Quality Act

Chall: Okay, then you were in the Resources Agency in '69 and '70.

Tooker: Right, and during '70 is probably the year you referred to before when you talked about the period when the Republicans were in control. If you recall, that's the year a special environmental task force was established by Speaker [Robert] Monagan and they came up with the Environmental Bill of Rights and they came up with a multi-issue program, a number of environmental bills.* A gentleman who very likely will be the Republican nominee for the U.S. Senate, Pete Wilson, authored a bill.** I used to know the number.

Chall: AB 2070.

Tooker: Right, and that created the Office of Planning and Research and, of course, we also had the bill that created CEQA [California Environmental Quality Act].

Chall: That was carried by John Knox--AB 2045. [laughs] I can know these because I keep them in front of me all the time.

Tooker: I used to remember them but I have now got so many bills to deal with. Having been a lobbyist for the last six years, you have a few thousand bills a session.

Chall: I know. Those happen to be landmark bills, but you don't have to remember them forever.

*The Select Committee on Environmental Quality.

**Pete Wilson won the Republican nomination for Senate in the June 8 primary and the November 2 general election, 1982.

Tooker: It's interesting. I remember I was down in the governor's cabinet when the discussion took place, what do we do with this Knox bill? Everybody agreed, well, they only pertain to public works projects, we haven't got any problems. In fact, a fellow who is now a very successful planner by the name of Bob Jones was the consultant to this special committee. I had always felt Bob was far smarter than I ever was. He was a deputy director of the Department of Fish and Game. He had some problems when the director left. He pushed too hard the wrong people or he could have been the director of fish and game, but it didn't work out. So he left--in a huff so to speak. I lived in the south area of Sacramento and he was a neighbor of mine and a good friend. I always liked Bob.

He got himself a job through some friends of his in the assembly as the consultant to the special select committee on the environment. This was one of his babies, the CEQA bill that he got through.

Then he resigned in November of '70 and opened, in conjunction with another friend, another planner from fish and game, a small consulting office. They used to have the top floor of a building out of town a little ways because the rent is even better out there. He is a very successful planner now, does a lot of environmental impact statements, which is interesting! [laughter] I figure I should have gotten a bill and put it through and set myself up! That's why I think he's smarter.

Chall: He knows what it's all about.

Tooker: That's right!

Chall: Did you work on either of these two bills?

Tooker: Oh, yes, and several of the others. In fact, we had a lot of problems with some of the bills. Right now I can't tell you specifically what all of the problems were, but I know there was great concern, particularly on the CEQA legislation about bringing construction to a halt and stopping everything. Unemployment was one of our concerns.

Chall: Was this before the Mammoth decision or afterwards?

Tooker: Oh, no, no, no. This was long before that. This was when the bill was still being debated in the legislature, yes. I remember lobbying against the bill at one point--at several points--because of the concerns that we had, and there were amendments made to the bill because of some of the concerns we had.

We also were not overly happy with the Wilson bill because the governor wasn't enamored with a state planning office. He could see, and his staffs could see, some benefits to be derived from a planning

Tooker: entity within the governor's office that was more than just land-use planning. But they were not in favor of a strictly a land-use planning entity to produce a plan like the governor had inherited when he was elected in '66 and which just literally became nothing.

Chall: As I understand it, George Milias just handed the bills to various people--one to Wilson, one to Knox, another to somebody else--

Tooker: He spread them around. I think George Milias was chairman of that.

Chall: I think he was and as I understand it, it was just a matter of who was handed which bill--how it went through and who was considered its sponsor.

Tooker: Right. There were a lot of hearings, there was a lot of deliberation, there were a lot of machinations that we went through on those bills.

Chall: What did you think about the bills as they were going through, as a person concerned with natural resources of the state?

Tooker: Well, I was then and I still am an advocate of a balanced approach. I do not think we should go in and just arbitrarily wipe out something or pave over something for the benefit of progress. On the other hand, I think that if you are going to preserve something, there has got to be a reason to preserve it and you've got to do it in a rational manner. You don't go in and say, "We're not going to do any more of this," and there may be people working to harvest that or process that and suddenly throw thousands of people out of work. I think you have to be a lot more pragmatic in your approach as you go about doing it.

As far as planning, George said one thing when he was in the process of convincing me I should be the director of O P and R.

Chall: This is George Steffes?

Tooker: This is George Steffes. He is the guy that got me into that as a matter of fact. George made the comment a planner is like a poet, they talk a lot and don't do much! [laughter] And I agree with that. I think we have a lot of problems. I think that the plan that was released in '66 or '68, whenever the Reagan administration inherited it, had a lot in it. One of the first things we did was take that and just go through it to see what we could use and what we could do. I think planners get in a bind. They get so far out, they get caught up where they literally can't see the forest for the trees. They apply their planning principles. They are going to do all this and that, but they don't do something.

III OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH: DIRECTOR, 1971-1973

Varying Opinions on the Functions for the Office

Tooker: In order to show you what I mean we will jump through '70 and it will tie in with the rest.

When I got over in O P and R, one of the concerns I had was that we see what we're doing when we make decisions. And that's when I came up with SEE--from the Cry California plan. They had a plan of what to do for California and this came out as an adjunct to the plan the state had done.

Chall: That's right. What did SEE stand for?

Tooker: SEE stood for the balance: environment, economy, and social. You balance the impacts--the social impacts, the environmental impacts, and the economic impacts.

Chall: The California Tomorrow Plan was a major effort.* Were you impressed by that plan?

Tooker: I was. There was a former newspaperman--I can't remember the guy's name now--in fact, I think that he has passed away. I was very impressed with him and we talked a lot.

Chall: Is this Jack Abbott? Are we talking about Cry California and California Tomorrow?

Tooker: Was it Abbott or wait a minute--

*Alfred Heller, ed., The California Tomorrow Plan (Los Altos, California: William Kaufmann, Inc., 1972).

Chall: There was Sam Wood.

Tooker: No, I see Sam who is still around here. No, it was Bill Bronson.

Chall: Yes, he has died. He was their editor.

Tooker: Right, and he came up right after I was appointed and we chatted. There were some things they had in there that I thought went too far. There were some things that I was intrigued with, and it was going over the material that he shared with me that got me the brainstorm about SEE.

One of the duties I had--and the legislature was very quick to point out to us that we had to come up with a report--was to come up with a set of environmental goals and policies for the state of California. I don't even have one copy of that report anymore; I've lent mine out to the people in forestry. They wanted to do some stuff on high fire hazard areas and they didn't have the maps that I had in the report, so they are borrowing it right now.

But we put the SEE concept in there and we talk about SEE. The decision makers we would hope would see what they were going to do when they made a decision. You can apply SEE to the approval of a subdivision plot map, to construction of a building or anything you want. I just think it is a good approach to look at what is going to happen. Don't just say, "I want to build a building and I'm going to do it come hell or high water." Just look at what that is going to do because you can do a lot of different things.

About that time when I was over in O P and R, they were trying to do some things up at Tahoe and Ike Livermore was involved. I was not really, but I would see Ike and do different things with him. We had a joint interest in stopping a highway project over the Minaret Summit from the east side from Bishop and Mammoth Lakes area over to the San Joaquin Valley. They were coming out around Fresno.

I had a young lady that I hired, Mary Jones Hawkins. She is now Mary Jones. She has remarried and lives in Seattle. She did her doctoral study on the decision to build that road. Ike and I collaborated along with a lot of other people fighting the federal highway administration in the early seventies. They wanted to build an all-weather road across the Sierras by the Minarets and we showed why it was very environmentally unsound. Some of the agricultural interests wanted it. I had entree to some of the agricultural interests with my background. I talked to some of them and, sure, they had some reasons, but I didn't think they were completely justified. As a result, California filed a letter with the federal Highway Commission --again, a Reagan decision I would like to quickly point out, a pro-

Tooker: environment decision that, no, the project was not environmentally sound and the cost to keep that road open in the winter would have been prohibitive. I mean things that the bureaucrats in Washington were throwing out were just absurd and so we knocked that one in the head.

So that one I was more directly involved with. In Dos Rios I was way behind the scenes; in this one I was more out front. But, again, this was another decision that we knocked over. We just simply said, "See what you are going to do," and when we saw what they were going to do, we said, "No way should they build that."

Chall: Your Environmental Goals and Policy Report was criticized early on by the Cry California people and others. I know you had problems with goals and guidelines all the way through. With respect to Cry California did you feel that their criticisms--and they were strongly critical--were generally justified? Did they analyze what you were doing objectively do you think considering their own bias?

Tooker: Okay, let me toss two things out at you. Some of the criticism I got--whether it was justified or not, I am not going to pass judgment on that.

To answer your question, I'll have to back up a bit. I got the job because I guess they couldn't find anybody else to take it.

Chall: Yes, I wanted to find out about this.

Tooker: I was approached real early in '71 by a fellow named Jim Crumpacker who was on the governor's staff and they wanted me to take the job.

Chall: Nobody had had it?

Tooker: No, it was just created and so January 1 of '71 when the bill became law, the position opened. Sam Cullers was over there with three other people and this was all that was left of the old state planning office that prior to that time had been in the Department of Finance. The way the position was explained to me and what they wanted to do, my reaction was, "I've got enough problems. [chuckles] I don't need to go and sit in front of the legislature and bleed for the governor."

They wanted to, if I understood the people who were explaining the job to me correctly, initially they wanted to disregard a lot of the environmental planning and the land-use aspects of the job, of the law, or at least put them very low key and very back burner type of thing and use the office and the positions that went with us for other purposes. They were interested more in policy planning, more legislative--a lot of which is being done right now with the Brown administration.

Tooker: That's not how I envisioned it and having sat through a number of the hearings, I was concerned. I envisioned real quick that whoever the poor sucker was that was there was going to be called upon to testify before legislative committees and get bloodied up pretty good. I had had two or three occasions where I spent three hours before a committee and finally at one point it was Ike Livermore who said, "Why don't you leave Tooker alone? He's doing a good job!" [laughs]

Chall: What was the problem? A difference of opinion about environmental planning?

Tooker: No, a lot of people in the Reagan administration were concerned about planners and the kind of things they might come out with, and I think in some of the plans I have seen around, I think they had a right to be concerned about things that they would propose. I think one of the concerns a few people had was that the Cry California plan was in progress and there had been a lot of ballyhoo and some of the early paper work had come out, and I think some of the people might have even been concerned that something like that would come out rubber-stamped, and they wanted to make sure they didn't put somebody in there [OPR] that would do something like that--I think. Now, I may be wrong.

There also were some concerns that they needed some other things done besides this kind of planning, the policy-type planning, and they wanted to give more emphasis to that. Their views and the views of some of the members of the legislature who passed the bill, the enabling legislation, were different and reasonable people can differ. That's why there are Chevrolets and Fords and Oldsmobiles! [chuckles]

Chall: So in the legislature you had the people who, despite all of the compromises, had wanted these bills like the CEQA and the OPR, and in the Reagan administration you had people who were not interested in this kind of broad planning for the use of land?

Tooker: That's right. Their priorities were a little bit different than some of the others, and you had in the legislature people who felt the compromises went too far the wrong way. I was aware of that. You had people in key committee positions that felt that way.

Chall: As I understand it, by the time that AB 2070 was passed, it was a bill that had no provisions for financing OPR. It had no staffing provisions. It gave the agency very little power.

Tooker: It had directives.

Chall: It had directives and there was almost nothing to back up the office and directives unless the governor and his director really wanted to back them up. Could you see that when you were asked to be director?

Tooker: Oh, yes, I knew that I would be in a position-- My main concern was that the way it had been originally explained wasn't what a number of people wanted it to be and there would be a lot of flack over that.

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Chall: Was it Steffes who was responsible for the appointment?

Tooker: No, Steffes was not in the picture at this point in time. That's why I kept saying no! [laughs]

Chall: All right, let me ask the question directly then. How did the appointment come about? As I understand it, for about a month you were a deputy. At least that is what I saw some place, that for about one month from February to March you were a deputy director of OPR. Who was the director?

Tooker: There really wasn't one.

Chall: There wasn't one? They just weren't sure about anything or anybody yet?

Tooker: No, that was another problem. Let me back up a second on this. As the position was originally explained to me--

Chall: By whom?

Tooker: By Jim Crumpacker. What they were interested in setting up there was a research and planning function in the governor's office to assist with developing policy and legislative programs.

Chall: About what?

Tooker: About all kinds of subjects--catastrophic insurance, no fault insurance, aging--

Chall: Oh, I see, just a general research office.

Tooker: Right, and this is what has evolved incidentally. This kind of thing is now being done over in O P and R. People don't realize that, but--

Chall: Really?

Tooker: Oh, yes, there are over a hundred people in that office now, a hundred and, what, twenty or or something. They do a number of projects that are not in any way, shape or form environmentally oriented. This is the type of thing which I have no fault with. I think that is good. I think a governor should have that kind of capability within his

Tooker: staff within his office. But at that point in time, with the environmental fever that was going through the state, to try to make that change and put some of the more environmentally oriented projects on the back burner and give more emphasis to other things wasn't feasible. These people on the governor's staff were more interested in trying to do more social, more people oriented type things.

Catastrophic insurance is one that we actually did get involved in when I got over there and it was a high priority thing that they were concerned about. A lot of horrible examples had been brought to the governor's attention about people undergoing kidney dialysis who literally had to go on welfare in order to get to the machines. Either you had the money or the insurance or you had the state assisted program and if you were rich, there was no problem. If you were middle class, you had a problem.

So those were the kind of things they were trying to deal with. It wasn't that they were trying to throw everything out, but they had a different set of priorities than I felt the legislature had is what I am trying to say.

Chall: But as I understood it, too, the governor really never cared too much about planning as such, the so-called land-use planning, on the broad scale that it was envisioned by this bill.

Tooker: I don't think he was-- You know he didn't jump up and down and clap his hands. One of the problems I had was with the professional planners. I wasn't one and they got very incensed that I was in that position. I don't think anybody had ever really sat down with the governor and realistically gone through some of the things you could do with a good planning process; I really don't think so. I know in some of the sessions we had, some of the people I brought aboard, we sat down with him, and it was amazing. I didn't think we were ever going to get out of one meeting. He got enamored with some stuff we were talking about. Can you imagine Ronald Reagan sitting there in his cabinet room with this fellow on my staff with rather long hair, not real long, and a beard, and going over some of the stuff? We were talking about endangered species and the governor really got excited and very intrigued. Ray and I and the governor and some of the others sat there for a couple of hours talking about this kind of thing. The appointments staff were killing us! [laughs] People were backing up.

Appointing John Tooker

Tooker: Let me mention that one day during this process early in '71, there was a change in the governor's office as to how different functions would be handled and George [Steffes] went from being the legislative secretary to a newly created position called director of Programs and Policies. The office of OPR, planning and research, was placed under George's guidance at that point, and this was late January of '71 when the governor's office was reorganized by Ed Meese, and that's when I got a phone call from George. He said, "I want you to be my new director of O P and R." I said, "I've been through that with Crumpacker three times. I am not interested. I don't like what they are telling me that they want to do with that office." He said, "What don't you like?" I told him. He said, "Why don't you go home, talk to Joannie, write some things down"--this was a Friday, as I recall--"and I'll call you Monday and you tell me about it."

So I got in the office Monday and Ike Livermore was in the office and I think maybe a secretary or two. It was a little early. I was jotting some things down on my desk and Ike came by and he stuck his head back in and said, "Congratulations, I talked to George this morning." I said, "What?" He said, "I understand you are the new director." [laughs]

You asked about the deputy. The problem was that Sam Cullers was there; he had been there for a while, and he thought he should be the director. If you don't have the name Sam Cullers on your list, you should add the name Sam Cullers. [spells name] I don't know what Sam is doing now. Sam had a couple of unfortunate experiences, but he is here in Sacramento, he is a planner. Sam came in from the Midwest, I believe Chicago, and worked in the old state planning office back in the mid-sixties prior to the Reagan administration; was retained. Sam was actually running the nucleus of the office that I inherited when I became the director of O P and R in '71. Sam had a lot to do with the 1968 state plan and a lot of the studies and the reports that were done. There were some done for the Resources Agency and for fish and game. There was a lot of planning effort done in the mid-sixties. Basically it's in Papa Brown's era but a lot of it dovetailed over to the early Reagan days.

Sam will refer to me as "that damn chicken farmer," but that's okay. Sam is a good planner and is a person that you should get involved in this because he, I think, would have a lot to contribute. Sam does not look at me as one of his better friends. He feels that George and I literally screwed him out of a job so to speak, which is unfortunate.

Chall: I see, you inherited him with the old Office of Planning.

Tooker: Right. He had hoped very much to be the director and it didn't work out that way.

Chall: But he had come in as a planner under the older--

Tooker: He had been there several years, right; he had been there several years.

Chall: Before Reagan?

Tooker: Yes, he was brought in by the Brown administration.

Chall: One could understand that change.

Tooker: [laughs] Tell him that!

But in considering the appointment I was very concerned about Sam and I told George that. Sam is black. I didn't want to walk in and make some black guy think that here is this racist honkie who is going to throw him out of a job. It was a very delicate situation. George said, "I'll take care of it."

So Sam and I went in to see George and George explained to Sam that they wanted me to be the director, but we were going to do this in a way that would not cause him any embarrassment--that I would be appointed as a deputy and I would report directly to George and so would Sam. Nobody would be the number-one man. We would be on an equal footing.

I was over there approximately a month when Sam Cullers came down with hepatitis. We had talked, the three of us, and he was, at that point, seeing the handwriting on the wall that he wasn't going to be appointed. So he was groping around for other things and, in fact, had an excellent lead with an engineering firm that was into environmental planning and things. He was getting things ready to go and was about to take off and so I was just going to bide my time as a deputy until he left. Then I would take over.

When he got hepatitis, he was out for six weeks. It kind of threw a monkey wrench into things. We had a man on the payroll who wasn't in the office, who was trying to put another job together. He came back and within a month after he came back, he resigned, he got his job with the other firm and he left. It was shortly after that then I was officially named the director.

When you read things in the history books or something, you often forget there is a little human touch there, and George very definitely is the kind of person who would feel concern. One of the

- Tooker: positions he had in '66 was to interview Papa Brown's staff and make the decision who kept their jobs and who didn't, and he was very concerned about that human aspect of it. I was, too. I knew Sam. I had nothing against the man. I think he is probably a pretty good planner. He just didn't know when to say the right things to the right people and said the wrong things to the wrong people and, of course, he was the other side's appointee! [laughs]
- Chall: That's true, that makes a difference. I have a name here, Rus Walton. Was he part of anything in the planning office?
- Tooker: Yes, Rus Walton actually got involved into the programs and policy unit too. He had been on the governor's staff and I guess Rus really got more involved. Rus was gone in a lot of '70 and then came back in '71 and he was in that office and he was doing some of the program work, too.
- Chall: In OPR?
- Tooker: No, he was on the governor's staff. When I went into the office of O P and R, there were Sam Cullers, Ed Baume, who is now back with the state Department of Finance; Harriet Ikemoto, who now is a secretary over in the Department of Finance- and there was one other girl and I can't remember-- Let's see, Pam wasn't there then. I think there was one other girl who was in the process of leaving and she was only there for a short period of time. I can remember she had dark hair and her husband was in the military and he was transferred and so she left.
- Chall: I want to get back to the fact that you didn't want the position. You were told to go home for a weekend and think about it and when you came back it was already established that you would take it. What assurances were given to you that you could do in that office what you felt you were supposed to do and what you apparently wanted to do? Were you given any assurances that you would be able to have your own way?
- Tooker: Actually, I talked to George later and he said that he and I would work things out to make sure that it wasn't as it had been explained to me by others. In fact, I got to do a lot of the things I wanted to do. George was very good about giving me a free hand. He wanted something to come out of that. I had certain constraints put upon me, more by state law than anything else, about who I could hire and how many.
- Chall: I thought that that office had a free hand in hiring.
- Tooker: No, no office in the state government has a free hand. You have personnel boards that set up very stringent restrictions on what you can do and can't do. I had so many positions available to me; the

Tooker: salaries were set by the state Personnel Board. The governor had nothing to do with it. This was civil service and there are regulations about what you can do with exempt positions. Do you realize that almost every one of my positions was an exempt position not subject to civil service?

Chall: That's what I understood.

Tooker: And they are very careful. You can't come in and hire a whole department of exempts and go around the civil service status. That's why the laws are on the books.

Chall: But OPR is almost entirely non-civil service. Did I understand that correctly?

Tooker: It was when I was there and I assume it still is.

Establishing the Program, the Budget, and the Staff

Chall: That is what Bill Press told me. Did you have then a relatively free hand in hiring the exempt people?

Tooker: Oh, yes, it was just that I had a problem because one of the guys I wanted, he took about a \$12,000-a-year pay cut to come to work for me and he didn't stay too long. He was intrigued with some of the things I was trying to do, so he left a planning firm in Sausalito and came to work for me.

The point I wanted to make was I couldn't just go out and hire anybody I wanted. There were limitations on salary and numbers. But as far as the people, and the kinds of people, I was relatively free. George said he wanted to see them. He wanted to make sure they didn't have two heads and one was breathing fire or something, but I went out and did my own recruiting. I went through various established planning agencies. I called people around that I knew like Bob Jones who at that point was a planner, a private sector planner. I called people I knew in the environmental community. Did they know of people? George knew of some people. Mary Jones--her husband happened to work for the state--she was looking. Her background was in political science. She was interested in environmental concerns and how they fit into the political arena.

I'll never forget. She walked in and George said, "I want you to talk to this young lady. You have some openings and I want you to talk to her. If she fits, I'd like you to hire her. If she doesn't fit, that's fine." She walked in and we talked a while and she said,

Tooker: I'll go to work for you for a thousand dollars a month." I said, "No, you won't." She looked at me kind of funny because there weren't many women around and I said, "The job description that we have written up says the salary is \$1,208 a month and if I hire you, you are going to get \$1,208." [laughter] The point being that she was willing to sell herself short because she was a woman and I wasn't going to buy that. I ended up with--what did I have?--three professional women on my staff. One was a Ph.D. candidate and two had master's degrees and they were very, very competent young ladies and very good.

The biggest problem I had was with the clerical staff. They had real problems. When I would delegate things to people on my staff, I felt like a quarterback handing the ball out to people. When the professional women would bring major typing assignments in for the girls to type, sometimes I'd have to take the draft to the clerical staff and say, "Here, I want you to do this." I could not have Mary or Carol or Fran do it. The clerical staff finally got over that, but there were a lot of problems.

There's an interesting story about Mary Jones. At that point I was brought into the governor's cabinet and I would attend the cabinet meetings. But I was running around, talking to people, doing things, and so I wasn't always there on Tuesday afternoons and I wanted an alternate to go. So I had suggested Mary Jones Hawkins. That was fine with Meese, Steffes, and those people, but a young lady--and I don't want to mention her name because she is a good friend still--got her nose out of joint. She was the only woman allowed in the governor's cabinet meetings and she didn't like the fact that another one was coming in there. She had to just sit and take notes and make sure things got done and this other one got to enter into conversations! [laughs] I even had one legislator call me and tell me what a good job she did.

I had to go some place. I think it to an American Institute of Planners meeting. They were very upset with me because I was this farmer and not a planner and I had this top planning position in the state. They were always asking questions and they had a meeting in May of '71. I was still trying to put a staff together, I was trying to meet deadlines and do things. We had to implement CEQA as well as prepare the Environmental Goals and Policy Report.

Chall: In a few months.

Tooker: Yes. The Environmental Goals and Policy Report was due on March 1 of '72, and I didn't even get in there as the deputy until February of '71. So I had a little over a year and then we tried to do CEQA as fast as we could, too.

Tooker: So I sent Mary to a legislative hearing to testify on behalf of O P and R, and the next day I get a phone call from the chairman of the committee who said he didn't want to see me in front of that committee again. He said, "She did such a good job send her all the time!"
[laughter]

Chall: That was kudos! I want to get back, if I can now, to the American Institute of Planners. What was the relationship that you had with them? Did they want you to come and speak to them once in a while?

Tooker: Let me back up a second and I'll get back to them. When I was brought aboard, one of the first things that George wanted me to do was to sit down (and I think I still have it at home some place), and lay out an outline what I thought the office should do. I brought this outline to George; we refined it. The outline reflected my views and got into the Environmental Goals and Policy Report.

CEQA was split between Ike Livermore and me. So I was more concerned at that point with staffing the office and doing something on the Environmental Goals and Policy Report because I knew I could steal staff from Ike and do things although I ended up using all of my own, too, on the CEQA guidelines. But he had people. An attorney that took my job when I left his office was delegated the responsibility. I knew Norm Hill quite well and we got along and so I knew I had the relationship there. But we had very positive and direct input into those guidelines. Ike and I held hearings both in Sacramento and in Los Angeles. I cut a vacation short, I remember, to go to one down there.

Anyway, so I was concerned about trying to put together a program for the office and then hire a staff to implement that program--do both things, and I was doing it very quickly. I was doing it as a deputy. I was doing it knowing that I didn't have a lot of money. So I couldn't hire people too fast because I didn't have any money to hire them.

Chall: The money came from--

Tooker: General funds at that point; basically the general funds.

Chall: If the governor wasn't terribly concerned about this kind of planning I suppose then it would be hard to get the money.

Tooker: Or the legislature because they reviewed our budget also.

Chall: But that would have been a constraint. You can kill off something by not giving it any funding and it hadn't been funded to begin with.

Tooker: There was no funding in the bill.

Chall: It had been taken out of the bill.

Tooker: That's right.

Chall: That's not a very good start! [chuckles]

Tooker: If you remember, during that period of time we had almost as bad a fiscal situation in the state as they do right now as far as the budget process was concerned. That was the period when the state workers were asked not to take their cost of living increases and they were not given them and we got them back later. In fact, I got mine in '75. I had left the state while it was tied up. It was tied up by a suit.

Chall: [interruption] I don't even know where we left off now. Let me check back. All right. You said you had budget problems and you were explaining that it wasn't necessarily that the governor didn't really want to give a great deal of help to this agency, but that there were also problems with the economics in the state.

Tooker: Right. In fact, I recall several meetings with representatives of the legislative analyst's office who, to a degree, had a jaundiced eye with what we were trying to do. We came in with some budget requests. For example, they will start this summer now putting together the '83-'84 budget, okay? I hadn't been there very long before I had to start putting a budget together. I had to expand the office obviously and I was trying to put a budget together. My budget requests then were reviewed by not only the governor's people as he puts it together, but also by the legislative analyst, and they had a lot of questions and questioned me about what I was doing.

So there were a lot of people, not just the governor, concerned about the funding for O P and R, whether it was too much, too little, or what, and a lot of people sort of wished we would just dry up and go away. I think the key was the fact that George was very, very good about letting me sit down and put this together.

I went over and talked to a lot of people in the Resources Agency about what we ought to be doing. I talked to some friends. In fact, I talked to a guy, as I recall, who is now director of fish and game, Charlie Fullerton; other people I knew, people like Bob Jones I talked to. This was on my own to get ideas to help me. And I had a lot of people giving me a lot of free advice. I had Bronson, for example, with California Tomorrow. I had the Environmental Defense Fund. They had some definite ideas. The Sierra Club people would come in and see me. They had some definite ideas. As I recall there were people with the news media, particularly a reporter from the Los Angeles Times who asked me a whole lot of questions--"Why weren't you asking for a million dollars and doing this and that?"

Tooker: Part of my problem was compounded by the fact that there were also bills being put into the legislature to either change CEQA because at about this time we were getting Friends of Mammoth.* We were changing some of the ground rules on CEQA. There were bills put in to change some of the ground rules for O P and R. I hadn't had a chance to do hardly anything yet.

We had a project given to us, the California Indian Assistance Project. In going through the papers and in looking at what I had inherited, I ran across something called 701 planning grants from HUD [Housing Urban Development]** Ed Baume had done a lot of that and so Ed and I had some long talks. Ed is quite a guy. I am very proud of that man. He had some very serious personal problems. He had been involved in a very tragic accident, was convicted of manslaughter, had a very serious drinking problem. He kicked all that and he really has picked himself by the bootstraps. He's quite a guy.

But with Sam gone, Ed was the only guy who had been around and knew about any of this stuff. I was learning. It's a lot different than cutting a field of alfalfa and bailing it, or feeding cows or chickens although there are a lot of principles that I discovered later that really applied. Once I got over putting the thing together and found people that could do things so I knew that if I gave a job to somebody that it would get done, then I could go about doing some of the other stuff. So this was what I was trying to do and it took a while.

Chall: The 701 program really provided you with funding. .

Tooker: At one point I had a million dollars! [laughter]

Chall: A large tail wagging a pretty small dog!

Tooker: It was pretty obvious that I wasn't going to get much money out of the state's general fund, so I had to find some.

*Decision of the state supreme court in Friends of Mammoth et al. v. Board of Supervisors of Mono County. September 21, 1972.

**701 refers to Section 701 of the federal Housing Act of 1954 which provided grants for local planning assistance only to states which had established state planning agencies within the administration.

Chall: It was there.

Tooker: It was there. What was interesting is that this is where some of my friends come in. Of course, I had Ed and Ed took me down and I met some of the people at HUD and, of course, they were very concerned about what was I going to do with this office, and there were some grants out that had to be finalized. Another thing we had to do: There were some grants out and I don't know if anything wrong had been done, but because of this period in the old state planning office where they really didn't have a lot of staff, and they didn't know whether they were going to be fish or fowl, and they had this bill going through that would create O P and R, there were a lot of loose ends that had to be put together.

There was a lot of money that the feds had already given the state and people weren't sure what happened to it. What did they get for their bucks? Well, you know government. We had to go through and put a lot of those loose ends together and that took time to find out what happened to the twenty-five grand for this and where was the state's match. I had Ed Baume and I brought another fellow in real quick from over in the Resources Agency named Dave Marty who was literally my bookkeeper. I had him go through the paperwork and he was working on these HUD grants: Where were they? What happened? He had to justify all of this. We spent hours with staff down in the regional offices in San Francisco. See, a lot of these grants were given for that old state plan, the one that came out in '68, but they had never finished the paperwork.

So I was trying to do guidelines for CEQA, the Environmental Goals and Policy Report, and justify all of this other stuff I had nothing to do with, and I only had one guy around who was even there before me, and he wasn't there for all of it and that was Ed. When I could get to Sam, when I could talk to him on the phone, or when he came back in the office for a while, he was a great help because he was there and into a lot of this. Of course, I had a line at my door of consultants constantly: "Are you going to have contracts for this or contracts for that?"

Chall: Did you?

Tooker: I became almost anti-consultant for a while. [laughs] I don't know if I still am that way, but I saw some of the work that some of these people had done. I would rather not mention any names, but there was one particular program for which a guy had gotten a substantial amount of money through HUD and he would come in with proposals unsolicited, to help me do my Environmental Goals and Policy Report. Well, there was stuff that I kept seeing--like these great studies. All they were going to do is xerox reports that they had done three years before and I just got turned off with a lot of that.

Tooker: In fact, there are consultants and a lot of them belong to AIP, the American Institute of Planners. They got very down on me because of this. Of course, the AIP wanted to know what was I going to do in the office? When I hired Mary Jones Hawkins, who was my first person, she was not a planner and they were very upset I wasn't putting professional planners in the office. They didn't like that. Cullers had been a professional planner and then he was gone and then there were none.

They wanted me to come down and talk to their convention in May of that year and I said, "No," and nobody had ever told them no before, I think. I said, "I'm not ready. I am doing legislative stuff. I am trying to do housekeeping things. I am trying to get ready to do a major project, and I am trying to write some guidelines for a major piece of legislation. I haven't got time, and I don't know what I would tell you even if I came," I told them.

Some of their people came up after their convention and talked to me. A fellow who was, I guess, their president--I am trying to think of the guy's name and I can't remember it. He went back to the federal highway administration and so he left. There was a guy, Sherman something that became their president and he was very hostile towards our office and towards what I was trying to do.

Completely unrelated to that about this point of time (we are now in the summer of '71) I, through the various feelers I had out, had been advised that there was a young fellow with Leslie Salt who was looking to broaden his horizons. He was going to be at a BCDC meeting in San Francisco one day and I was going to be down there. So I called him in his office, told him I understood he was looking around and that he couldn't talk too much. He said, "Yes." So we arranged to get together and have a drink in San Francisco.

That was John Passerello and within a month he was on my staff. John had all the credentials. He was a geographer. He belonged to AIP. He was active in the local chapter. John, I very quickly found out, was a number-one scrounger. You tell him what you want and he would go digging and he'd find things.

About the same time, I had a young lady who had been an intern for me in Resources. She came over and she was very intrigued--Fran Peterson was her name--very intrigued with what we were doing. She was graduating from Davis, and she wanted to get into the Institute of Ecology and get a master's in environmental planning. So I said, "I'll tell you what Fran. I was impressed with what you had done for me and the legislative staff as an intern in Resources. I don't know how much money I am going to be able to give you, but I'll have maybe \$100 a month or something"--she only wanted part-time work--"and I can probably have enough money where I can keep you on in the summers.

Tooker: Why don't we get you into the Institute of Ecology at Davis, why don't you get your degree, and when you get out of there and unless something happens I have no control over, I'll give you a job when you get your master's."

That worked very well, too, because she worked good with John and she could refine stuff that he would pick up for me. She was a good writer and very close to academia. So we brought her in part time. She never even showed on the books other than she was a part-time employee.

Chall: Did these people have to have, besides education if you were seeking that, did they have to have a party affiliation?

Tooker: No, I never asked. I know Passerello was a very active Democrat. I think Fran was, too. I had that happen to me. I had a man walk into the office--something else. I think he thought I had a whole bunch of \$50,000-a-year jobs sitting there for the taking and he started throwing all of these politicians' names at me and people in the party's names and said that so-and-so had sent him over. He started mentioning Norm, that he was a good friend of Norm's--I didn't say anything--and that Norm had suggested maybe there would be something for him here. He was an unemployed aerospace guy and he wanted a job. I mentioned to him the top salary in this office was twenty grand and that was mine.

Another time I had a black man pull the same thing on me. He wanted a job and he wouldn't start under twenty-five. I said, "You've got a problem." He said, "What's that?" I said, "I only make twenty!" [laughs] He was already with the state, a civil servant in highways and he thought he was going to cut quite a deal, but that didn't work.

Anyway, another guy was very upset with me, but his background wasn't what I wanted. I had told George the kind of people I wanted and how many and it was small. I had a total of eleven and two of them were borrowed. I wanted an economist and I could not afford an economist and I stole one from the Department of Water Resources on loan for a year. So the governor's office never paid his salary. The DWR was so intrigued that although the guy was actually on loan to the state Water Resources Control Board for their 208 planning, they brought him back and loaned him out to me.

I got another environmental planner, a great landscape architect named Jim Warren from the Department of Parks and Recreation. There was a problem there, a personality problem, and they didn't know what to do with him. He was very close to retirement. He had great expertise, knew people all over. I said, "I'll take him! If you don't want him, I'll take him." [laughs] So I borrowed people and

Tooker: I hired my own. We started to grow together. Then this fellow--that I already mentioned who was a planner in the Bay Area walked in and started talking about what we were doing. He got so interested he asked for a job--for \$12,000 less than he was making--his name was Ray Belknap.

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Tooker: He now works for Bill Geyer, as a matter of fact. He is doing a coastal zone project down in San Luis Obispo County. Belknap came walking in unsolicited. Well, I was really impressed with Belknap. We talked and I told him what I was trying to do and I reproduced a few copies of what I had given Steffes and I gave him one. We talked about it. He went back and he called me and he said, "If you've got an opening, I think I really would like to come." I knew what he was making and he was making around thirty grand working for Sasaki-Walker, I think, the landscape architectural firm. But he said, "I wake up in the middle of the night and it really bothers me tearing up these hillsides and putting all of these tract homes on them and I would like to do something for a while to get away from this." He had a beautiful home in San Rafael, a wife and two kids, and so he said, "How much can you get?" Well, I went scrounging. I called my friends in the Department of Finance and I said, "What is the top salary we can get?" As I said, it's all spelled out through the personnel board what you can pay these people, what level you can hire and what you can do. I think it was something like eighteen grand was the most I could get him and he was making thirty. He took it! He took it!

In fact, Passerello--who was on the staff at that point--he and I went and helped Ray move. We rented a truck and to save him money [laughs] we moved him! It was fun because everybody was hired for their particular expertise. I brought in and out other people, too, for special reasons. We had the economist. We had the environmental planner from parks who knew recreation-type stuff. We had Belknap who was a great environmental planner. We had Passerello who was a geographer. Ed Baume I got back off of some of the paperwork and used Dave Marty for that.

Chall: You kept Baume on your staff then?

Tooker: I kept Baume the whole time I was there. We had a period where I had to sit down and have a couple of talks with him and things worked out. He was taking three-day weekends every weekend and I told him that had to stop and it did and the guy straightened out. In fact, I tried to appoint him to something and unfortunately his record prohibited that. Anyway, it worked out.

Chall: I see. So you had a staff then that was satisfactory to you. To that extent you were free to develop your own staff?

Tooker: Yes, and I never got any static from Steffes or anybody else in the governor's office. Was I hiring a bunch of Republicans? Did they give money to the party? None of those questions were ever asked of me. In fact, I made it a point to call when this guy from southern California who came in a second or third time and wanted this high paying job with all of these great (in quotes) "party connections." I asked, "He's bugged me three times now, is there something I don't know? Am I supposed to hire him?" They said, "Do you want him?" I said, "No." They said, "Then disregard him." So I was never put under any pressure, which was great. I had certain deadlines for Steffes I had to meet. I had to accomplish things. I had to show we were being productive.

I had to do one other thing. About this point, the governor became very intrigued with trying to do something I mentioned earlier about catastrophic insurance. We were in the middle of no-fault debates.

I used Mary Jones. She was really intrigued with the CEQA guidelines and wanted to work on those. She was great the way she wrote things. Belknap had a lot of good ideas and a lot of good stuff, but sometimes the way he would write it, it would be too flowery and too long. Mary could condense stuff and yet keep the thought that he was trying to get through. So the three of us would work on stuff and I think that worked out very well. We used the same approach in the Environmental Goals and Policy Report and, in fact, more so there than we did with the guidelines. Ray had some good ideas with the CEQA guidelines.

Developing the CEQA Guidelines

Tooker: One of the big problems we had with the CEQA guidelines is that once we had the Friends of Mammoth decision and we knew we had to apply the guidelines to all of the state agencies and everybody else, was the input we got or the lack of it. First, Ike and I--my staff and Ike and I--would look at them. His staff was working on them, too, joint things. Then we'd come out with rough drafts and take them to the cabinet. We spent hours making sure the cabinet said that they were comfortable with them. Then we'd send them out to agencies for review and local government input, and people wouldn't respond. That was one of the biggest things that bothered me. In fact, the one that really galled me was the attorney general, Evelle Younger, and this guy named Nick Yost.

Chall: Yes, you had some real conflicts with the attorney general over the CEQA guidelines.

Tooker: Yes, I did. Indirectly even more so because Ike and I were sued by the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, and the Environmental Defense Fund for not implementing the law and not coming out with the guidelines. One of the reasons was we had given the attorney general's staff ninety days to review a set of draft guidelines. They waited 105 days and then came out with a horrible document severely criticizing the whole thing. This really got me mad because all they had to do was say, "Look, guys, we'd like some changes." They never commented to us. They had no contact with us.

Chall: Is that so? You never--

Tooker: No, and then came out with a very, very critical analysis. In fact, the report was released and a news release went out and the attorney general wasn't even in town! [laughs] Yost did the whole thing because I tried to call Ev and he wasn't even around. Ike was livid. Then about that time we got sued, too. So I don't know if there was something going on. A lot of people told me, oh, they were in collusion with the environmental groups. That never bothered me. If they were, fine; if they weren't, fine too. All I know is that as things worked out the Environmental Defense Fund had people coming up and talking to me a lot; Bill Press came in to talk a lot. I wasn't trying to hide anything.

Eleven people trying to do a pretty big job. In fact, there were two or three jobs. It was difficult: trying to do something for the first time, and trying to get some of these staid bureaucrats go go along. We had problems with highways, for example, trying to come up with things like categorical exemptions. You may not know the program the highway department has on weed abatement and pest control on freeways and on highways--spraying. They don't know just what is going to hit them from year to year and they have to have some flexibility. Well, here we were trying to work out something that will apply there and yet then come back and give fish and game the flexibility with the guidelines that would allow them, let's say, to poison all of the trash fish in an alpine lake and restock it with maybe graylings or trout or something. All these things we were trying to put together in one set of guidelines. And also we had to speak to the parking structures in downtown San Francisco or a high rise on the environmental concerns--traffic patterns. There are all kinds of problems. We were trying to use SEE all the way through, both in the CEQA guidelines and on the Environmental Goals and Policy Report. We finally got it done and the suit was dropped once they were released. They've been revised a number of times and the law has been changed, too.

Chall: I understand that the Reagan administration or the Reagan cabinet would have liked the whole CEQA Act to disappear and made it difficult for you, even difficult as it was, to get those guidelines out, that they kept holding them back and wanting to review them. They didn't like the whole CEQA program, not just the guidelines.

Tooker: Anything that's new, you always have a problem with. I don't care who you are whether you are a governor or whether you are a department head or whether you are just a regular citizen like you and I are. We had problems all the way down the line and various degrees of problems. The governor's cabinet spent a lot of time with us in reviewing the CEQA guidelines, Ike and I. We had a lot of breakfast meetings at the Sutter Club that George set up. We'd meet at seven o'clock in the morning, sometimes twice, sometimes three times a week, to go over drafts. Part of that was precipitated from--we would get into these departments. We would get into highways, for example. This is before Cal Trans and, as I said, we were trying to be careful so we wrote the guidelines so that we didn't stop all these things from happening--the pest abatement and weed abatement programs--because you have an impact. You stop this thing and you cause two other things to happen. When you write a law--and I have been involved with writing quite a few--and you get involved in the legislative process in Sacramento, you've got to remember and sometimes we forget, all too often we forget, that the world of Sacramento is a lot different than the real world out there where people are trying to take that law, interpret that law, and work with that law.

We were aware of that and we were trying to take these things into account. We didn't want just the extremes. We wanted what was going to happen with the day-to-day working process. We were trying to identify a number of departments of state government that had environmental programs, for a lot of reasons, and we did that. People were astounded when we did that and we put together actually a supplement to the governor's budget to show how much money really was being spent on some of these things. People had no idea at the people that would get involved. The Department of Real Estate, the Department of Agriculture, water resources, the typical ones, the obvious ones, and some that weren't so obvious, too.

They all had programs. This thing I talked about, bluestone in an alpine lake, that was a real hangup for us for a while. We spent hours with the fish and game guys because they didn't want those guidelines written in such a way that they couldn't go in and get rid of trash fish and improve the fishery of the state for the people. We could have written them in a way where we could have prevented them from ever cleaning up a lake. Squawfish is a naturally occurring species up in the mountains. It's not rare and endangered or anything and it's a so-called trash fish--it's not a sports fish--and we could have written those guidelines so if they get a population of a species they don't want, they couldn't do anything about it.

Chall: So the guidelines almost got to be very, very specific. I hadn't realized that the guidelines would be quite so specific.

Tooker: We tried to write them broad enough to give flexibility to various entities of state government and local government, too, to carry out various programs, and we didn't want to ruin the economy. That's the other thing we were concerned about. Do you write something where the high-rise in downtown San Francisco is brought to a screeching halt? I had labor union people talking to us, wanting to know what is going to happen. We had all kinds of things. Standard Oil of California sent some people in to see me. What we were going to do? They were concerned because they owned a lot of property. The Southern Pacific Railroad was interested. They are a major landowner in this state and they wanted to know what was going on; citizens groups. You'd be amazed.

Part of my problem was that I had just put a staff together. Belknap I hired in August of '71, so he was one of the last I brought aboard, and here I was trying to hire, trying to prepare a budget for the next year, trying to do an outline for the Environmental Goals and Policy Report, get these CEQA guidelines out, and I probably was seeing people five or six hours a day who had questions. What is this farmer doing heading a planning office? What are you going to do? How is this going to impact me? I'd have irate property owners who were on the Sonoma County coast, "What are you going to do with us?" All kinds of--it was unbelievable the people that--and if you didn't see them, then they really get mad. So somebody had to talk to them; in essence, almost hold their hand. Local governments, cities and counties, were very concerned and they were constantly wanting to talk with us.

Chall: The League of California Cities and the supervisors association?

Tooker: Right, CSAC, right. [laughs] Oh, yes, constantly they were concerned. At the same time, you recall, another entity was created in 1970 and that's that Council on Environmental Quality or whatever they call it. John Geoghegan headed that.

Chall: Was that set up by Ronald Reagan?

Tooker: That was set up through legislation, I think.

Chall: I see, the Council on Environmental Quality?

Tooker: Yes; Geoghegan headed it. Geoghegan is a good friend. He is now a lobbyist with the California Manufacturers' Association. We work together on a lot of legislation, and he was doing studies and things. Now, he wasn't doing the land-use planning thing. He was doing the environmental quality thing. But that was also set up and they were doing some things. A supervisor from Orange County, I think his name was Baker, he was chairman of that for a while.

Chall: Okay, I did come across that.

Tooker: They were housed downstairs from us. We were down in the Blue Anchor Building.

Chall: The lieutenant governor had appointed the Environmental Study Council. That may be separate. I am not even sure about that. I keep running across these names.

Tooker: This was run by Ed Reinecke. This was run by the lieutenant governor. It was under his bailiwick.

Chall: The Council on Environmental Quality was run by Reinecke?

Tooker: Yes, Reinecke. They reported to the governor through him. So it was a lieutenant governor's appointed agency.

Chall: The bill for the Department of Environmental Protection had come out. You helped write that. I thought that the idea for that department came out of that study council.

Tooker: It very well might have, it very well might have.

Chall: We were talking about the CEQA guidelines. Do you think that the Reagan administration was helpful in terms of your dealing with all of these concerned people on the outside?

Tooker: I think that the Reagan administration was like any other administration and it's no different. I don't know what Bill Press told you, but in conversations I have had with Bill Press, I kidded him one day and I said, "Wasn't it fun to be on the outside, jabbing those on the inside?" He smiled and said, "Yes." Because I remember several lunches with Bill and he knew the kind of constraints I had, that anybody in an elected office or working for a person in that position, would have. In fact, a lot of my friends in the Resources Agency and in O P and R said to me, "It's more fun being on the outside." You don't have the responsibility. I am sure Bill Press had the same problem I had.*

*See interview with Bill Press, "From PCL to OPR: A Land-Use Activist Outside State Government Moves Inside," in Four Perspectives on Land Use, Land-Use Planning Volume III, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1983.

Tooker: He must have had restraints on him that I had only he had them from Jerry Brown and I had them from Ronald Reagan. You are going to get that when you work for a governor and you can't get around it because you have a lot of departments with conflicting objectives and you try to satisfy them. I find it interesting that Bill now represents developers and is undoing what I did--and I represent livestock interests trying to save the land.

The other thing is, I keep emphasizing, this was something new and different. People fear what they don't know. There was a lot of concern. The lawyers over in highways were just really very apprehensive about anything we were trying to do.

Chall: Highways especially.

Tooker: That's right.

Chall: They had been running the show for so many years in many ways and much of the environmental movement got its start because of the highways.

Tooker: A lot of things that were done, that's right.

Chall: How frustrating was it? You got along with the Resources Agency, so the fact that CEQA guidelines--the writing, the preparing of them, the adopting of them--was largely put over to the Resources Agency after the Mammoth decision was no problem to you?

Tooker: Partly I didn't have time.

Chall: So you didn't feel left out, shut out, let down by this change?

Tooker: If you had been sitting down at the corner of Tenth and N about the time that happened, you would have heard a big sigh of relief! You recall that the bill that created our office had some specific dates in it. The legislative mandates to do the Environmental Goals and Policy Report, and that was driving us crazy, doing those and the guidelines. And we had some other responsibilities. Like I said, we were doing some other projects. I had two people almost full time working on research and other policy things not related to environmental things at all. Then I supervised, kind of a watchdogged, along with a fellow who is now back in Washington, Jim Jenkins, the California Indian Assistance Project, and discovered very quickly that California Indians and maybe others may be great people but they are not very good administrators. We had that program we were trying to kind of help and get off the ground, too.

Chall: Some things that I read had made it look as if the guidelines had been taken away from O P and R because the governor really didn't want to have anything to do with the CEQA guidelines, and if you moved them to the Resources Agency, then it would look as if he (the governor) wasn't responsible for the program.

Tooker: No, quite the contrary. In fact, it was my feeling then and it still is now that the logical place for that was in the Resources Agency, because if you put the secretary of Resources in charge of that, he's got the agencies under him, the regulatory bodies, that could do something about it.

Chall: They can work it out.

Trying to Coordinate the Planning Functions and Identify Needs

Tooker: Yes, and we didn't. We were not a regulatory function, yet they were and they had staff. They had more staff than I did that could work on this and that was another good reason. Paul Clifton, who had been over there was actually coordinating the environmental impact reports and comments on them which were coming through. I guess that was sort of the nucleus of the state clearinghouse.

We also had another problem to a degree and there were some personality conflicts unfortunately. There was a fellow named Jim Johnson. There was another office that we haven't even talked about that was housed in the same building I was in. They competed with us for some of the money that HUD had and they got their own piece of the pie as well and that was the Council on Intergovernmental Relations.

Chall: Yes, tell me about the Council on Intergovernmental Relations. That was a part of your office wasn't it?

Tooker: No, that was not and that was a problem. In fact, one of the reasons that I moved and got out of there was that those people reported to the lieutenant governor and to the governor through him, and I reported directly to the governor. I am sure that didn't sit too well with some people. It never bothered me. Of course, I was reporting to the governor, so it shouldn't bother me. But anyway, even if I reported to the lieutenant governor that wouldn't have bothered me. But they had a local government function they were working on. They were doing planning grants with local government; they were doing all kinds of different things. A fellow by the name of Mark Briggs down there was trying to put together a state clearinghouse, which I thought was a great idea.

Tooker: We did some things. I don't know what they've done in my absence. I just let those people alone. I haven't really gone back and bothered them.

Chall: I don't think it exists any more basically.

Tooker: That's too bad. One of my pet projects was the gathering and publishing environment information that local planning agencies could use in their review and planning activities.

Passerello was, as I said, my scrounger. I turned him loose in the Resources Agency and I was probably spending a tenth of my time on the phone to Ike or Ford or somebody else over there saying, "Now, that's okay, he doesn't mean to bother these guys. I'm sorry." Apologizing. When he was talking to some planners one day in the Department of Water Resources, and saw some loose leaf binders sitting on a guy's shelf, John asked this guy, "What are those?" He said, "Those are some maps we did on the comprehensive planning report for the state water project." John asked, "Can I see them?"

He opened those books up and it was unbelievable what they had. They had done part of the work and then shelved it. That's when I had been negotiating with HUD and that's when I called the chief deputy director of water resources and said, "I understand you've got a budget problem with your planning unit." He said, "Yes, we are going to let most of them go." I said, "How would you like to keep about a dozen of them?" He said, "How?" I said, "How would you like a couple of a hundred thousand dollars?" [laughs] I could hear him salivate on the telephone!

Chall: This is what the office was supposed to be able to accomplish, some kind of a coordination of planning within and among the state agencies.

Tooker: This is what we tried to do, this is what we had to do.

Chall: You might have been able to coordinate the budgeting in your office. That would have really put state planning and research in the governor's office. Even the earliest state planning proposals and the 1959 Act envisioned that.

But you had to make it happen.

Tooker: As far as the budgeting is concerned, it is very difficult and again the long historically established fact is that the Department of Finance did the budget. It was very difficult, and this had nothing to do with Ronald Reagan. I don't care who was governor. If Press tried it under Brown, I am sure he would have the same problem. The director of finance does not relinquish to anybody, especially some-

Tooker: body in the governor's office, the responsibility he feels he has for putting the budget together, even if it is just the environmental part of it.

We made some good headway, I thought. We funded programs through 701 planning money-- A lot of planning stuff. We could use people over in DWR. They did all our maps for us and they had the planners. We funded some stuff through fish and game on rare and endangered species. We helped them keep people on their payroll, on their staffs. I stayed away from outside consultants. I did some outside consultant work. I had a couple of wild ideas, we tried to do some things and it wasn't all bad.

But I was very concerned, and I think I was expressing the concern, that I saw in the Reagan administration. I wanted the biggest bang for my buck. I knew I had a limited amount of money and it was my money; it was taxpayers' money. It was those workers' money--the guys that I worked with on ranches who had callouses on their hands--and I was going to be very frugal about what I did with it, I wanted to make sure. I had seen too many situations where money had been spent by government for something that wasn't worth the paper it was written on. It would come out and go on a shelf some place and nobody would ever open it up. I may be the only one-- I've got about four or five friends around--we may be the only people who still do this, but believe it or not, over ten years after we came out with it, I am still opening my Environmental Goals and Policy Report and looking at maps and looking at areas in there that we have identified for various concerns. I tried to spend the money that way.

An example: My friend, Al Hill, went up to the Department of Conservation, which had then the Division of Forestry. It is now the Department of Forestry. He worked with us in developing a program to identify and map high fire hazard areas located in the state. I had been out in the woods enough on ranches and stuff and I knew about control burns and I knew about brush and I knew fire hazards. Apparently Ray Hunter who was over there as the director, as a matter of fact also had an idea about establishing areas, high fire hazard areas.

This was part of Belknap's concept: You identify an area and a problem or something you want to protect and then you work around that with your guidelines to take care of it protecting it. If it's the oak trees on a ridge line in the foothills, then you plan your development in areas so that you leave your ridge line. If that's the thing, the resource that you want to save. If it's a fish or if it's a bird or whatever--this was the concept.

I talked to Belknap, and he and I really got along well. His concepts of environmental planning were not so much regulatory. They made sense. Suppose you've got a beach front you want to protect, but

Tooker: you've got a landowner who wants to build a resort. Let him build his resort, but keep it down and make it go inland so that you've got some beach for the people and you don't ruin the views. Leave the line of sight open. They did this in Hawaii. In fact, Ray, I think, has been involved as a consultant in some of those projects.

So he had that expertise that was great that he brought into the office and the concepts. Even some of the most ardent anti-environmental movement-type people--I won't say they weren't environmentalists--bought a lot of these concepts and theories. The governor himself liked a lot of the things we talked about. He was very much with us. The governor wasn't the problem. It was some of the other people who had ego problems. [laughs]

Chall: They wanted to determine what you did?

Tooker: To a degree I was the new kid on the block and one of the biggest things we had to go through was a turf battle. When I started going through the budgets and the programs of all of these entities of state government and started to question as we felt we should--

Chall: It's here in the act.

Tooker: That's exactly what it says in those sections of the government code. But, I got a lot of people's noses out of joint. I'd send guys out like Passerello, I'd send over to other places. He'd spend a couple of weeks in highways and I got a call from their director! [laughs]

Chall: I see, then they would complain to the governor?

Tooker: Or me. Usually to Ed Meese and Ed Meese would call and say, "What's going on?" I'd tell him and, "Okay," and then he'd have to soothe ruffled feathers. We never, at any point that I was there, were told, "Stop, you've gone too far." We were told, "Be careful in what you're doing; don't go and get a bunch of guys mad at us and upset." But they never tried to pull the rug out from under us I guess is what I am trying to say.

Writing the Environmental Goals and Policy Report

Chall: How did you work with Governor Reagan and his top staff people in writing the Environmental Goals and Policy Report? I understand that there were times when the whole--and I think you mentioned this with the CEQA guidelines--when the cabinet would meet and practically go over things line by line. How did that work? I think that the general

Chall: knowledge about how Governor Reagan worked is that he liked to have the information brought to him in concise form so that he would know what the problems were and then he could make decisions. He did however work through a cabinet. How did this cabinet function? Was the governor usually at the work-study meetings or did he come in later?

Tooker: No, we would put a product together that had the consensus of agreement of the cabinet members.

Chall: How did they get that consensus? How did that come about?

Tooker: [laughs] It wasn't always easy! I told you we had a lot of breakfasts. It wasn't just CEQA. We had a lot of breakfast meetings and lunch meetings and a lot of just plain old meetings. We got a lot of criticism, which I thought was constructive criticism.

A lot of the things that we did in the first cut were too long. We wrote it about three or four times before the governor saw it. Ray is like I am with you, unfortunately. We'd get wordy and that was one of the first criticisms that we got, that we were too voluminous. So we cut back. We said what we wanted to say in few words and got the general points across in what we were trying to do. In some cases, we would be more illustrative and they felt that some of that wasn't really necessary, so we'd take some of that out. But the general content and what we were trying to get across, the principles and that type of thing, that wasn't necessarily changed as much as it was, let's say, put into fewer words--made clearer.

But we had a lot of meetings on it. They went through it. I guess it took a good six to eight weeks because they wanted to see everything, and that's the way the cabinet system worked with something of this magnitude. They looked at it. They had it in their possession. We would do a lot of xeroxing and make sure every one of the cabinet members and the other line staff--the cabinet secretary and there were others--were all brought aboard and all saw it. They would have it for a couple of days and then we'd meet and go over parts.

Some people would have a problem with this and some people would have a problem with that. A lot of problems. Ike Livermore, bless his heart, was one of the most nitpicky guys I have ever worked for and it didn't change because he had a lot of questions about "Isn't it better if you phrased it this way, or take that period out and put in a semicolon and add this?" We got down to that part of it. I mean we were doing that! [laughs]

Most of the meetings were just George and I and the cabinet.

Chall: How big was the cabinet?

Tooker: There were what, four cabinet secretaries--Jim Stearns-Agriculture and Services, Ike Livermore-Resources, Jim Hall-Health and Welfare, and Frank Walton-Business and Transportation--plus related staff. The executive secretary, Ed Meese--[Michael Deaver usually wasn't there. It was usually Meese, and Crumpacker or [Edwin] Thomas, the cabinet secretary, George Steffes, Director of Programs and Policy, and then sometimes Jim Jenkins.

Chall: They gave their time to this then and just about everything else?

Tooker: Oh, yes.

Chall: They must have been meeting continually.

Tooker: We had a lot of meetings, five to seven, five to eight, seven to nine in the morning. We'd do a lot of that.

Chall: Then when it got to Reagan, who would go in with them?

Tooker: I did. I presented it to him in front of the cabinet.

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Tooker: We would first negotiate what we were trying to get across and see if we couldn't say it in some way that was agreeable with the cabinet members.

Chall: But you might get to a point with the governor when there wasn't consensus already or would you have to make sure of that first?

Tooker: The governor's time was very valuable and so we would use our time in trying to reach agreement and once we had reached agreement-- I am sure I'm not recollecting them, but I am sure there must have been a few things that we had problems with and couldn't reach consensus on, and may have dropped. If there were, they must have been relatively minor because there is nothing that really sticks out in my mind. There was never what you would call any real bloody, knockdown and drag out in my estimation.

Really a lot of the time was taken in the way we approached it and did it more than the actual content. They wanted it to be a working document and not a doctoral thesis or a master's thesis. The way some of the drafts--I think I still have copies at home-- were written, they were almost that way.

Chall: There was some criticism naturally of the final report.

Tooker: There was a lot; you're being nice! [laughs]

Chall: I haven't seen it all, but I do know that there was some. They felt that it just was a series of policy statements and no plan, that no particular methods for planning had come out of it--ways to go about doing something.

Tooker: I spent some very difficult moments defending it and the approach we used in front of a couple of different legislative committees, primarily on the assembly side as I recall. The senators didn't seem to be that concerned. It was mainly in the assembly although there was a joint committee that did have some of the senators on it. There was criticism of that and the CEQA guidelines too as well, and if you haven't come across it, you will. Ike Livermore and I, I remember, one morning spent most of it in front of a legislative committee in Room 4202 literally justifying what we had done. That was one of the points. It was obvious that some of the legislators who had been party to writing the enabling legislation envisioned something that those of us who were called upon to do it, and the people in the governor's office, saw differently.

Ike felt, and I talked to enough people, some friends, some foe, who felt that under the circumstances, given the time, given the amount of dollars available, that what we did was not that bad at all. A lot of people thought that we were going to come up with a lot of recommended regulatory changes. That we were going to do this and that and hard and fast. I guess one of the reasons that we didn't, why we came up with policies is that we tried to use friendly persuasion to get people to do things--I think I was quoted as saying this if my memory is correct--we were sort of like Quakers, and it is ironic that Passerello is a Quaker. I remember a line of questioning from Paul Priolo, who was very adamant about why didn't we just flat out say we'll do this and do that. I said I thought we'd catch more flies with honey than vinegar.

Chall: Do you think you caught any at all?

Tooker: I think so.

Chall: I guess that one of the criticisms was that you couldn't work with it, that you wouldn't really know what to do in terms of planning--environmental control--with the policy statements and goals. The goals and the policy statements were all fine, but then what do you do? Did you consider that up to some other level of government or the private sector?

Tooker: Okay, I am sure people did say that. One of the responses that we made in Los Angeles was they bear in mind what we were trying to do and that the way the enabling legislation was written was that those goals and policies were going to be used by state agencies, local agencies, and in a lot of different situations. I didn't profess to have a magic crystal ball to be able to tell you every situation

Tooker: that they were going to have. Again, we were striving for a balance. This part of Belknap's concept, this is my concept. This is SEE and we talked about SEE extensively in the report, as you will recall.*

The thing we were trying to do with that, I think we've accomplished. I hear this from Passerello who still has a lot of contacts with planners at the county level throughout the state, particularly since he is the project coordinator for the California Conservation Corps, so he gets into a lot of things. We were trying to avoid not disasters, but avoid situations that occurred in various areas. Let's say a board of supervisors would approve a project that would cause silting in streams that would cause massive erosion. We were trying to lay out a suggested program, a policy if you will, for them to follow in making decisions on projects. But the situation in Mendocino County may be quite different than that in Mariposa County and quite different in Orange County, and I didn't want to come up with a book that said in Mendocino County, you will do this and in Mariposa that.

It was a first cut. It was something that people could latch onto and use and in some places, in fact, they have done that. It was trying to give people, planners-- Well, I was trying to do what I told some people at Davis. When the first report came out I was over there. I think it was a meeting of an advisory committee I was on. I'm, as I said an alumnus--and I used to be on the alumni board. It was a group the chancellor appointed me to and there was also an Episcopal priest on it. It was an advisory committee to the school of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences.

We were having lunch and we were looking over some of the programs of the university--we were talking about engineering and agricultural engineering--and the priest said, "What can we do in the school of engineering to help them?" I said, "The best thing we can do is make them take eight to ten units of environmental sciences, so an engineer knows when he builds his bridge, what his bridge is going to do to the stream, to the surroundings beside the stream. If you are going to build a home, what's it going to do.

I think some of your better environmental planners are people who have had to work out in the environment. Some of the ideas I got, as wild as this may seem, they sort of came to us and to me in particular, from talking with the people on the California Indian Assistance Project. Some of the things you will find in that report,

*For additional information on guidelines and planning, see pages 75-76.

Tooker: if you ever read it--and, gosh [laughs] you would probably be one of few that ever read it if you do are my ideas about the carrying capacity of land, which I got from running cows on land. If you put too many cows on a given field and they eat the grass down, then you don't get much of a crop and you don't get a fat cow like you want. The Indians we talked to--the same thing was true: fire hazard areas, control burns we talked about to improve water yields, wildlife habitats.

I remember this one Indian kid from down in the Tule Reservation, outside of Porterville, Joe Carrillo. We talked a lot, and he said, "We get a fire started in the mountains--my ancestors used to let it burn. You guys are crazy. You go out and spend millions of dollars trying to put it out and then you've got a bunch of scrub brush on your hands." And that made sense to me. You know, if you'd burn off that brush that is of no value, you increase your deer herd, you increase your water yield, you have a product called grass that animals can eat whether they be domestic livestock or whether they are wild mammals. And if you put too many on there or if you don't control the size of your herds, whether they are domestic or wild, and you overgraze, you ruin the land.

Chall: That's just understanding the balance of nature.

Tooker: That's right and that's exactly what we were trying to do, not put out something that is strictly regulatory. Goals to shoot for and, sure, they might have been kind of lofty goals, but goals that a planner in Sonoma County can shoot for in looking at subdivision maps, or that one in Orange County can use, or that planners could use in considering second-home subdivisions in Butte County or Mariposa County or Amador County. Something that people at various levels with varying degrees of education or experience could use.

Chall: What was your interest and concern about implementing? As you say, you didn't want to set up regulations.

Tooker: We didn't have the authority to set up regulations either if you look at that law.

Coordinating Goals and Policies: Turf Battles and Politics

Chall: That's right, you didn't. Is that a frustration for a person interested in environmental impacts? I don't think there was any implementation in the guidelines either.

Tooker: We talked a little while ago about the Department of Environmental Protection. That was one of the things that we came out with at one time. It was really just to be a super resources agency with department status basically as we thought about it. Because you have got so many regulatory bodies in the state of California, I don't think you need anybody else to implement any new laws.

Chall: Except they are not always working in harmony with each other, are they? Couldn't some of them be working at cross purposes?

Tooker: Definitely. They still do! [laughs] That's one of the things that we were trying to accomplish. Again, when you were talking to Press he might have mentioned this. I don't care who the governor is, or whether it is Huey Johnson in the Resources Agency or Ike Livermore. You've got one major stumbling block. That's human egos and people pressure.

Chall: Somebody has said that if you are going to do any real planning in California at the state level, there would be "brutal civil service in-fighting."*

Tooker: We spent a lot of time, particularly with the Environmental Goals and Policy Report and CEQA, too. These turf battles. People guard what they have got very jealously. We were trying to get something done, at least get something started and yet not get everybody fighting among themselves, and that's not so easy to do.

Chall: Implementation then is really the missing area.

Tooker: As I recall the enabling legislation, there was really nothing in there for us to do. We were prohibited.

Chall: No, it was definitely stated you weren't allowed to enforce. You mentioned a little while ago Paul Priolo. I wanted to ask you about Paul Priolo, Ed Z'berg, and John Knox. They had those bills dealing with regional government. These all had to do with regions, with putting environmental concerns under some kind of statewide regional organization. Priolo and Z'berg and Knox. At one point, Z'berg's bill looked almost like the Department of Environmental Protection but not quite. How did you all relate to these particular legislators and their bills? Paul Priolo is a Republican.

Tooker: Yes, and Ed Z'berg was a Democrat.

*From an interview with Assembly Consultant Bob Connelly in Stanley Scott, Governing California's Coast (Berkeley, California: Institute of Governmental Studies, 1975) p. 224.

Chall: But they were dealing with a similar kind of issue and that is regulating and implementing.

Tooker: If I recall properly, I probably spent more time with Z'berg and his people than I did with Priolo if you have any concerns that we spent more time with Republicans.

Chall: No, I haven't any; I am interested in their bills.

Tooker: The Priolo bill, as I recall--and I am having trouble recalling much of Paul's legislation. But this particular piece of the legislation might have been our bill, I think.

Chall: I was wondering who carried your bill.

Tooker: I think it was our bill or at least we worked with him on it.

Chall: I see, for the Department of Environmental Protection?

Tooker: Right, because as you recall, there is such a recommendation in the Environmental Goals and Policy Report.

Chall: Yes, there is.

Tooker: We also worked with Z'berg. We had a lot of problems with it. Again, they were people problems. You would have a director or a chairman of the Water Resources Control Board extremely concerned about "am I going to lose some power?" Also, you'd have Bill Simmons and John Maga before him as the executive officer of the Air Resources Board. They were quite concerned. The Department of Water Resources, "What are you going to do to us?" The fish and game people, "How about us?" I think one of the reasons the bills ran into trouble and were never passed is that as much as anything else. You never could get a consensus as to who got what authority among all of these various department heads. Then you had people like highways or Cal Trans later on, very concerned. "Do you mean they are going to tell us what we can do and where we are going to build our road?" They have their friends that they lobby across the street--when I say across the street I mean in the capitol. You get this nomenclature working up here. [laughs] I'm not sure everybody understands it.

You get something called the political realities, too, especially when you have one party in control. A lot of times these things come up in an election year. Obviously, if you are the majority party and a minority party member had an idea that looks good, you don't necessarily want him to look good, particularly if he has got aspirations for any higher office. You want one of your own to do it. I don't care who is in power whether it is a Republican or

Tooker: Democrat, that's the way the game is played. That's a fact and a reality of life across the street. That entered into some of this, too.

A lot of these things we were trying to do were in the final days of the Reagan administration, and at that point everybody knew that someday he very likely might be a president. There are people around in the legislature who didn't want to let him look too good. Didn't want to have him--

Chall: Succeed?

Tooker: Succeed in too many things. We talk about my friends and you mentioned earlier about the Resources Agency. One thing I didn't tell you and I probably should have. It goes back to my environmental planning and a lot of my thoughts. When I was still in the Resources Agency, George called me in one day and said, "I want you to sit down with John Maga--who was the executive officer of the Air Resources Board--and I want you to develop an air pollution program for the governor. We want to do some things."

I helped sell the governor--Steffes and I spent a long night in cabinet one night with the governor selling him on retrofit devices for NOX [nitrogen oxide] and some of the mandatory inspection and things that we have now--vapor recovery systems that Maga said would cut down a lot of fumes, particularly in the South Coast Basin. These were bills that I helped draft and worked through the legislature in 1970 and some of the other stuff--the legislators' environmental package, the CEQA legislation--I was not as involved with because I had my own babies that I was trying to give birth to like the air pollution package. I have the dubious honor and distinction of having moved out of the state in the end of 1974 and the beginning of '75 and then coming back in and little bills that I helped push have come back to haunt me since I moved back into the state of California! [laughs]

Chall: What about the Knox bills and regional government?

Tooker: He had to come back after Friends of Mammoth.

Chall: Yes, after Friends of Mammoth he revised the original legislation.

Tooker: Yes, he had to come back and rewrite CEQA and I was brought in and worked with him on that. The administration, their legislative people, probably did more until they got into some hangups on the senate floor. I remember getting a call from Tom Willoughby who was his consultant with the Local Government Committee and coming over and helping, with the administration people--a fellow named Bill Evans and others from down in the governor's office--and working out some problems. They had a couple of hangups with things they were trying to do.

Looking at Regional Governance

Chall: There was quite a bit of compromise in that post Mammoth decision CEQA bill, AB 889.

Tooker: Right. On the regional government thing. When you start talking about environmental problems it's very obvious that environment-- air, water--you have specific problems confined to regions that overlap various political jurisdictions. You may have a political boundary called a county or a city, but the problem may be within a basin, it may be within a valley like the San Joaquin or Sacramento, and an obvious way to approach a solution to the problems that you can have with your air, your water, or with other things, too, is not to limit yourself to just the jurisdiction of that particular political boundary, like a county or a city, but go throughout that geographic area.

Chall: How do you arrive at that?

Tooker: We tried very hard. We at one point--Steffes had the idea that maybe we could do away with some of the counties that we had and, boy, if you ever want to get into something that is really a political hot potato, try that.

At that point, I had a fellow named Steve Poseland on my staff. He is now a consultant. He worked with the Air Resources Board and the Energy Commission at one point. Steve and Mary and I spent hours with George and on our own trying to look--where can you redraw boundaries? We looked at throwing counties out, cutting down, making changes. There are things that don't make sense. Political sense maybe but not from an environmental sense or a geographic sense. Look at Los Angeles County. Lancaster probably shouldn't be there because the environment of the Lancaster-Antelope Valley area is very different from that of Malibu or San Pedro or even Palos Verdes. And you have other parts within the county that really have little micro-climates or areas that really don't have the same kind of problems.

But you try to separate off some of those areas and you are into a fight you really don't want. It gets bloody. We even went so far as to suggest it to some people about changing that boundary and putting a high desert county in parts of Kern and eastern L.A.

Chall: I think there is something going on now in upper Fresno County. In the San Joaquin Valley I know there is one group trying to split off.

Tooker: But then when you get--and I'm getting to the Knox bills--then when you get into a regional approach to these things, the people within your political boundaries get very nervous because what do you do

Tooker: with them? They represent a constituency and they feel they have a role and a position. I went and talked to the ABAG [Association of Bay Area Government] people and the SCAG [Southern California Association of Government] people and the SRAPA [Sacramento Regional Area Planning Agency]. The SRAPA people were in my office all of the time for a while. That's the local Sacramento area group. What do you do with them? What do you give them and how far do you let them go? To date nobody has ever been able to--as some of the legislators just said the last couple of days about passing the budget--bite the bullet and come up with a proposal or a solution that satisfies the concerns of these, in essence, politicians in these political boundaries. What can you come up with to enable everybody to agree, yes, for this purpose we are going to look at a regional approach.

We had trouble within state government. One of the things I wanted to do was standardize the regions that government divides itself into. You have water quality control regions, you have fish and game regions, you have park regions.

Chall: Air pollution.

Tooker: Air pollution. You name it, they've got 'em. They all in their own little worlds can justify why the boundary is where it is. But that's just the very tip of the iceberg. I live in a community called Fair Oaks, which is an unincorporated area of the county east of Sacramento. There is a fire protection district, the Fair Oaks Fire District. That has one set of boundaries. The Fair Oaks Park and Recreation District has another set of boundaries. The Fair Oaks Community Council, which has a planning function, they have another set of boundaries. You have at least two and I think part of a third water district within there. Decisions can be made by the fire protection people that influence development, urbanization, growth. The planning people have a very definite function. The water people have a very--if there is no water there, you're not going to have people there. Then you've got a sanitation district. I'm not sure, I think there is countywide flood control. There are a couple in the storm drain area. We, at one point, looked at special districts and what we can do with special districts combining, eliminating, giving the function to somebody else. That's a can of worms.

Chall: Wasn't that one of the responsibilities of the Council on Intergovernmental Relations?

Tooker: That's right and we got into a little territory fight with them over that. [laughter]

Chall: About who was supposed to draw the boundaries for the regions?

Tooker: That's right because we were making recommendations to the governor and they didn't like that!

Chall: I see, because that is probably one of their duties.

Tooker: Yes, one of their duties. It was one of their responsibilities. In essence, probably the way they were set up, they probably were given more responsibility for working with local governments than we were. But we had to. We didn't have any choice.

I never held anything against the people there. In fact, I hired a couple. I think that made some of the people mad. I hired a couple of their people towards the end because they had some good people. There was a young lady, Carol Welker that worked for them that I brought aboard, another young lady with a master's degree. She wasn't happy with what she was doing. I had some work that needed to be done and she had the expertise to do it, so we brought her into the office and she was good. She was a good urban planner and that's what I wanted. If you create an urban environment and you make people want to live in the city, in the urban complex, and you fill in, you can stop some of this cherry stemming and leapfrogging and you can save some of these ag lands.

I think some people got very upset with me because one of the first groups I created was an agricultural advisory committee. I had all kinds--I had a person--one of Bill Press's people from the Planning and Conservation League--I asked them if they wanted to put somebody on. I had a representative of the Sierra Club, the cattlemen, the Farm Bureau, the Grange, the Ag Council--every ag group I could think of--nurserymen, wool growers, they were all there, and we kicked around some very heavy stuff.

Before you run out of tape, I wanted to say one other thing.

Chall: We have more than a half-hour.

Office Staff and Interagency Cooperation

Tooker: Okay, I had a very small group. I had eleven people, and two of them were borrowed. I had nine on the payroll. I like to think we did a lot, when you consider that there are over a hundred there now. We had a very small budget. I think we got up to a hundred-and-some-thousand dollars of state general fund money and approximately a million dollars of federal money. I had a lot of departments that were very skeptical, but later on I think made believers of them because they cooperated very well. Water resources was an example; parks was great. Bill Mott. I go back to when I had the car and brought his son Bill home from school. His room was two doors from mine at Davis, so I had known the family for years! That didn't hurt. If I needed something from parks, I picked up the phone and I got it.

Chall: Yes, those contacts are important.

Tooker: The people in fish and game were great. The wild river stuff, anything I needed, that was a great help. Ike himself--Livermore, the secretary of resources--everybody has their differences, but we basically got along fine and his deputy and I were good friends whether it was Ford B. Ford who then left or John Maga who took over. I helped hire John Maga as executive officer for the Air Resources Board. Nobody in the agency when I came aboard in '68 knew anything about air pollution. They told me to go to a meeting and it was a very interesting meeting. Nobody knew who I was and when they wanted to go into executive session everybody got up and left except the board members and me. They didn't know who I was and I just sat and listened.

Then when they hired Maga, I had to go and find them office space. His secretary put her desk in with my secretary. Maga had his in a storeroom that I was responsible for. Then we went and hired a fiscal officer and had to go and rent offices. So I helped put the Air Resources Board together literally. So those guys were very helpful to me. Simmons was an attorney and I told Maga a long time before he needed an attorney on his staff, and Simmons ended up being the executive officer when Maga left. He was sharp. He was a heavy Sierra Clubber but he was good. He knew what he was trying to do, and he did a good job, I thought.

So I could get help if I needed something from the Air Resources Board. One of my concerns was the burning of agricultural commodities. I also was into prescribed burns. Now, most of them are high but not all and there are materials you need--equipment. Pruning material from deciduous fruit trees you've got to get rid of. You can't mulch them all; you've got to burn. Rice was a problem. So we tried to get some money for a planning function in the Air Resources Board and we did, in fact, get a unit started in the Air Resources Board in long-range planning. So there is quite a bit we accomplished. Well, you better ask questions.

Chall: You have given me quite a bit of material. You talked about the problems of districts. When the Local Government Task Force began to work in March of 1973 or even before that, at first you were listed as being on it, but later when the task force was finally assembled you were not on it.

Tooker: That was because I changed jobs.

Chall: Oh, I see. So otherwise you might have been--

Tooker: It would have been a whole different responsibility.

Chall: I want to go into that. Let me talk about the task force then because you were with the governor's office at the time the task force was put together and came out with its report. Ronald Reagan had had some real concerns about districts and how many there were.

Tooker: There were more than five thousand.

Chall: Yes, and he obviously had something else in mind when he appointed this task force. What happened to it?

Tooker: This is a horrible thing to say, but I really wasn't involved and I honestly don't know. I left in what was actually in April--no, in May [1973].

IV THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE: LEGISLATIVE SECRETARY, 1973-1974

- Chall: You were director of OPR until May of 1973 and then you went to the governor's office as a legislative assistant. I don't know why you left OPR, and what you did in the governor's office. So we might take that up then.
- Tooker: Okay, actually what had happened is--let me say it's kind of a delicate thing.
- Chall: Let's be candid.
- Tooker: Well, the guy is now dead. A friend of mine had lost his wife and he was the governor's legislative secretary. His name was Bill Evans. She had lupis. He was a very close friend of George Steffes's as well. One day I got a call from Bill and he said, "Do you want to have lunch?" This was, I guess, in about April. Dottie had died in February, I think, and he said, "I am having a problem with Will." Will was his son, who was eleven. He said, "I can't do this job and spend the hours and raise my son. I've got to get out of here. I'm going nuts." He had gone through a rather traumatic experience through the last few years. He said that because I had worked in legislation and had been dabbling in it in O P and R--when they needed somebody as back-up or something I would get called in. So, he said, "They tell me that if you come over and take my job, I can get out of here right away." I said, "I don't want to take your job." He said, "I've got to get out and I don't have time to train somebody new. You know how to do it, you know the players, and you can step in."

I went to my friend, George Steffes, who at this point had left state service and was a private lobbyist, and I said, "George, they want me to be a legislative secretary. What do you think?" He said, "You won't like it and I'm not sure you'd be a good lobbyist." I always like to say that because now I work for him and I am a lobbyist! [laughs] I remind him of that every now and then--not when the paychecks come out though. [laughs] So I went home and talked to my wife and we decided it would be different and it might be fun.

Tooker: In the office we had gotten a couple of things I wanted to do done and things were set in place to do some other things. It was then arranged that Bob De Monte was going to come in and assume my job if I left. He was in Housing and Community Development.

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Tooker: They were doing something else with housing and they wanted to find a new spot for him anyway. So I went over and became the governor's legislative secretary and had the job that George had when I first met him several years before.

Chall: You were in close touch with the governor's office then?

Tooker: I was right in the governor's office. I worked legislation and my responsibilities were the state senate. I had an assistant that worked with me in the state assembly.

Chall: Who was the assistant?

Tooker: It started out being a fellow named Tim Cole and then he went over and became a deputy director for Verne Orr of finance. When he left, we brought aboard a fellow named Marty [Martin] Dyer, who is now a lobbyist also.

Chall: What was your responsibility, just all kinds of legislation that the governor was concerned about?

Tooker: Yes, all legislation. Being a liaison between the legislature and the governor's office.

The Process of Handling Legislation

Chall: Who would determine what the point of view would be of the administration toward the legislation? Was that done in the cabinet or how?

Tooker: No. Well, if it's a major policy question and someone isn't sure then, yes, it would go to cabinet. There was a process that I believe is still used in the governor's office because the people who worked for me, some of them are still over there. At least the attorney that I used worked for George, worked for me, and he is now still over there. In fact, Jim Neff, who is now the governor's legislative secretary worked downstairs in CIR. So Jim and I have known each other for a long time, too! [laughs]

Tooker: The policy was that when a bill was introduced, it came through the governor's office. We had a couple of gals that would sort all of the bills. Most departments and/or agencies have bill service, so they would get them. We would assign bills by subject matter to whatever agency had the responsibility for whatever the bill dealt with. If social welfare, it would be the health and welfare people who would get it. They would do something called the bill analysis. On it there is a recommended position, why and what the bill does and all this. In the governor's office, they'd come in, we'd go over them, and then we approved positions or disapproved positions based on what they told us.

If there was something that they had sent in recommending one way or the other and we thought there was a problem that ought to go to cabinet, then we had the ability to shovel it upstairs and the cabinet would meet and decide, yes, we should do this or shouldn't do that. Sometimes we would meet with the governor, sometimes we wouldn't meet with the governor.

So I had the responsibility while I was not physically doing it all of the time of making sure these reports were brought in. We looked at them, we established positions, approved positions of departments. Then if a bill was set for hearing, we made sure that our position was brought forth to the committee and on record and would work it in some cases.

Some bills--we didn't get involved in that many bills. The governor would have specific bills in his program, the governor's program. Those bills, yes, I would be actively involved and working on that legislation. Sometimes we were successful and sometimes we weren't.

Chall: How did the governor work with the legislature? Was he interested in working with the legislators?

Tooker: By the time I got to be his legislative secretary, he had improved over what he had done earlier. I think part of the problem was that when he first became governor in 1967 he had been led to believe by a lot of people close to him that most elected officials, particularly state legislators, were a bunch of S.O.Bs--I'm not talking about the son of the boss--and that attitude has changed. I am very proud of what Ronald Reagan has done as president, considering the way he started in Sacramento. He learned his lessons in Sacramento and learned to get along with the legislature better. He wouldn't have gotten the things he has gotten through Congress if he hadn't learned his lesson.

Some of the things we did. We had a senate that was almost evenly split twenty-twenty. The lieutenant governors were Ed Reinecke and then for a while John Harmer when Reinecke was forced to resign. We

Tooker: did things to better the relationship between the governor and the state senate, by holding a series of small dinners. We had from ten to twelve--well, I guess from eight to ten--twelve at one point--members to the governor's house for dinners. They were just informal, no agenda, just yak. I was concerned that what we were trying to do was like in lobbying, like in sales: people buy things from people they know. People work better and more closely with people they know. We didn't have just Republicans. We had Democrats and Republicans.

I remember the governor was pushing a tax limitation similar to the Prop. 4 the [Paul] Gann thing. This was in '73. It was in bill form then and Randy [Randolph] Collier was at this one particular dinner. He was sitting up next to the governor with his shocking white hair. It was some kind of a turkey casserole we had. The cooks the governor had were great. I mean they had great dishes; it was with noodles and it was really good and we were eating. Somehow, and I didn't want to bring this up because I didn't want to get too embroiled in bills that were confronting us, the subject came up and Randy turned to the governor and said, "You know, Governor, I have been around this place a long time and a lot longer than you, and I've got to tell you, even the best ideas take a few years to get through." We were having trouble and it looked like we were going to lose it. The point he was trying to get across obviously is Rome wasn't built in a day; it may be a great idea and if you don't get it now, don't give up.

Chall: One of the state senators whom we interviewed said that you were approachable, that one could talk to you, but that Ronald Reagan was intransigent, that he would not negotiate. Ronald Reagan would state his position and then not "give an inch." Governor Reagan's idea of a concession, we were told, was to lay out a new position without involving the legislators.*

*James R. Mills, "A Philosophical Approach to Legislative and Election Realities, 1959-1981" in The Assembly, the State Senate, and the Governor's Office, 1958-1974, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, 1982. pp 90-91.

Tooker: Okay, as I interpret what the person--and I have no idea who you are talking about--what I interpret him saying is that the governor did not--and it's true, he's right to a degree--bring legislators into his final decision-making process. He would make a decision with his cabinet with, in quotes, "his people" and then we would present that position to the members of the legislature.

Now, that was not always true. There were a few senators that we did bring in and work with. It occurs to me that we had some problems with some things and we brought in a couple of guys. One that was brought in and we worked very closely with was George Deukmejian. Bob [Robert] Lagomarsino was another one. Bob carried the tax program for the governor and we brought him in to talk about it. The governor had his staff put together what he wanted to do. We brought those ideas in to work with Bob on the actual legislation. There were a lot of instances where we had the reorganization plans. We had other things we tried to do. We would develop them and then we would present those.

Now, the senator may have felt that he was being left out, but you've got to realize that when the founding fathers put this country together, they put together three levels of government for checks and balances. The legislative branch and judicial branch were two and the executive branch is another. I'm not sure you want more than one branch collaborating together. Maybe it's--well, as long as you've got that check and balance system, what's wrong with one branch coming up with their ideas and proposing it to another? If they are salable, sell them. I think people are entitled to their difference of opinions.

I thought that we got along pretty well with the senate and with the assembly, too. The assembly used to give me fits. We had one particular time. They came back for a veto override session. This was '74. They came back for a veto override session and they had bills that were just ridiculous that we had vetoed, and they would come flying out of the assembly, sixty-three to two, sixty-three to eight, one of them! [laughs] Eight of them came flying out of the assembly and I got a phone call from Ed Meese, "Now, I don't want any of those bills getting overridden." We had some hairy moments on the senate floor during that period. It was very tricky, but we were lucky.

Chall: Did you have to offer the senators something not to vote for the override?

Tooker: You appeal to their good nature. [laughter]

Chall: I see, it's just that!

Tooker: What do you have to offer?

Chall: Did you deal with Proposition 9, the coastal zone initiative? [1972]
Did you have anything to do with the coastal bills?

Tooker: Not really. No, not really. That was really the Department of then
Navigation and Ocean Development.

V PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, 1974--

Chall: How about winding up now with your telling me what you might have
learned from that experience in terms of planning and what you are
doing right now.

Contract Lobbyist

Tooker: [laughs] I don't know if you want to know what I am doing right now
or not!

Chall: You are lobbying.

Tooker: Right. It's fun.

Chall: Are you lobbying for certain groups?

Tooker: Yes, we are contract lobbyists. We represent various clients. I
think we have around thirty, twenty or thirty, somewhere in that
area; very diversified. I enjoyed being in O P and R and I enjoyed
being on the governor's legislative staff. A lot of what I do now
is more closely akin to what I did when I was the governor's
legislative secretary. It's different working for a governor than
working for the private sector so to speak. Obviously, there are a
lot of similarities but there are a lot of differences, too. I enjoy
it. A lobbyist is really nothing more than what the actual name of
what we do implies. We are legislative advocates. We advocate a
position or a philosophy that our clients have. A philosophy I have
and George shares is that if we don't think we can do what the client
wants, then we won't take them as clients. We have turned clients
down.

We had a situation in the last few weeks, the last couple of
months. There is a firm, a major company, that manufactures a teflon-
coated bullet. There was a bill going through the legislature sponsored

Tooker: by almost every peace officers' association in the state to outlaw these. They are armor piercing and they will go through the flack jacket or the bullet-proofed vest that a lot of law enforcement officers wear. The company approached us and George got us together, the four of us in the firm, and he said, "What do you think? It is a chance for another lucrative client. Are we interested?" I just looked at one of the young ladies that works for us, Sarah. I looked at George. Sarah, I knew from the look on her face, she shared what I was going to say. I said, "George, I think I'd rather have the cop there a lot more than those people's money." And we turned them down.

There are lobbyists, I am sure, here in this town or in Washington or any place else that if you have to, you'll take whatever you can get. I'm lucky. When I came back to California--

Chall: What did you do in the interim?

Tooker: I worked for the American National Cattlemen's Association. Unfortunately, the job I thought I was taking and what I ended up with were two different things. Having done the types of things I had done here in California-- They tried to put an Oregon boot on me and chain me to a desk all day. I am not the kind of person that can sit still. You've had me sitting still a lot longer than I normally sit still!

Chall: Good for you! [laughter]

Tooker: But I was just going nuts. I was literally going out of my mind and I wasn't happy at all. So that's when I contacted George and he said, "Do you know of anybody that you might be able to pick up as a client or two?" I told you about my background in agriculture and it just so happened that the California Cattlemen's Association had been toying with the idea of hiring a contract lobbyist. Their work had gotten to the point and their legislative duties had gotten to the point where they felt they could either try to bring somebody aboard and train them or hire a lobbyist. They didn't know if they had the money. But by hiring contract lobbyists, they don't have to pay fringes. Somebody else does that. So there's a lot of advantages.

I had known Bill Steiger for over twenty years, the guy who is executive vice-president. He was back in Denver at a meeting and I was still living back there. We talked about it. I came out on my vacation in August of '76 and went to a couple of meetings he had with his long-range planning group and with his board of directors and helped sell them on the idea that they ought to hire a full-time lobbyist. He said, "Okay, now you've gone half the battle." I said, "Good. Now, when do I interview?" He said, "We'll have to go through that, but first you've got to convince the board of directors and the membership to vote on it at the convention in December." So in December

Tooker: of '76, I kissed my wife good-by, got in my car and drove out to California. I stayed with my cousin and drove down to Fresno and on my own went to his meeting.

Going to a cattlemen's meeting for me is like going to a family reunion. Really, there are people at some of those that have known me all my life. In fact a director from Siskiyou County, his father and mother knew my parents before I was born. Another fellow and his wife who were there, I knew them. I had been to their wedding in 1943; we go way back. And there are others around the state that I know like that. So people would say, "What are you doing here? We haven't seen you in years?" I told them, "I am going to convince you to hire a lobbyist and I'm going to convince you that the lobbyist should be me." Some of my old grouchy friends would say, "Why in the hell would we want to hire you?" [laughs] And so I told them!

When I told this to an old buddy of mine, he was shocked! Every year I go at least twice to his ranch up in Siskiyou County just to get back in the real world--sit on a tractor or a horse or go out and irrigate. You've got to do that when you work in this place. I told Clancy and he said, "Didn't you take kind of a chance? You quit your job and you came out and you had no job and you didn't know if they were going to hire you or anybody?" I said, "That's right, but I had enough faith in myself that I could convince them why they needed somebody and why that somebody should be me."

It was fortunate for me because what happened is Ronald Reagan was the speaker at one of their major functions. I hadn't been there very long when one of the girls, who didn't know me at that point, said, "Mr. Tooker, there is a Dennis Le Blanc looking for you." I said, "Dennis Le Blanc, what's he looking for me for?" He's the advance man for Ronald Reagan or at that time he was. He was the president's bodyguard and did advance work.

So Dennis set it up that I helped him with the Fresno police and did some of the advance work with him.

Chall: Oh, really? Back to square one!

Tooker: That's right. And who did I go out to the airport and pick up and shepherd into the hotel down there? Ronald Reagan! Who did I scoop up and get out to the airport? I made sure that the then-president of the Cattlemen sat in the back seat of the limousine right next to Ronald Reagan! [laughs] And I got the job obviously.

Chall: Very good! All right, from here you are planning to go and be a rancher, is that it?

Tooker: Right.

Chall: How much acreage do you have?

Tooker: I don't have any at the moment. I have half an acre in Fair Oaks.

Theories on Saving Agricultural Land

Chall: What is your theory about open space, about legislation for the retention of open space? I know that that is one of the major areas of concern now.

Tooker: Are you ready for a long speech? I have some problems and I will be very, very quick. Number one, if people want to save open space just for open space and don't want to put it to any productive use, that's fine, if that's what they want to do and they are willing to admit that's what they want to do and if they are willing to pay for it. I get concerned when people come in and say, "We are going to be the great savior of agriculture. We are going to help you save all of this open space." Then when agriculture tries to plow or spray or put in animals that make noise or smells on that land, people say, "Wait a minute, we really don't want you." When they go down to Orange County and pass ordinances against poultry operations to get them out, when they say you can't use manure from the feed lots in the Imperial Valley on your yard--they really don't want the farmer. People who are two-faced, that try to use agriculture as the reason when that is not the reason at all, I have a real problem with. But if you want to save open space, productive agricultural open space, you don't have to have regulatory functions, you have to have an economy that allows the man on the land to make money and stay there.

If you are going to save agricultural lands--not open space, agricultural lands--then you've got to save the farmer. Now, I am trying to get myself into a position where I can get a small piece of land and do some farming, but I am not worried about making money. Fortunately, my family situation is such that I can feel easy. My mother has put money in a trust to take care of my children's education, so that's not a burden I am worried about right now. One boy says he wants to be a doctor and that does make me a little nervous because that is going to cost money. But he is also a pretty good athlete and I keep telling him he is going to learn how to play football! [laughs]

But I'm looking for a way of life. Unfortunately in the livestock industry in this state, the way things have gone the farmers have not made any money. These people are out there sitting on a horse or a tractor or a pick-up truck all day for ten hours, twelve hours

Tooker: a day in the hot sun, or out in the freezing sleet and snow. They are the ones who go out and try to hug a calf that has just been born to keep it from freezing to death. There are a lot of things a city person doesn't understand. These farmers do things that end up with that good-looking steak on your table which you can enjoy in your warm dining room or kitchen. You've got to be able to let them make some money and for the last eight years, the people in the cattle business haven't made any money. If you come along and dangle a few dollars in front of them to build a subdivision on their land they are going to want to sell. I don't think it's fair to say no, you can't sell.

The guy has put his heart and soul into his farm for a number of years. Usually his back is shot. Why not let him sell if he can make more money? If you don't want him to sell, then when the developer comes to that farmer and says, "I'll give you three thousand for it," then somebody else better come up with the three thousand and let the guy sell it to him. Don't force him to stay on it.

There are all kinds of situations I can tell you like that. There is a Nisei tomato grower out here who had a son who was just teething over the bit to take over Dad's operation. Unfortunately, the boy was home from college one day and he was on a tractor and it overturned and he is now in a wheelchair for the rest of his life. The old man is tired, he is in his fifties, and he's selling out. What do you do with a situation like that?

Maybe there won't be anybody who is dumb enough, like a Tooker or somebody else who would want to buy that land and farm it. Maybe there will be but maybe there won't be, and if there isn't, what are you going to do? Are you going to tell the guy, "I am sorry, mister, you've got to farm that, even if you're losing money?" You let people in the business make money, whatever you have to do. I am not talking about being millionaires. Let them pay their bills and make money to send their kids to whatever college they want to go to, and they are going to stay there. It gets in your blood. I have wanted a ranch since I was nine years old and I've been working at it. Twice I started and because of different situations, one was a divorce, I didn't.

[chuckles] April is a very bad month around here. We had deadlines and it was just terrible. We were here early in the morning and until late at night and I was just going nuts, and so were the rest of us in the firm. Friday morning things were calming down and at 7:15 I got a phone call and it was the wife of my buddy in Siskiyou County and she said, "Clancy told me to call you." I said, "What's the matter?" She said, "Fatso quit"--he was one of the hired hands --Clancy thought about now you would be interested in the job!" [laughs] I said, "What do I have to do?" She said, "You have got to

Tooker: sit on a tractor seat for ten hours a day!" I said, "Where do I live?" She said, "I don't know. You'll have to work that out with Joannie"--my wife. [more laughter]

I'll tell you, it sounded pretty good. Then she said, "We'll even give you five hundred dollars a month!" They were pulling my leg obviously. But let me use this friend of mine as an example of the bind this guy is in. He is in a position where a local government has made a decision to allow some lot splits on property adjoining his. It was property that he had been using for years to move cattle from the main body of his ranch to some pasture land seven to eight miles away. This was some 250 acres he owned along the Little Shasta River up in Siskiyou County. He had it worked out that he could, with his neighbor's approval, cut the fence, move the cattle through cross country--no roads--and then put the fence back the way it was. It was about seven to eight miles that way. It's twelve to fifteen miles if he has to drive them down to the land and back. It's not worth it to move the cattle that far on a road because he has got to put people out with pilots in case a car comes along.

He is thinking seriously of selling out. With the lot splits houses are now going in. When I was up there in the fall, they had already built about three of the houses.

He went through a lot of trauma this year getting an operating loan from a bank at interest rates that would curl your hair. One banker sat him down and went through his financial report and showed him how they had appraised the ranch. He told me, in late January when he was at my house, as he is every year for his birthday, "Tooker, I could sell that place, pay off all my debts and my partner, and invest it in municipal bonds and live very comfortably the rest of my life and we could educate the two kids who aren't through college yet."

Chall: I am wondering about the county allowing a developer to take land that was already being used for agriculture--

Tooker: This actually wasn't a developer. This was just another guy who had land and they let him divide it into twenties. Then he sold the twenties to people, I think, from like Redding and San Francisco who wanted a country place. But the supervisors didn't see the consequences of their action. My friend, in fact, is very deeply involved in the supervisorial race now--he is not running--because of this kind of thing.

Chall: Did he argue his case before the board of supervisors?

Tooker: I honestly don't know. I know he has been fighting it and he has been in court with them so I am sure he did.

Tooker: It's not necessarily the planning, it's the implementation. Sometimes you can have the best plan going and if the people involved in implementing it, don't do it the way you planned it, what's the use of planning, which is really unfortunate. You've got to get to the implementers as much as to the planners.

Chall: The implementers are usually the political people.

Tooker: Right, and they have difficulties. I don't want anybody to think that I am saying that they don't have difficult decisions to make. They are the man in the trench in the front line so to speak and they have to look at all facets of this. They have got to look at the economy, and what it is going to do. My concern is sometimes they don't look at the whole picture, that they are influenced by one side or the other. I don't care which way their philosophy is, towards the environment or away from the environment, we need people to look at the total picture and see what that action is going to cause.

Environmental Impact Reports and Related Studies

Chall: Aren't EIRs [Environmental Impact Reports] supposed to help that?

Tooker: That's what we thought. Well, I think if they are used properly, I think they can be a very valuable tool, I really do. In fact, at one point--we didn't talk about this--we were very close to putting a lot of the materials to do EIRs, at least a quick scan of an EIR, on a computer. We actually had a small program. I got hold of some graduate students at Davis who were having trouble with a National Science Foundation grant. The feds were asking them, "How is the government going to use what you have got?"

They happened to run into John Paserello who brought them in to see me and we showed them how we could use what they had. So we got a lot of work done free for us. In fact, I had a local TV man here who found out about this. It was Bill Harvey for KCRA here in Sacramento. He was over at Davis and found out they were coming over with their equipment to do a pilot demonstration for some SRAPA people and some department heads in my office. He called and asked if he could come and he was in there forty-five minutes filming this demonstration we did. I was amazed. He gave us about six or seven minutes of six o'clock news and two or three minutes on the eleven o'clock news. We got a lot of great coverage out of that.

But we had also done some simulation work about what happens with the quality of air in San Diego. They were doing some work with the local planning agency down there, so they had the information and they

Tooker: could plug it in. What happens if you add fifteen hundred homes in this area, what impact can you expect on garbage collection, sewer, air pollution, the whole thing. How about the allied services you'd need, the back-up services, where are they going to go and what is that going to do? Does that generate even more homes--this kind of thing.

Chall: It really worked well enough to tell you?

Tooker: We really went into it on a very limited scale. There are a lot of problems. Number one, you have to have good information to put into these to be able to get good information out: garbage in, garbage out. Everybody had trouble at that point with money.

I don't know what they have done in San Diego about it. I know what we had done in OPR was to try to computerize the various maps we'd had in the Environmental Goals and Policy Report so that, quickly, when an EIR came in from the clearinghouse or wherever, the guy could look and say, "Okay, it's in grid co-ordinates so and so. Okay, we see that in these grid co-ordinates there, is the habitat of the San Joaquin Kit Fox. It is a rare and endangered species. There is a fault going through there. We need to see exactly where." So what we were after was a quick and dirty way to identify a problem area, so that those concerned could go back on the ground and see whether they were taking precautions for the Kit Fox or whatever. Are they going to stay away and give them a buffer area where it won't hurt them? How about nesting areas for condors or other birds? What about the fault? Is there a fault? Where is it? Is there a problem?

We could identify quickly whether it was fish and game we needed to get detailed comments from, mines and geology, who. This is the kind of thing we were trying to do, and we were trying to get this done for the clearinghouse. Whether they have ever done it or not, I don't know. I know the guy who is running the clearinghouse, or last time I heard he was, is a computer programmer. If Bill Press is unhappy with what has gone over there, it may be that program has been shelved.

Chall: I see, that's the clearinghouse for EIRs in OPR?

Tooker: Yes, it was. [laughs] Maybe you didn't know that.

Chall: Well, that's the end of the tape. I really appreciate all of the time you have given me. Thank you for an interesting and very informative interview.

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University of California
Berkeley, California

Government History Documentation Project
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era

Peter Hannaford

EXPANDING POLITICAL HORIZONS

An Interview Conducted by
Gabrielle Morris
in 1982



PETER HANNAFORD
1983

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INTERVIEW HISTORY

An energetic latecomer to Ronald Reagan's gubernatorial administration, Peter Hannaford offers in this short interview an enthusiastic view of the smooth-running operation the Reagan team had achieved in their last year in the governor's office. Hannaford, now a national public relations consultant, also provides lively commentary on some realities and practicalities of local politics and a sense of the camaraderie among the able young men close to Reagan in the 1970s, many of whom continued to play key roles in his presidency.

"It's amazing," he told senior aide Michael Deaver a few weeks after joining the governor's staff as director of public affairs in January 1974. "Everybody seems so cheerful and they all work so well together, there's nobody getting in each other's hair."

Earlier, Hannaford had been in advertising in Alameda County and was active in various civic organizations in which he became acquainted with Donald Livingston, Edwin Meese III, and others who were to figure in Reagan's administrations. Against the advice of his boss, Hannaford took on the management of a few local political campaigns. Most of his candidates won, which led to his becoming a member of the county and later the state Republican central committees.

In preliminaries to the 1966 gubernatorial race, Hannaford favored George Christopher. He was, however, impressed with Reagan's charisma when they met at a party convention, and moved to his camp after the primary election. Party experience was troublesome for Hannaford because of internal power struggles, but he found it instructive for his own candidacy in 1972, when he challenged Ron Dellums for the 7th Congressional District seat.

The following year, there was a resignation from the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency; the governor's appointments aide looked for someone "who was a strong Reagan supporter and a member of the Sierra Club," and Hannaford was appointed. Like the Republican committees, the TRPA was not a case of good or evil. "You didn't have the good guys and the bad guys. If you put yourself in the shoes of the people you were fighting and see from their perspective, it takes on a very different look."

Also in 1973, Hannaford became northern field coordinator for the special election campaign for Reagan's tax-limitation initiative (Proposition 1 on the June ballot) which was managed by Deaver.

"It was a rewarding experience," Hannaford commented. "I believed very much in what he was trying to do. [L]ike most of the supporters, I did not see its Achilles heel, which was its length. [T]he opponents

got together in the summer, while we were still laboring under the illusion of a big lead in the polls, [and] started going around rather quietly to city councils, county boards of supervisors, and school boards, making presentations against it. [W]e began getting bombarded with news accounts that this or that city council had passed a resolution against our proposition-- By the time we fired up the boilers we were on the defense....I just knew if people in what ought to be hard-core constituencies are uncertain about its effect, they're not going to vote for it."

Although Proposition 1 lost, Deaver liked Hannaford's upbeat style and asked him to join the governor's office staff for the administration's final year, during which the watchwords were "finish strong" and "forward planning." Lean and relaxed in his chic downtown L.A. office as he remembered those days in Sacramento, Hannaford described helping Reagan follow through on program issues in a way that would provide a lasting memory of his years as governor, such as visiting the Indians of Round Valley whose lands he had preserved from being flooded for a dam in 1969. Much thought was given, too, to Reagan's future options, Hannaford recalled. In answer to concerns about how Reagan would deal with the quantity of correspondence and appearance requests that were expected to continue, Deaver and Hannaford put together a firm to handle Reagan's public activities, which began operations as soon as the governor left office. Deaver resigned when he formed President Reagan's staff; the firm became the Hannaford Company.

The interview was recorded on December 1, 1982, after being rescheduled several times to adjust to Hannaford's cross-country commitments. Interview tapes were transcribed and the transcript rough-edited in the Regional Oral History Office. Hannaford reviewed the transcript with a careful editorial eye, revising only a few comments that might be thought misleading, and returned it promptly for final processing. Hannaford has written a detailed account of his acquaintance with Ronald and Nancy Reagan, from Sacramento through their first year in the White House.*

Gabrielle Morris
Interviewer-Editor

June 1984

*Peter Hannaford, The Reagans, a Political Portrait, New York, Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1983.

The Hannaford Company, Inc. Public Relations & Public Affairs

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Personal

Born September 21, 1932. Glendale, California

Married to the former Irene Harville, August 14, 1954, Eureka, California.

Children: Richard, 26; Donald, 23

Education: Piedmont (California) High School, 1950

University of California, Berkeley, California. AB 1954

Military: First Lieutenant, Signal Corps, Army of the United States, 1954-56

Business

Chairman of the Board, The Hannaford Company, Inc. (formerly Deaver & Hannaford, Inc.), public relations and public affairs firm, Los Angeles, Washington, D. C., New York, Sacramento, 1975 - . President of Hannaford International, Inc. (a wholly-owned subsidiary), Washington, D. C., 1981 - .

Assistant to the Governor (Ronald Reagan) and Director of Public Affairs, Governor's Office, State of California, Sacramento, 1974.

President, Hannaford & Associates, Inc., public relations, Oakland, California, 1973.

Vice President, Wilton, Coombs & Colnett, Inc., advertising agency, San Francisco, 1969-72.

President, Pettler & Hannaford, Inc., advertising and public relations, Oakland and Orinda, California, 1967-69.

The Hannaford Company, Inc. Public Relations & Public Affairs

President, Kennedy, Hannaford & Dolman, Inc., advertising & public relations, Oakland and San Francisco, 1962-67.

Vice President, Kennedy-Hannaford, Inc., advertising & public relations, Oakland, 1957-62.

Account Executive, Helen Kennedy Advertising, Oakland, 1954.

Activities — Political, Civic, Cultural

Member, Advisory Committee on Overseas Public Relations, U. S. Information Agency, 1981 - .

Member, Board of Trustees, The White House Preservation Fund, 1981 - .

Communications Adviser to President Reagan's 1980 Presidential campaign.

Member, Steering Committee, Citizens for the Republic, 1977-79.

Research & Issues Director, President Reagan's Presidential campaign, 1976.

Republican nominee for U.S. House of Representatives, 7th Congressional District, California, 1972.

Member, Republican State Central Committee of California, 1968-74.

Member, Alameda County Republican Central Committee, 1966-74.

Secretary, Bay Area Republican Alliance, 1970.

President, Alameda County Division, Bay Area Republican Alliance, 1968-69.

Member, Governing Board, Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (bi-state), 1973-74.

Member, Governing Board, California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 1973-74.

Vice Chairman, Governor's Consumer Fraud Task Force, California, 1972-73.

Member, City of Piedmont Park Commission, 1964-68.

President, Mutual Advertising Agency Network, 1968-69.

Member Board of Session, Pasadena Presbyterian Church, 1980.

Member, Board of Trustees, Piedmont Community Church, 1967-70.

Member, Board of Directors, California Roadside Council, 1965-69.

Member, Board of Directors, San Francisco Opera Guild Talent Bank Foundation, 1967-74.

Member, Board of Directors, Coro Foundation, 1973-74.

Chairman, Mayor's Anti-Litter Committee, Oakland, 1965.

Member, Executive Committee and Board of Directors, Oakland Symphony Orchestra Association, 1963-69.

President, Advertising Club of Oakland, 1961-62.

Instructor in Advertising, Merritt College (Peralta Junior College district), 1965-67.

Scoutmaster, Troop 2, Boy Scouts of America, Piedmont, California, 1970-72.

Memberships

University Club of San Francisco

University Club of Washington, D. C.

The Guardsmen, San Francisco

Town Hall, Los Angeles

Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco

World Affairs Council, Los Angeles

Pasadena Presbyterian Church, Pasadena, California

Articles Published

Editorial Associate to Ronald Reagan for his nationally syndicated (King Features) newspaper column, 1975-80.

"New Approach to Peace in SWA/Namibia?", Southern African Forum POSITION PAPER, November, 1980.

"If Pinyin is Here, Can Qiner be Far Behind?", THE ASIA MAIL, October, 1980.

"On the Presidential Campaign Trail", POLITICS TODAY, May-June, 1979.

"On Top of Mt. Fuji", THE ASIA MAIL, August, 1978.

"Twenty Mules and a Man Named Smith", Hughes Airwest SUNDANCER magazine, April, 1974.

The Hannaford Company, Inc. Public Relations & Public Affairs

"In Search of the Perfect Martini", PSA CALIFORNIA magazine, March, 1974.

"The Wildcat", Hughes Airwest SUNDANCER magazine, December, 1973.

"Seeing Death Valley", WESTWAYS, April, 1973.

Numerous restaurant reviews for BEAR FLAG REPUBLIC, 1973-76.

Books Published

"The Reagans: A Political Portrait". Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, New York.
April 1983

Biographical References In:

WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA

WHO'S WHO IN FINANCE AND INDUSTRY

WHO'S WHO IN AMERICAN POLITICS

Hobbies and Interests

Mountaineering, sailing, tennis, swimming, horseback riding, philately, gardening.

April, 1983

I EARLY POLITICAL AND BUSINESS CONCERNS

[Date of Interview: December 1, 1982]##

University of California Student Interests; Oakland Advertising
Agency Career

Morris: In spite of the fact that you've written a book on your association with then Governor Reagan,* I'd like to take you over some of the same territory in terms of what we're doing on our oral history project.

The first question is usually the origins of your own interest in politics. Was this something you grew up with?

Hannaford: No, not particularly. I first got interested--my recollection is I was a sophomore at Berkeley. I was an English major and I fell under the spell of Adlai Stevenson's rhetoric. I thought if any politician could be that literate, he ought to be president. I had never done anything in politics before, but I was writing for the Daily Cal at the time, and I asked someone on the Daily Cal how one goes about helping out. Whoever I asked said [to] call a particular assemblyman, whom I called, and he said, "Call Pierre Salinger at the San Francisco Chronicle. He's trying to get up some kind of committee to help out." That must have been late '51 or early '52.

I don't recall that I ever got through to Salinger, but I remember Stevenson, when he was a candidate the next year, spoke down by West Gate in the fall, and I was further excited about it

##This symbol indicates the start of a new tape or tape segment.
For a guide to the tapes see p. 45.

*The Reagans: A Personal Portrait, Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, New York, 1983.

Hannafor: and decided I wanted to do something just to help in politics. I was very idealistic. I wanted to have something to do with how the world turned out. But I never got around to doing anything in any campaigns at that point. I became a Democrat and, ultimately, voted for Stevenson the second time around, when I was old enough to vote.

By then I was in the army, in Massachusetts. I'd been in the ROTC at Cal and was called up. My wife and I lived in Massachusetts and came back at the end of that time to the Bay Area. I'd been undergoing some changes in my thinking. I went into the advertising agency business in Oakland, and I was beginning to understand some things about how the economy worked, which I really knew nothing about before. I decided it was inconsistent of me to be supporting the Democrats while I was trying to contribute to a free enterprise economy; because, in those days at least, my sense of most of the Democratic office-holders was that they were heavily into redistribution.

So I took the worst possible time to switch my registration, 1948 [chuckles], when the Republicans lost just about everything. I'd come from a Republican family, but my parents voted for FDR.

Morris: Republicans who voted for FDR?

Hannafor: Yes. They were young and having a hard time making ends meet. So I grew up thinking FDR was just terrific and liking Truman, too. My mother stayed Democrat; she voted for Truman. I think my dad probably had switched back by then. My mother ended up switching back to Republican a few years later, too.

Morris: Were they supporters of Bill Knowland, the local publisher?

Hannafor: I guess they voted for Knowland. I don't recall it being discussed around the house. But the year I switched to Republican, Joe Knowland was the president of the Piedmont Junior Chamber of Commerce, and I had joined the organization at about that time. Most of my friends in the group were Republicans and one day I decided to re-register.

The first time I really got active was in 1960. I volunteered to work on a Nixon phone bank in Oakland, and then I joined one of the Republican volunteer groups locally, but it struck me as being dull.

Morris: Was that the California Republican Assembly?

Hannafor: Yes. I joined it again some years later, but it wasn't for me in those early days as a Republican.

Hannaford: My business partner was a woman (she'd been my first boss, and then she took me into an ownership position in the company). She was also a graduate of the university and the widow of one of the Kennedy brothers whose typographical works are at The Bancroft Library. She had said, when she brought me into ownership and put my name on the door along with hers, "Let's just agree on one thing: we'll never handle any political campaigns, okay?" I said, "That suits me just fine."

She retired in, I think, '61. Her husband had died of cancer. She'd been married rather late in life, so it was a particularly strong marriage and it was very hard on her. She decided, after a couple of years, to take a long vacation. She took a group trip to Asia. It was the first time she'd had a vacation in many years. She fell in love on the trip with a recently retired Safeway executive, and they were married a few months later. Both of them had sufficient means, so that's why she decided to retire. I took over the business. I was aged twenty-nine.

Morris: You must have showed promise very early.

Hannaford: I guess she thought so. I thought I was ready to take it over but, in retrospect, it was a little early. You learn these things after the fact.

Morris: Was this mostly local clients?

Hannaford: Yes, mostly East Bay-based clients.

Morris: At that point, were they interested in what your firm presently is, public affairs?

Hannaford: No, this was in advertising, not public affairs.

In the small advertising agency business you tend to get into public relations work. You help with press releases, you talk about special events that may advance the company's fortunes and the client's community activities and so forth. So you do public relations, but it's sort of an adjunct to the advertising.

Piedmont and Alameda County Elections

Hannaford: Anyway, in spite of this vow, no political campaigns, in early '64 a municipal judge called on me.

Morris: That would be whom?

Hannaford: The late Homer Buckley. He was an old friend of Helen Kennedy, my retired partner. Homer said, "You know, I filed for the superior court this spring and I didn't think I was going to get any opposition. But now there's another municipal judge who's filed against me, and you're going to manage my campaign."

I said, "How on earth can I do that? I've never done anything like that before!"

He said, "Well, you've just got to do it, that's all."

Morris: Had you known Judge Buckley?

Hannaford: Never met him before. I knew of him and his reputation. He was well respected, and he'd been active in a lot of civic affairs--non-political type things--the Red Cross and that sort of thing.

So, I talked it over with my associates. I had a woman on the staff at the time, a writer, who was very politically motivated; a bright, intellectual, conservative woman, and she said, "Let's do it. It will be fascinating. We can do it, and we can elect him." Sure enough, we helped elect him! The irony of the thing was that he was my former partner's friend, and she was the one who said, "Don't do this sort of stuff."

I guess what really triggered my concern for politics was that, like a lot of young business and professional people, I could still identify my ideals with Kennedy, for whom I did not vote--I voted for Nixon. I was very upset by his death, despite the fact that I was a Republican. It just seemed to shake the foundations of the society, for me. I just decided, you've got to do your part. You've got to get active. You've got to somehow be involved and give something of yourself.

So I ran for city council in Piedmont that next winter, in the beginning of '64. I came very close but I didn't win. But in Piedmont city elections, where there's no such thing as party politics and the issues are basically pretty tame, the losers are rewarded by being appointed to the park commission or the recreation commission--that sort of thing. They put me on the park commission; I was on it for four years.

In the process of running for that election I met Don Mulford, who was the assemblyman from that district at the time. (He'd moved from Berkeley to Piedmont in a redistricting in '58 or '60.) He came to a Piedmont candidates' night. Afterwards, when we shook hands, he said, "Let's get together. I'd like to get to know you." I said, "Okay."

Hannaford: The next thing I knew I was a volunteer communications adviser on his reelection campaign that same year. I served in that capacity more or less continuously until he lost his seat in '70. He introduced me to more and more people in the Republican apparatus. In '66 there was a vacancy on the county central committee; I was asked by some of my friends if I would be willing to serve if elected. They asked me to go to a meeting one night at the headquarters, in what had been the old post office, on Piedmont Avenue. I went and I was elected!

What I didn't realize [until] afterwards was that when you get elected to one of these bodies--I've found from Democratic friends it's the same way with them--you suddenly acquire a whole set of friends and enemies you didn't know you had, because these organizations are rife with factionalism. There are power struggles going on all the time between the forces of "good" and "evil," depending upon which side you're on. [laughter] So all of a sudden people hated me whom I'd never even met before!

Morris: Because you were on the--?

Hannaford: Because the other side got me elected; they had the votes. I was naive and idealistic. I thought, all I really want to do is help my party; to pitch in. I'm in the advertising business; I can help with newsletters and fliers; help them do a better job. That sort of thing.

I was on that county committee for eight years, I guess, and they spent most all their time fighting each other.

Morris: The committee just elected its own members?

Hannaford: It tended to be self-perpetuating.

Morris: I thought the candidates were on the ballot.

Hannaford: Oh, they always were, but both the Democrats and Republicans work pretty much this way: if there's a vacancy in mid-term, the committee fills the vacancy [and] that person runs as an incumbent in the next election.

Morris: Oh, I see. The city councils used to work that way, too.

Hannaford: Yes, very much so. Of course, they still can, I think. I don't think there's a requirement to call a special election, not under the state constitution. There could be city ordinances that require it.

Morris: Did you run into Don Livingston and Ed Meese, and any of those other people?

Hannaford: Livingston I met in 1961, or '62. At an Oakland Symphony function, he sought me out. He worked for Kaiser then, Kaiser Steel or Aluminum--and he had just gone on the board of the Oakland Symphony and so had I.

I must have met Ed Meese for the first time somewhere along in there, but never really knew Ed until I went to Sacramento. Of course, his was a famous name in Oakland. His father and grandfather had both been in public service. His father, even then, was still the country tax collector.

Anyway, I was active in Piedmont, on the park commission. That was really very satisfying, rewarding to work for, because everybody wanted to solve problems; nobody was out there to knife anybody--there were no power plays going on. They were just people who lived in this nice little city and they wanted to keep it that way.

Morris: Was it a real bombshell on Don Mulford, to lose in 1972?

Hannaford: I think it was. It was '70 when he lost.

Goldwater and Rockefeller Factions; Other Realities of Local Campaigns

Hannaford: In 1966, not only did I go on the county committee, there was a redistricting--that was the one-man, one-vote redistricting. Lew Sherman was the chairman of the committee at the time, and he and Colin Kelley, who is still an Oakland lawyer, both decided to run for at-large state senate seats, and run as a ticket.

That's an unprecedented thing to do. They didn't have much money. They said, "Let's pool our money. These are both county-wide seats this time, we are comfortable with each other's view of the world, so let's run as a team." They came to me one day and they said, "Will you do our advertising and manage our campaigns?"

Morris: This was for two different senate seats?

Hannaford: The eighth and eleventh, but they were both countywide, so had the same borders.

Hannaford: So we ran the Sherman-Kelley campaign. Well, my battle with the right wing of the party intensified because there were two people, to the right of these men, who also entered.* I wasn't against the others; I didn't even know them. But Sherman and Kelley had come to me, they were already my friends, and I said, "Sure." Why not? You know. I didn't know there were different kinds of Republicans. (This was just before I went on the county committee, when I learned all this.) So I earned the enmity of other people running in the primary.

I had been a strong Goldwater supporter, but just as an individual--I bought a lot of Goldwater books and passed them around to friends and did that sort of thing.

Morris: But you didn't feel you were a right-wing Republican?

Hannaford: No. I liked Goldwater. I thought of myself as a conservative Republican--I liked the intellectual content of conservatism--and I had voted for Goldwater against Rockefeller in 1964 because I thought Rockefeller ran an absolutely despicable campaign in California.

Morris: Bue he did tie up most of the visible Republicans.

Hannaford: I guess. I don't even remember that now. I just remember his advertising turned my stomach. And I liked what Goldwater was saying. I supported him, just as an individual, but I wasn't involved in any of the apparatus. So I was really unaware of the factionalism in the county committee until '66, when I began getting active.

What I began to realize, finally, was that in all of these primaries in Alameda County the battles, below the surface, were between the Goldwaterites and the Rockefellerites. See, I didn't really care about that. I could like a Republican who supported Rockefeller, if I liked him. It didn't make any difference to me.

Anyway, my candidates won their primaries, and then Sherman went on to beat Byron Rumford. Rumford was an assemblyman at the time. That was that cliffhanger, where it took us three days to get the ballots counted.

*In the 8th District, Sherman was opposed by J. Howard Arnold, Joseph Egenberger, Jr. and Kenneth Steadman; in the 11th District, Kelley was opposed by Byron James.

Morris: Didn't Byron Rumford ask for a recount, or he thought about it? There was some real question?*

Hannaford: No. That was the recount. It was a hand recount, because it was so close. It was nine hundred votes or something like that, and it didn't change appreciably in the recount. We were up all night election night, and I think it was about thirty-six hours later when the recount started. It took about two or three days to do. I'll never forget it: in the basement of the county building, walking around monitoring this. It was a very honest recount. Everybody was conscientious, doing a good job. You know how politics is in California--cemeteries don't vote here. [laughter] At least not that I'm aware of. They certainly didn't in Alameda County. I think we've had very clean election procedures in Alameda County.

Lew still won, by a narrow margin, and became what I thought was a very good state senator. Kelley came close but [Nicholas] Petris beat him. I also got involved with Ray Norton's campaign. He was a black track star who was running for Rumford's old seat in the assembly. I even helped a couple of congressional candidates--can't remember who they are now--doing some peripheral work in the country. I really did an awful lot that year. It wasn't at all good for my business, because it--

Morris: Were you doing this as a public service, not as part of your advertising agency?

Hannaford: The Kelley-Sherman campaign was an account for the company, and we charged a fee. Of course, we put in a lot more hours than we were charging for. The work for Norton was at a fee. I think we were doing the advertising for Mulford for that year, too. Yes, I'm sure we were. But I also advised him, just as a volunteer, personally, in my own time on the weekends.

Morris: It must be hard to separate that out, when you are providing a professional service.

Hannaford: Not so much with advertising it isn't, because the advertising, buying [time and space] is pretty cut and dry. It certainly would be more a question in the kind of business I'm in now, yes, but it wasn't so much then.

*See William Byron Rumford, "Legislator for Fair Employment, Fair Housing, and Public Health," Regional Oral History Office, Berkeley, 1973.

Hannaford: Politics wasn't good for our general business because we were so immersed. Every time, if you have a political crisis and a corporate client crisis, you always solve the political one first because the urgency seems so much greater.

Morris: It has to be done today, yes.

Hannaford: Your regular clients are patient for a while, but their patience isn't inexhaustible. So it's very debilitating to the business, and it's not profitable work either, from an economic point of view. Anyway--

Morris: You're blasting one of the great myths of current political life, that it's exceedingly profitable.

Hannaford: Oh, if that's all you do, it can be very profitable. No, I don't mean that for people who are only in the political consulting business. It's when you try to straddle the two that it's very difficult, because your political work, you're not doing enough of it to really be profitable, particularly if you're doing what we were doing, which is a lot of small, local races.

There's a certain synergism, you know, when you're handling a lot of candidates in the same party, in the same county, because you know what the issues are and the issues tend to overlap. You're all sort of working for the same cause, and you're working with a lot of the same volunteers. But it's very labor-intensive work, particularly if you're managing the campaign. You've got to go out and get the volunteers organized, and there's a tremendous amount of ego stroking to be done. All people who get into volunteer work in politics, as you know, are exercising their egos, and that has to be recognized.

Morris: Both the candidates and the volunteers?

Hannaford: And the workers. Each one is making some kind of a contribution and that must be recognized and attended to. I've seen it happen many times: campaigns lose much useful time by failing to understand the ego needs of the volunteers.

II RUNNING FOR CONGRESS IN 1972

Changes in 7th District Constituency

Morris: How did you deal with peoples' egos when you became a candidate yourself?

Hannaford: Oh, that's easy when you're a candidate.

Morris: Really!

Hannaford: You take wonderful care of your volunteers, always, as a candidate. The arguments go on between the candidate's staff and the volunteers--

Morris: I see.

Hannaford: And you try not to be the one that has to adjudicate those arguments. You hope that the manager does that. As a candidate, you may know that the people who come in to lick the envelopes may be at swords' points with the chief secretary or the scheduler or something, but a good manager keeps his candidate away from the altercations if possible. The candidate loves everybody and everybody loves the candidate; that's what you try to achieve. [laughter] It was much easier being a candidate, in that sense, than being a manager.

Morris: Really?

Hannaford: Oh, yes, because, you thank everybody for everything, even if it's the third time you've thanked them, and you pay careful attention to why this person is important in your campaign. It may be a very narrow reason, you know, maybe just very big in one block of one precinct. If so, know that and recognize it. So you're recognizing what makes that person feel good, and if they're effective for you, then it's worth it.

Morris: What was there about 1972 that made it seem like a year that you'd try running for office yourself?

Hannaford: After the Sherman election, he appointed me to the state central committee. I was on that for eight years, 1967-74. I was also an officer in the Republican Alliance.

That was a group that was mostly business and professional men and women. They had a chapter in each county around the bay, and each had its own officers. I was in the East Bay division.

Morris: Was this statewide?

Hannaford: No, it was just a Bay Area thing. What they did was provide forums for Republican officeholders and candidates. I liked that group because it was much less ideological within the party--it wasn't at war with anybody in the party. It had a lot of quite conservative people, but also some more-or-less liberal Republicans. Most were in-between.

Morris: Who had put that together? Had the party started that?

Hannaford: One of the first people who put that together was John Vukasin, who's now a superior court judge in Alameda County. That was in the early sixties. He was a Reagan appointee to the bench, too. He was an attorney at the time. I can't remember who the other ones were, but John sticks out in my mind as one of the early people.

I was attracted to one of its early meetings. A number of my friends in the Oakland business community were involved, people I liked and enjoyed, so I ultimately joined. I went through the chairs and became the president of the East Bay unit. I was also on the Bay Area board for some time.

Both Mulford and Sherman lost in '70. The mood of Mulford's district kept changing. We didn't have any polling in those days the way we do now, but you could just tell that he and the district were moving apart, partly through redistricting, but also because the composition of the district was changing and he was staying pretty much where he was.

Morris: Right, and there was a fairly strong, new, Democratic organization developing in Berkeley, the April Coalition.

Hannaford: That's right.

Morris: Very aggressive.

Hannaford: And, you remember Ken Meade, who beat him. It was the second time running against him that Meade won. A lot of younger couples, professional couples, could identify with him and Mulford's times seemed to be passing.

Hannaford: That was not true with Sherman. In his case, he lost narrowly to [John] Holmdahl, who had retired, you know [in 1966], and was now making a comeback.* Holmdahl was a comparatively conservative Democrat and Sherman was a comparatively liberal Republican. Lew lost by a small margin. But Holmdahl had a base of his own.

That was a very disappointing loss. Lew Sherman was a wonderful man. I was very fond of him, and I thought he was a fine state senator. Not that Holmdahl wasn't a good one, but I think that was a real loss for the party, with Lew. I think Mulford had done some good things while he was in office--I supported him strongly--but he was a more confrontational sort of a man and Lew was more of a conciliator. Governor Reagan later appointed Lew to the bench. A few years later he died of cancer.

By 1971, I'd been in all of this for years. I was bone tired of the central committees, and I thought to myself, all of this must have some purpose. What are you doing all of this for? You don't want to end up being "Mr. Republican" at age eighty or something. [laughter] I thought to myself, the purpose must be to run for office.

I looked at the situation and I thought to myself, well, why not run for Congress? [Ron] Dellums' margin was close in 1970. He had a lot of [Jeffrey] Cohelan's supporters furious, still. Dellums was very confrontational in his style. He was using high-voltage rhetoric. An unknown Republican [John E. Healy] had come close because of the circumstances of the '70 election.**

Organizing Strategies; Party Weaknesses

Hannaford: One of the rules in this business is, if you've got a severe registration disadvantage, the only time you're going to catch a controversial incumbent is either his first time out or his tenth time out, when he's outworn his welcome. If we don't beat him in '72, he's going to be there for a long time, I thought.

*The general election results were Sherman, 149,660; Holmdahl, 157,329; and Lynn Winslow (American Independent), 4,843.

**The general election vote was 89,784 (Dellums), 64,691 (Healy), 2,156 (Scahill, Peace and Freedom).

Hannaford: I thought to myself, if I can run a credible candidacy, it's worth it. It's a long shot, but it's worth it. And I figured, if there's one thing I knew how to do in politics in Alameda County, it was to organize a Republican primary, because I'd done quite a number of them. I knew the steps you go through, I knew who you call to have the first luncheon and how to gauge the outcome of the luncheon--whether or not you're going to have a viable committee with the necessary seed-money support to show people that you're a serious candidate--and that sort of thing. I'd done it for a number of other people, or participated with a number of other people, so I knew the procedure one had to go through.

I figured I would try to clear the field early by getting organized early--because the secret in a Republican primary, at least those days, was to get organized well and early.

So the first person I talked with other than one or two personal friends--Livingston was one of them--the first sort of leadership person in the party that I talked to was Mulford. He gave me some good advice.

He said, "Well, yes, I think you'd make a good congressman, if you win. It's an uphill fight, but it's worth the try, if you can get the support. You've got to go around and see the party wheel-horses and do all of that."

Morris: You had quite a lot of clout yourself at that point, didn't you, as a member of the state central committee?

Hannaford: Oh, I didn't have any clout.

Morris: Really?

Hannaford: No. You see, Hiram Johnson turned the two state party organizations into toothless dragons--Hiram Johnson and the Progressives, back in 1913, after they took office. You remember, they came in on a reform ticket and they wanted to break the power of the unions and the SP [Southern Pacific Railroad]. That is, the top-to-bottom linkage of power and back-room power brokering. They did it by constitutionally severing the umbilical cord between the state and the county operations of the two parties. As a result, they have nothing to do with one another, organically. Emotionally, yes; philosophically, maybe; ideologically, maybe; but not organically. The county committee doesn't report to the state committee and the state doesn't dictate anything to the county. They're completely separate entities.

The result is you tend to have a lot of sound and fury and relatively little substantive action coming out of the state organizations as such. Some years it's better than others for one party or the other, because of strong leaders. It's less often true in the county operations.

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Morris: As a member of the state central committee, did you have a say in developing the Cal Plan?

Hannaford: Gaylord Parkinson, the state chairman, developed the Cal Plan, and the Eleventh Commandment.

Morris: Was that something that helped you?

Hannaford: Reagan ran in '66 and that united the party, and we swept all but one constitutional office and got stronger and stronger in the legislature. So the party was feeling generally pretty good about itself. But, that started turning again in '70. We still took all but one of the constitutional offices, but we lost the legislature--never had it back again since.

And in Alameda County things were looking bad, indeed, because the registration kept moving further and further away from us. The loss of Sherman's and Mulford's seats was quite demoralizing for the party structure in the county at the time.

Morris: Who did you go to for your own campaign manager?

Hannaford: We hired a man from Santa Rosa, Ray Paschke, who had recently run for, I think, assembly there.

But Ken Thompson, now retired, who is also an Old Blue, was my Alameda County chairman. He was a partner at Coopers and Lybrand in Oakland and had been the county chairman in the late sixties--after Lew Sherman went to Sacramento. Ken became my chairman. And Clark Wallace, who was a fellow alumnus of Piedmont High and is a prominent realtor in Orinda, was my Contra Costa [County] chairman.

I set out early on. I went around and saw the key people, both people I expected I could get a good support from and other people I felt might not go for me. I felt the best thing to do was to go to the people who I thought wouldn't be for me and ask for their support. The worst they could say is "no," I told myself. Indeed, everybody gave me a quite courteous hearing. I reasoned that even though a number of those people would say "no," or would hold off, if I won the nomination, I would certainly want to bring all of them into the operation.

Morris: Were you a beneficiary of the Cal Plan? Did you have some money or some advice from them?

Hannaford: No, that was only for state legislative candidates.

Morris: I see.

Hannaford: The Cal Plan, I think by '72, was more name than substance. Its best days were in '66, '68, and to some extent '70.

But to my surprise in early '72, the federal judge let the redistricting through on the congressional races but not on the legislative, and the redistricting called for a slice of Contra Costa to be thrown into the 7th District. I had managed to get sufficiently well organized and get the word out around Alameda County--that portion of the district--that two or three other people who were thinking or running thought better of it. In other words, I got the head start that I thought was essential. There was one guy, a very conservative black man in Berkeley, who was determined to file. I didn't consider him a serious threat.

When this redistricting came, all of a sudden, three men in Contra Costa--from Orinda--decided to file. What had happened--they were all good men, but they had not bothered to look closely at the composition of the district. They suddenly thought, "Oh, it's virtually a Republican district!" Well, only 15 percent of the voting population was in this little slice.

Morris: Oh, boy.

Hannaford: Now, that slice was about four-to-one Republican, so it all helped, but I didn't have any illusions about it changing the basics very much.

Morris: For the whole district, yes.

Hannaford: And these guys thought, "Oh, boy, we can win this seat now." So they plunged in and filed without looking at it very closely.

Campaigning Against Ron Dellums

Hannaford: We had a very lively primary. It was very polite, in the sense that none of us attacked each other. I decided, what I've got to do is run against Dellums. The person who appears to have the best understanding of the ultimate opposition and how best to defeat him is going to be the one who wins the primary. I crafted my campaign on that.

The basic theme of my campaign was based upon a concept that's today enshrined in law, thanks to Senator Russell Long, and that's broadening the base of capitalism so that employees can have a

Hannaford: means of acquiring shares in the productive, working capital of corporations in America. ESOPs, they're called, employee stock ownership plans. Louis Kelso was the inventor of the concept, a visionary lawyer in San Francisco who had been campaigning for it for years.

I'd heard Kelso speak at a business conference put on by the UC Extension--a marketing conference a couple of years before--and was quite taken by him and read one of his books. And then, early in my campaign, one of my young supporters who was a drumbeater for Kelso introduced me to Kelso and Patricia Hetter, now his wife, then his business partner. I thought there was something in what he had to say that would have a great application for this polyglot district of ours; something that bridged the gap between the haves and the have-nots, and the redistributionists--who I thought had a wholly wrong idea of how to make our country work--and the free enterprisers. I still believe that it is a valid economic tool, important and valid. ESOPs are widely used today.

Morris: It did not originate with Mr. Kelso, if I'm right.

Hannaford: Yes, it did. It originated with him.

Morris: But there have been various kinds of company profitsharing.

Hannaford: This is different from company profitsharing.

Morris: And encouraging employees to buy stock in the company?

Hannaford: That's different. Encouraging them to buy stock is different. No, this is a means of providing capital financing for the company through a block of stock that is bought by an employee trust. So it's brand-new capital. Typically a company, particularly in the manufacturing business, needs to replenish its capital about every three to five years (and it retires its indebtedness usually on three to five year cycles) to buy new machinery, new parts, and so forth.

His idea was: take the employee group to the bank and get a loan to buy a new issue of stock from the company, thus providing the company with the capital it needs to buy the equipment. The stock is used as collateral for the loan. The loan is paid off out of the dividends from that stock, and once it is paid off and the stock is unencumbered the employee trust owns it free and clear. Now, it isn't distributed individually to the employees; it's kept in a trust. In that sense it's a little like profit-sharing, where you have an accounting of what your share is but you don't actually get it out until you leave the company. But it's actually stock. It's not shares of profit, it's actual stock in the company.

Hannaford: Today, that's a widely used tool. There are a number of variations on it today, and there are many companies in the field that put these plans together. It finally became law about a year after I ran against Dellums, '73 I think it was. Kelso got Senator Long's ear. Of course, he was then chairman of the Senate finance [committee]. Senator Long tacked an ESOP bonus, a 1 percent tax-break bonus, on to the tax bill that year and it suddenly started a whole new industry! A cottage industry of ESOP consultants. Now it's an accepted device.

Anyway, I was very much taken by that. A lot of my more traditional Republican advisors said I shouldn't deal with such crackpot schemes, but I stuck with it.

Morris: That doesn't sound like the kind of a question that would come up in your usual candidates' meeting.

Hannaford: No, but it would come up primarily in talking to the business [community]. I made it part of my speech every time. I made it part of my speech because the first thing I felt you had to do was identify the nature of the opposition.

What kind of a person was Dellums? Then you had to go to what he said, and you use his own words, and why he is divisive, and why he is going to cause more problems than he will solve. That he can't adequately represent this district, that we need somebody who will bridge the disparities amongst the different constituencies in the district. And I made the point that you can never make everybody happy all the time, not in a district as diverse as this. We have everything from cows mooing in Moraga to heavy industry in Oakland, and much in between. (It was a bit of a microcosm of the whole country, as you know.)

So you can't hope to make everybody happy, and you have to say that. But you can say that this kind of divisiveness and this high voltage, radical rhetoric, must be replaced by something that offers hope of solving some of the basic problems in our country; something that could offer everybody a share of the action, while at the same time leaving our institutions intact and not tearing them asunder. There is a way we can do it, I said, and here is an idea we ought to be looking at. I used ESOPs as an example of problem solving.

I wanted to show that there could be a candidate who was doing some creative thinking, or at least talking to people who had creative ideas. I didn't try to say, you know, this will solve every last problem, but rather it is a start: I used it in

Hannaford: many of my speeches and, of course, I got a lot of questions. Kelso was a good teacher. He had primed me for most of the questions, because he'd faced them all thousands of times before.

So I won the primary, I think because I seemed to be the only candidate with what might be a better mouse trap. At least that's the way I thought of it. It was an exciting time.

The Fall Campaign; Problems on the Right

Hannaford: I was persuaded to move somewhat away from that campaign issue in the general election by all of my advisors. I had some new advisors by then, and they persuaded me that I ought to focus in the general election on two things: one, that Dellums, in his first term in office, was doing an awful lot of talking, but he wasn't there for the votes. He had a terrible attendance record as it turned out; he was so busy being a national figure. And it was a vulnerable spot of his that took us awhile to discover.

I also discovered another vulnerable spot. I had a number of Jewish people on my committee, in senior positions. They were saying, "You ought to take a look at his record on issues involving Israel and the Middle East. He is voting against Israel pretty consistently." Sure enough, he was.

He and I ended up having an impromptu debate in the basement of a synagogue one day on that issue. Boy, did we have fun! Do you remember Lester Kinsolving, the Episcopal priest who turned to journalism?

Morris: Right.

Hannaford: Lester took a shine to me. I met him for the first time on Solano Avenue one Saturday as I was out going from store to store campaigning. I bumped into Lester with one of my campaign people who knew him and, I don't know, he seemed to take a shine to me. He was still doing what was, technically, a religion column every Saturday in the Examiner.

I finally smoked Dellums out. Some supporter of his at the temple that's just off the MacArthur Freeway, just above the Grand Lake Theater, they were going to let him use the social hall for a campaign press conference. The chairman of the sisterhood was one of my women's chairmen. She called me up and she said, "You

Hannaford: are going to that press conference! I am outraged that the rabbi would let the social hall be used for any political event, but as long as it's going to be there, we're going to make it bipartisan. I'm going to escort you to that." [laughter]

There was this long flight of steps up to this synagogue. When Dellums got out of his car to come up the steps of the synagogue, I was at the top of the steps [laughter] with cameras rolling. You know, we had to campaign where we could.

Kinsolving triggered a wonderful, riotous debate. [laughter] You know how he is! Oh, he just lambasted poor Dellums! We had quite a time. Dellums and I ended up having a couple of formal debates which were really pretty gentlemanly, actually, but Dellums wasn't going to take me seriously until I started going on the two issues: one, that he wasn't paying attention to the job--that is he wasn't there for many votes--and when he was, he was voting wrong.

I guess my advisors were right. You can only cover a couple of themes if you are a challenger, and if you try to bring in a visionary look at the future at the same time, it skews people's attention.

Meanwhile, one thing I really hadn't counted on, I didn't take seriously--the American Independent Party still qualified for the ballot in those days. They had about four hundred members in our district, and a man named Frank Cortese, a druggist in Albany who was a local officer of the John Birch Society, filed for that seat. I remember looking at the primary results. I was so euphoric about winning my primary, and I saw this guy with about four hundred votes and I thought, who needs to worry about him? Well, I ultimately came to worry about him a great deal, because he could excite some of those ancient divisions in the Republican party. If I wasn't sufficiently conservative--that is, more conservative than I might normally be--people to the right of me always had some place to go. So I was always looking over my right shoulder. As it turned out, my recollection is he took about 7 or 8 percent of the votes.

Morris: Yes, it was a visible percentage.

Hannaford: I still wouldn't have beat Dellums without him, but it was enough to have been a serious dent, to make my life very difficult.

We had a candidates' night down at KTVU toward the end of the election. Competing candidates weren't invited to be there at the same time. It was rather kind of like a man-in-the-street sort of

Hannaford: interview, inside the studio they'd have different candidates in each of three or four settings in the studio, and they'd switch from one camera to another. An interesting format. Then supporters of the candidates could come in and sit in the bleachers. It was sort of like a campaign fair. But the rivals weren't facing each other.

I'll never forget, when I was up there doing my interview, the Birchers had brought in (I didn't recognize a one of these people) an army of people, in these plastic straw boaters, and carrying signs for Cortese. I don't know where they came from, but it sure wasn't Alameda County. And they were beating my workers over the head with the signs! I was so mad I nearly jumped off that stage and started slugging some of these people. I didn't, but they were very ugly in their behavior, yet, they had to be contended with just the same.

Anyway, the campaign ended soon after. By 1972, I no longer ran my own small advertising agency. I'd sold my interest. I'd had a merger in '67 which didn't quite gel, and left in late 1969 and went with a larger firm, in San Francisco, owned by some chaps I knew and liked very much. I became a vice president, but I didn't own any of it.

They were wonderful to me during that 1972 election. They let me take a lot of time off. I was on full leave, actually, the last two months, but all throughout the summer and the spring they let me meet all my campaign appointments, which is hard to do when you're in that business; to be partly "in" and partly "out."

III SERVING ON GOVERNOR REAGAN'S ADVISORY GROUPS

Consumer Affairs Panels

Hannaford: Working for the San Francisco agency, I worked on a couple of Milton Marks' campaigns. I worked for Milton as a volunteer in '67, when Gene McAteer died and Milton ran in the special election. I remember--there were two elections, a first round and a second round--both my wife and I tramping up and down San Francisco hills out in the Haight-Ashbury and Noe Valley, ringing doorbells to get the vote out. Then, a couple of years later I guess, the firm was handling Milton's campaign. We also worked on Supervisor John Molinari's campaigns.

Morris: Yes. What's the name of the firm in San Francisco?

Hannaford: Wilton, Coombs & Colnett.

Morris: But somebody in Sacramento was watching you. Had you gotten to know some of the people in the governor's office by that time?

Hannaford: I had several friends in the administration, but my wife, Irene, became involved before I did. When Governor Reagan reorganized all the professional licensing bureaus into the Department of Consumer Affairs, he made Don Livingston the first director.* Livingston asked my wife to go on the board of furniture and bedding as a public member. Under the Reagan administration the

*During Reagan's first term as governor, Livingston was an aide to Agriculture and Services Agency secretary Earl Coke and head of the Bureau of Furniture and Bedding Inspection; he became director of Consumer Affairs after a brief tenure by Leighton Hatch. See Mr. Livingston's interview in this series.

Hannaford: first public memberships were being developed in some of those boards. That was late 1970 or early 1971. She became, I believe, the first public member on the Furniture and Bedding board, which later became the Home Furnishings board. She ultimately became the chairman. She served well into Brown's first term. It took him about a year and a half to get around to replacing her.

Then in late '71 they were looking for somebody for the governor's consumer fraud task force they were putting together. They invited me to be a member of that, and I became the vice chairman. That lasted until the spring of '73. I was doing that all throughout my campaign. That was a wonderful experience. It was a little bit like that park commission in Piedmont. I had the feeling everybody was pulling for the same objective. We had a disparate group of people: Democrats, Republicans, people of various races and walks of life. It was a small group, but we represented a lot of very different interests. Yet somehow the spirit of cooperation was very strong. We often had strong tussles between us but we always came out with a consensus somehow. And, we came out with a good report, parts of which found their way into administrative action and into bills.

Morris: Who was your chairman?

Hannaford: Vince Jones, who's the general counsel for the western region of Sears.

When that was over I remember saying to Ned Hutchinson, the appointments secretary, "Well, Ned, what happens to old appointees? Where is the elephants' graveyard?" [laughter]

He said, "Well, if we liked the job they did, we may ask them to do something else.

I said, "Well, if you decide you liked the job I did, I'd love to do something else. This was very rewarding for me."

I didn't think anything more about it, and along about mid-summer he called me up and said, "How would you like to be Governor Reagan's appointee to the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency?"

I said that I'd be thrilled; that I would be very honored.

He said, "Your old friend Allen Bray is resigning." Allen was from Oakland. He had been president of the Oakland Symphony board for a number of years when I was on that board. Allen was the charter chairman of the TRPA and was one of the people who campaigned hard to found the organization. He had deep love for Tahoe. He was

Hannaford: resigning as the governor's representative after several years. Let's see, the Tahoe compact became operative in 1970, but he'd been through the whole gestation period and he was the first chairman, from '70 until '73. I think he just thought it was time that he retire.

Morris: Even from the beginning that was a very controversial, argumentative body.

Hannaford: Oh, very much.

Anyway, Ned asked if I'd like to be on the TRPA, taking Allen's seat. He said, "We're looking for somebody who is a strong Reagan supporter and a member of the Sierra Club [laughter], which I was.

First Impressions of Ronald Reagan, 1965

Morris: How had you become a Reagan supporter? Had you met the governor along the line?

Hannaford: Well, I wasn't an early supporter. I first met Ronald Reagan at the Republican state convention in February '65, at the San Francisco Hilton. On the mezzanine level various organizations had booths, and I remember Livingston and another chap, Bill Stricklin, who was a lawyer and former student body president at Cal, and I were strolling around.

Don worked for Mulford by then. He was his aide, and Stricklin and I were known as Mulford supporters. Well, some of Mulford's friends had been suggesting he run for lieutenant governor, so he said to us, "Why don't you sound people out and see if there's any sentiment for that?"

Morris: Oh, boy.

Hannaford: Well, the three of us had taken some names of people we wanted to see about this, and we were strolling around the convention booth area with this trial balloon. I remember Reagan coming down the aisle with that friendly grin of his, shaking hands and meeting people and stopping to chat for a few minutes. He had a couple of aides. That was the first time I'd ever met him.

But for '66, I thought, he seemed like such a likable man, but he can't possibly win.

Morris: Did you also know George Christopher?

Hannaford: Oh, yes, slightly, and also people around him. I thought, George Christopher, he's been a good mayor, he's a good solid guy, he'll acquit himself well. I thought he could win, so I voted for him in the primary.

We'd had both Reagan and Christopher speak to our Republican Alliance group, at different times. We had sellout crowds each time, and I was very impressed by Reagan's way of handling himself. Christopher did well too, but Reagan had a certain charisma that was quite different.

Morris: Reagan came across more positively.

Hannaford: It was the first time I'd ever heard him speak and I was very impressed. I still voted for Christopher in the primary, but I was strongly for Reagan after that.

Then the next time I met Reagan was in '70 when he came to Alameda County to do a fundraiser for Lew Sherman's re-election campaign. I was Lew's chairman. (In '70 I was not working professionally; I was purely a volunteer chairman of the campaign, but I really threw a lot of my time into that campaign because I cared a lot about Lew.) I remember greeting the governor at the door and bringing him in and introducing him.

Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 1973

Hannaford: Characteristic of Ronald Reagan, I never got one instruction of any kind on how to behave at the TRPA. No "dos" or "don'ts."

Morris: He didn't have any ideas of what he wanted?

Hannaford: I learned later that it was typical of him. Once he picked somebody who he felt had the necessary qualifications, he tended to leave them alone. His philosophy was, and I think to this day is, identify the job to be done, find the man or woman to do it, and let them do it. Then, if you do anything drastically wrong, you can always be fired because it's a "pleasure" appointment. [chuckles]

Morris: True. How about Norman Livermore? Did he have strong ideas about how to--?

Hannaford: We got along famously from the beginning, Ike and I. He was a good mentor. I sat next to him at nearly all of the meetings and sought his advice frequently. He'd been through a lot of battles. He could tell me a lot about the players and the hidden agendas they had, which I otherwise wouldn't have known.

I had a strong feeling about the conservation of the lake. The greatest thing that bothered me about the whole mix--and to this day I think it bothered Reagan the most, even in going for the Compact--was the absence of a formula for land "taking." With "down-zoning" at Tahoe there was no formula to pay for the land that you were in effect depriving the owner the use of.

You see, Reagan could subscribe to the belief that the ecology of the basin is so fragile that it will not support an infinite population, either temporary or permanent--that you have to have some controls. That means restricting the use of some of the land. But if you do that, if you put land use controls on somebody who bought the property in good faith, with the expectation, perhaps, that they're going to divide it, sell it and use the money for their retirement fund, and you suddenly say, "You can only have one house on this land instead of have ten"--that's not right. It's inequitable. It's unfair, changing the rules after the game has been started. And there's no provision for taking that land.

Of course, what had happened with the plan in operation was you effectively were down-zoning a lot of property. We heard a lot of cases of people who were coming in asking for exceptions and re-zoning and so forth.

Morris: Not the casino owners and operators?

Hannaford: We had those too, but we had a lot of individual owners with small plots who thought that you could get ten summer houses on this land [and] "we'll sell this and go back and retire to the city." Instead, the TRPA was telling them they could have only one house every four acres or something like that, so the property was not worth as much as they had expected. We had the casinos too.

I remember one time--I didn't know the protocol very well; it was my second or third meeting, I think. There was a casino proposition up and I had read everything I could get my hands on about it, and I felt it was dead wrong. So, I thought, when the issue was presented, under normal Robert's Rules of Order and Parliamentary Procedure, you would move the approval or disapproval of the matter and then open discussion. As soon as the title of the thing was read by the secretary, I asked the chairman for the floor and I moved the disapproval of the casino [laughter], and surprised everybody.

Hannaford: Well, it turned out I had a clique! All of the Sierra Clubbers and the League to Save Lake Tahoe people stood up and cheered [laughter.] It reminded me of the county central committee, because from then on all the casino people and the owners of large undeveloped land tracts were very wary of me. They tiptoed around me. I wasn't automatically against them. I just happened to feel this one was wrong.

I don't remember now even the basis of the proposal. That kind of thing was very technical; it's in my files somewhere. But I still ended up voting against that one. In fact, we bottled it up for quite a long time.

The months on the TRPA board (I was only on it about eight months), were both rewarding and frustrating. It was rewarding to be in on the shaping of policy, where you had to decide matters of equity and policy; but it was frustrating, often being unable to move things off dead center. I see the "basics" more clearly now than I did at the time, of course. There were some underlying objectives of the constituencies that were almost irreconcilable.

Morris: Other agendas than the direct--?

Hannaford: It wasn't a case of good versus evil. You didn't have the good guys and the bad guys, really. If you put yourself in the shoes of the people you were fighting--and I was frequently fighting the locals--once you put yourself in their shoes and see it from their perspective, it takes on a very different look.

You had county supervisors from all the surrounding counties--two Californian and three Nevadan--and then you also had a member of the South Lake Tahoe City Council. These people are beholden to their own voters, who have their own sets of concerns. They're going to vote for the local constituency's concerns primarily. One of the things they're most concerned about are jobs.

Morris: Yes, and their local tax revenues.

Hannaford: And their local tax revenues. All the things that are part of the economy of their community. And while at first you look and think, why are these people being so intransigent and not seeing the light on this issue--

Morris: The greater good for the greater number.

Hannaford: The greater good, the greater number, which I still feel is important; nevertheless, after a while you begin to see that it isn't that they're fighting for a wrong cause; they're fighting for a narrower cause that is completely right so far as they're concerned. Indeed, some of them became pretty good friends.

IV JOINING THE GOVERNOR'S STAFF

Public Affairs Responsibilities

Hannaford: Reagan's policy was not to permit people on his own staff to be on any appointive boards or commissions. You couldn't perform two roles. I had to go off the Tahoe board when I joined his staff. That was just an unwritten rule he had.

Morris: Had you gotten to know Jim Jenkins and the public affairs staff, or did you come in cold?

Hannaford: Pretty cold. I think I'd met Jim just before, but not long before.

I remember getting a call from Livingston (this is in my book also) one day, I think it was in early January, saying, "Let me try an idea out on you."

I said, "What's that?" And he said, "How would you like to come to Sacramento this year [and] work for Governor Reagan in his final year?"

I said, "Well, I'd like nothing better, but I can't. I've got this little company I'm running." You see, I didn't go back to the advertising agency after the campaign. I hung out my shingle with my own little public relations and marketing firm. The advertising agency was very good. They sent me some nice public relations accounts--they didn't handle PR--and I also handled all the communications for the re-election committee for Mayor John Reading in Oakland that spring of '73. I was very busy that year.

I talked this over with my wife and she said, "Well, why don't you do it. It's true your business will decline while you're gone." I had a woman assistant plus a secretary. I turned it over to them--went off my own payroll. I'd come home on the weekends, they'd leave me notes and I'd answer the notes. Sure enough, by the end of the year all but about 15 or 20 percent of

Hannaford: it had dissipated. But my wife had persuaded me that I could get it started up again in a month or two, and the governor's office would be an unforgettable experience. So I did it, and I've never regretted it.

Morris: And they did want you to come in in the public affairs slot?

Hannaford: Yes. That was specifically what they wanted. What had happened was that Earl Brian had resigned as Secretary of Health and Welfare to run in the Republican primary for Senate, to challenge Alan Cranston that year. (He didn't win that one, as you know.) When he did that, they decided to put Jim Jenkins in Brian's slot in Health and Welfare, leaving a vacancy in the governor's office. So they asked me to fill that vacancy.

I remember, when I called Livingston back I said, "Well, I don't know what to do about this. What kind of job is this? Director of Public Affairs, what does he do?"

He said, "Well, it's really easier than you think. It's just what you do all the time with your clients." I don't remember his exact words but in effect it was to help the governor put his best foot forward, watching out for opportunities that would be helpful to his programs, and watch for pitfalls.

Well, that sounded simple enough [laughter], but it wasn't quite that simple. So, I went up to Sacramento and plunged in and loved every minute of it.

Morris: You were working with quite a large number of people on the governor's immediate staff.

Hannaford: I think we had 105 people on the governor's staff. Of course, I didn't work with literally every one of them. You interfaced with many different ones. I reported to Ed Meese, as did Livingston and [Michael] Deaver--there were the three of us there, right under Meese, who was chief of staff. Reporting to me were the press office, the speech research office, the Office of Community Relations and the Office of Information Services. I don't know if they still have that latter one.

Morris: Is that the radio one, and there was a TV operation, too.

Hannaford: Radio. It was just radio when I was there, but it was fairly new when I took over. Jenkins had started it the year before, as I recall.

What it was was a clearinghouse of public information from all the departments of the state government, particularly for radio use. They had a feed of actualities two or three times a

Hannaford: day at all the radio stations around the state, using these machines over the telephone. They had a professional radio man come in to run them. He would get all the information from the information officers in the state offices.

Let's say it was time for all the roads to close across the Sierra, or maybe the passes are being opened now. The highway department announces that. He puts that out on the morning feed saying, "Effective tomorrow morning the Tioga Pass road will be open," whatever it is. It was that kind of information. The governor was never interviewed for it or was never on it. It had nothing to do with gubernatorial policy, as such, or the formulation of policy. It was purely state information: road information, crop information, weather information, whatever. And it was voluntary. The departments would feed whatever they wanted to this outfit, which was a one-stop center where the radio stations could call in and get a twice-a-day feed of four or five items of interest they could put on the air.

Morris: That they could then tape and rebroadcast.

Hannaford: They could tape this and then use it as a quasi-interview quote, saying, "Mr. So-and-So of the State of California says today that so-and-so." It was a good service. It was very professional. It took them a few months to get acceptance, particularly from the radio stations who at first suspected this might be some kind of political operation. But Bob McCaffrey, who put it together, was very persuasive, and, he being a radio man, gained their confidence.

Morris: What was community relations by then? It had floated around in different places, hadn't it, each year?

Hannaford: It had ten or eleven people, black and hispanic field officers in this group. Mel Bradley was the head of it and he was based in the governor's office. (He's now at the White House.) They reported to him and he reported to me. They were the governor's representatives in predominantly black and hispanic neighborhoods, serving as sounding boards, where they would get feedback from people about problems and policies and so forth.

Morris: And didn't that have a political component?

Hannaford: No, not in a literal sense, not for campaigning.

Morris: Yes?

Hannaford: When I got there, it was the end of our trail. We weren't running for anything, so it was strictly two-way communication, that was all. Some of the men were more effective than others. I think the concept was good.

"Finish Strong"

Morris: In that last year, to what extent was there a feeling that something could still be accomplished?

Hannaford: Oh, a strong feeling that there could be. We had no illusions that we could accomplish everything, particularly against a strongly Democratic legislature. They weren't going to let him have his way on everything, and the closer you got to the end the less likely, particularly on appointments, that they would do that. But our unwritten motto was "Finish Strong."

I remember when I first talked to Ed Meese when he was interviewing me for the job he said, "If we had a motto this year it would be, 'Finish Strong'."

The idea was to finish as many jobs as we could, and do a lot of things that the governor had always wanted to do as governor, that he'd never found the time to do. Now, some of these were ceremonial things, or things that would be called public relations but were important, in the sense they were designed to bring recognition to particular constituencies, particular areas.

I remember one thing we did. It still sticks out in my mind as one of the most pleasurable. One day in August, 1974, we flew to Round Valley in Mendocino County to visit an experimental farm where a professor--whom I'd met by sheer coincidence the year before at the Santa Cruz campus of the University--had one of these French-intensive truck gardens, and he was teaching all young people the French-intensive method.

Then we had a big lunch with all the Indian leaders, and a meeting with the Indian leaders. You remember, it was Reagan who saved Round Valley.

Morris: Right. Instead of flying over a lake up there he flew up to look at the valley that remained.

Hannaford: The Indian leaders never forgot that, that he'd saved the reservation and the burial ground, and their farms. It was a very touching day. It was a gorgeous day and it was a happy occasion. Indeed, the local clinic in the valley had just burned, and the Indian leaders asked the governor if he would go to bat with the administration in Washington to try to get some money to rebuild it. He promised to do that. From there we flew to Modoc County, where he opened the one hundredth Modoc County Fair at Cedarville. And I remember in the plane flying with us was Butch Powers, who'd been lieutenant governor under Goodwin Knight.

Morris: Yes, he was from up in that part.

Hannaford: Yes, up in the northern part of the state--Shasta or Siskiyou, I believe. He was retired by then. Somehow he'd gotten cross-wise with the Reagan people early on. I don't quite know what the story was, but he'd been on the outs. He'd heard about this trip and asked if he could come along, so Governor Reagan invited him and it was kind of a reconciliation.

It was typical of the kind of things Reagan wanted to do; things that they'd never quite had the time to do.

We battled for a lot of legislative programs and blunted our swords, but quit the field with honor.

We had a task force on what we called Welfare II, which was particularly concerned with food stamp reforms, where we came up with a blueprint for federal food stamp reform and went public with it. The governor sent it to the California congressional delegation and to the president, and had bills introduced in the legislature which we knew were not going to go very far.

Morris: Because they required federal--?

Hannaford: Because the Democrats were getting very balky about any reforms.

There were also some election reforms that we put in. I believe there was one to eliminate corporate contributions in election campaigns.

Morris: Did that feed at all into the measure that was on the 1974 ballot?

Hannaford: Proposition 9? No.

Morris: That was an independent kind of a thing.

Hannaford: Yes. They weren't connected.

1973 Special Tax-Limit Election

Morris: Were you involved at all or not yet on hand when the governor was running his own special election?

Hannaford: In 1973? Yes. I forgot that part. Seventy-three was a mighty busy year.

Hannaford: Mike Deaver took leave from the governor's office for about two and a half months to manage that campaign, working out of Californians for Lower Taxes, which was the committee. He hired me on in a professional capacity (I had my little one-man company) to do field coordination for eleven northern California counties on Proposition 1. I drove all over northern California giving speeches, rallying the troops, finding chairmen for the committees, and that sort of thing. I believed very much in what he was trying to do. I thought it was an excellent piece of legislation. I, like most of the supporters--people working closely on the thing in the early stages--did not see its Achilles heel, which was its length.

Morris: The length of the measure itself?

Hannaford: Yes, about ten thousand words. Its demise was built in. In order to be airtight and cover all the contingencies, which it did--as a piece of legal work it was superb--it had to be very long. But by being long, its opponents could say, "anything that long must be too complicated." In tax elections, voters, when they are the least bit confused or uncertain about the effect of a tax measure, will tend to vote against it. It's the old "Better the devil we know than the one we don't" theory.

The opponents got together in the summer, while we were still laboring under the illusion of a big lead in the polls. (It had a very heavy lead in the polls from its early, conceptual days on, and we still had a heavy lead in the summer.) The opponents started going around rather quietly to city councils, county boards of supervisors, and school boards, making presentations against it. The argument they used with the communities was, it's going to throw the tax burden back on the communities and the local school districts. This was untrue. There was no way it could do that! That was one reason it was so long; it was airtight against doing that.

But most of these local bodies had heard little about it up till then. Instead of making our presentations very early, we were doing ours at a leisurely pace, and the opponents came in with a lot of flying squads--the League of Women Voters, the California Teachers Association, and the California State Employees Association working as a team. They made very effective presentations.

Suddenly we were being bombarded with news accounts that this or that city council had passed a resolution against our proposition--this or that school board, or this or that county board of supervisors.

Morris: Working through decisionmakers rather than the grassroots.

Hannaford: That's right, and it was a very effective campaign. By the time we fired up the boilers we were on the defense. Then we had to start explaining why it wouldn't do all of these things, when the other people said it would, and we had to say, "No, it won't." Well, that's not a good way to run a campaign.

I think most of us sensed defeat by October--I certainly did in the field work I was doing. I had to debate people on the other side in audiences that ordinarily ought to be very much for this, and I found a lot of skepticism, worry, uncertainty. I knew if people in what ought to be hard-core constituencies for a measure like this are uncertain about its effect, they're not going to vote for it.

Morris: Who did the legal work of drawing it up?

Hannaford: I don't remember which lawyers.

Morris: Somebody in the--?

Hannaford: It may have been the task force people. I think they were all lawyers.

Morris: That's likely. Was this the first thing that you and Mike Deaver had worked on together?

Hannaford: Yes. I'd known Mike, but we hadn't worked together on a project.

Morris: How had you come to know him?

Hannaford: Through others of my friends in the administration, some months before that.

Morris: Coordinating the eleven northern counties sounds like what I've been told that he did in 1966--he was a field coordinator.

Hannaford: For the state committee, right. That's right--the central coast counties, from San Jose I think south to Santa Barbara. In 1973, in the Proposition 1 campaign, they had several regions, each with a coordinator, and they reported into a headquarters in Sacramento.

I think (and I've said this in my book) that in the genesis of that Proposition 1 was the belief that this would crown Ronald Reagan's career as a governor and, very likely, be the prairie fire that would lead him naturally to the presidency. The thesis of my book is that the really serious thinking about a Ronald Reagan presidency began in approximately early '73.

Reagan's Options

Morris: Was there thinking as you were winding up the gubernatorial administration, that there was a nucleus [that was] going to stay together and work with him?

Hannaford: Well, by '74 things had changed a little bit. In early '74, I recall Ed Meese saying, "We don't know what the governor's going to do, and I don't think he has made up his mind. But we don't want to close off his options. Our job should be--many of us are not going to be around when he has to make this decision, so while he's still governor we just don't want to do anything that closes his options, that's all." Indeed, that was the way we all thought about it during the course of that year, those in senior positions around him.

But the scenario was very different by early '74. Spiro Agnew was gone, Gerald Ford was the vice president, and Richard Nixon by then was in very deep trouble. At the beginning of '73--nobody knew anything about Agnew's problems--Nixon had just come off of this huge victory, and Watergate seemed like a small, dark cloud on the horizon; nothing that couldn't be dealt with. Then you begin to look at who the players would be in '76. Agnew didn't seem to be a possibility because his style as hatchet man in the second Nixon campaign, as vice presidents sometimes are, meant that he really would not be able to tie the party together effectively. The thinking of the Reagan people was that--

Morris: And Ford was not even a consideration.

Hannaford: Ford wasn't a consideration. The thinking of the Reagan people was that, considering the way Republican conventions are constituted, no Republican convention would nominate Nelson Rockefeller. The delegates, by and large, would be much more conservative than Rockefeller. Thus, who is left who has a loyal national constituency? Ronald Reagan.

I don't know if this was actively discussed when they first started talking about the tax-limitation measure at the end of '72 and early '73. I believe they thought of the tax limitation measure just as a great way to end the Reagan administration, in any case.

Morris: But maybe lightning could strike?

Hannaford: California being a bellwether state, if it works in California, the next thing you know is it's usually tried in fifteen other states the next year.

Hannaford: Of course, by the time Proposition 13 lost, the national scene had changed. By then Nixon's troubles had deepened, Spiro Agnew had gone, Ford was on the scene. And, by early '74, Nixon was in great peril. Nobody knew what was going to happen. Ford had, I recall, taken an early pledge that all he was going to do was serve his term.

Morris: Mind the store.

Hannaford: But we all knew that was changeable, because the office tends to affect the man. Things weren't as certain, so the main thing was, let's keep the options open, and then, "finish strong."

Of course, the fact that Governor Reagan wasn't running for re-election and didn't have to worry in that final year about a big campaign of his own meant that he could spend a lot of attention on many details, tying up loose ends. We knew, from Dick Wirthlin's private polls in the beginning of that year, that his popularity was quite high. The number of Californians who viewed him favorably in his performance on the job was surprisingly high for a man who had been around almost eight years. We took it as one of our charges to keep it there, so that he'd go out as a popular person. And he did.

Staff and Cabinet Meetings; Press Conferences

Morris: Was the polling being done nationally at that point?

Hannaford: No, it was just in the state. Wirthlin, without identifying his clients, would share sometimes with us, in periodic luncheons with the governor and the senior staff, answers he was getting to national issue questions. He'd get his client's permission and just not identify the client. He'd say, "We took a poll for a client last month on certain issues, and these two or three would be of interest to you"--particularly on the matter of confidence in the public institutions and government, which was declining very rapidly.

Morris: Did the agency secretaries sit in on these luncheons and these kinds of--?

Hannaford: We had several groupings. We had a lot of breakfast meetings. We met at least once a week--I think it was called "forward planning"--with the cabinet secretaries, Verne Orr, Ed, Mike, Don and myself. It had to do with coordinating activities between agencies--what was going on this week, what was coming up, what had just been settled.

Morris: Did that include political considerations?

Hannaford: No, these were policy matters, and we used to hold those at the Sutter Club, at breakfast.

Then about every two weeks, we had a meeting with what was called the Nofziger group. Lyn Nofziger was a political consultant to the governor at the time.

Morris: Right. He was no longer in the office.

Hannaford: He was not on the payroll, he was paid out of the political account. Bob Walker, who was a political aide, was involved in that, and again Meese, Deaver, Livingston and I. My recollection is that Jim Jenkins always used to sit in on those too, but the other cabinet secretaries weren't involved. Jim, because of his--

Morris: Right, Jenkins because he had prior been in--

Hannaford: --his previous role. And Nofziger, of course, Those are the principal groups. They met quite regularly. Then there'd be other, ad hoc groupings of various kinds.

I saw department heads and bureau heads when problems would arise on issues that they were having with various constituencies, or misunderstandings over issues, and how to deal with them, with the press and all of that. They would brief me so that the governor wouldn't be blind-sided at the next news conference.

We also did weekly briefings of the governor every Tuesday morning before the press conference. The press secretary, the day before, would talk to several members of the press, find out what was on their minds and draft a list of expected questions. He'd circulate them to the governor and the senior staff the night before. Then we'd come together for about an hour and a half, usually over rolls and coffee, just before the press conference, and we'd review the questions. The press secretary, who was Clyd Walthall at the time, would play the roll of the inquisitor.

Morris: Do the devil's advocate kind of thing.

Hannaford: Yes, and then the governor would answer the question. Any of us were permitted to jump in and say, "Well, governor, I think if you go down this road it's going to be a blind alley. It'll be more productive if you go down this road." Whatever.

Morris: Were you getting the adversary kind of people in the press conferences yet? At that point had that developed as a technique?

Hannaford: The press conferences were pretty polite. Press people then and now, and always, are looking for controversy if they can find it. But they weren't--

Morris: While I was waiting for you I was reading through your pamphlet on the Hannaford Company and you refer to ambush interviews.

Hannaford: That's more a latter day phenomenon. These were more static press conferences. Have you seen the press conference room in the capitol?

Morris: Yes.

Hannaford: You know how it has the different tiers and the seat assignments? By this time he and most of them had been working back and forth every week for quite a long time, so that he knew them, they knew him.

Morris: And he was doing weekly press conferences.

Hannaford: Weekly press conferences. There's less frustration on the part of the press when you have frequent press conferences and less hollering for attention--combatting one another for attention. There was never any shouting in these. Now and then he'd go down a road that would open more questions than he wanted to answer. But it was never shouted questions or harassment or any of that sort of thing.

Morris: Did you take the press conferences with him, or did Ed Meese?

Hannaford: I would usually go in to the press conferences, but Ed was always the one who would stand just off to the side. If it came to a technical question, where one would be expected to turn to an aide, he would turn to Ed and he would answer it. Or, if there was some particular presentation the governor wanted to make on some issue, he might bring in some other technical person, to answer the technical questions.

Morris: How about the cabinet meetings, the ones with the agency secretaries and the governor's staff? Several people have said that those meetings seemed to have spent an inordinate amount of time, once a policy decision had been made, discussing how it ought to be said. Is that your recollection of it?

Hannaford: No. I was in and out of cabinet meetings. Some of them seemed to go on very, very long. Other times I simply had competing priorities that drew me away when I didn't particularly want to be drawn away.

Hannaford: Of course, I was only involved in the last year's cabinet meetings, so I may not be a good litmus test for that. They worked pretty well in the last year, I thought. There wasn't a lot of talk about what "face" you put on this or that for the public.

I'll never forget (I think I've got this one in my book) I hadn't been there but two or three days. At the end of the day I dropped around to Deaver's office. I plopped down and said, "Mike, this is like getting paid for having fun." [laughter] I said, "It's amazing! Everybody around here seems so cheerful and they all work so well together, they're all so nice to a newcomer, there seem to be no turf battles--it's just a smoothly running machine."

He said two things. [laughter] He said, "Well, we've had seven years' practice." [laughter] The other thing he said, "You should have been around here the first year!" I remembered that all through their first year in Washington, when there was all this talk about everybody being at each other's throat and all that. There's always a shake-out period to go through, there really is.

Morris: By the time you get to that last year, was there a sense of a difference in perspective or closeness to the governor, between the agency secretaries and the actual governor's office staff?

Hannaford: Morale was very high, I would say, in that last year. It was tangible to me, coming in straight from the outside. I'd been to the governor's office before, visited people. But you don't get a sense of how things are going unless you're part of it. That's why I went around and said that to Deaver. It just was so striking to me. Morale was very high, and the whole place seemed to hum.

Morris: With Mr. Reagan himself not running, was there any particular interest in any of the elections that were going on in '74?

Hannaford: Oh, yes. We wanted Republican candidates to win.

##

Morris: Did any of the governor's people help out on Houston Flournoy's campaign?

Hannaford: We offered to do television spots, all kinds of things. Reagan did some fundraising appearances for Flournoy, but his campaign people didn't take up the other offer.

Morris: How about Hayakawa's campaign?

Hannaford: Was that '74?

Morris: No, it was '76.

Hannaford: Seventy-four was Cranston versus Richardson.

1974 Transition

Morris: We're told that the transition over to Jerry Brown was something that was better organized than it had been when the Reagan administration came in. Could you describe that?

Hannaford: Yes. As I understand it--in fact, I heard the governor say this--he was so dismayed at the lack of cooperation from Pat Brown's administration, that he vowed he would never let that happen to anybody else, no matter if he liked them or not or whether they were Republicans or Democrats. It just shouldn't happen.

As I understand it, the Reagan administration got the legislature to pass a bill to create a transition budget for the incoming [administration] and a small one even for the outgoing administration, basically to organize the papers. Reagan's transition had no public funds. He had to raise private funds for it.

The morning after the '74 election he sent a telegram to [Jerry] Brown and invited him to come for lunch and a meeting the next day, and to bring whomever he wished, and to have his chief aide get in touch with Ed to work out the details. They brought Gray Davis, Warren Christopher, and one or two others. We had Ed, Mike, Don, the governor, and me.

Ed had gotten us all working well beforehand on a pro forma schedule for transition, and we presented that to Brown, who seemed impressed and pleased that it was so well organized. Then Reagan and Brown exchanged a few pleasant words and Brown asked Reagan for a few words privately, in his office. Reagan told us afterward that Brown said to him (I'm paraphrasing now), "Look, a lot of what you've done I've admired and respected. One thing I'll promise you is I'm not going to go around 'bad-mouthing' what you do in this office." [laughter]

Reagan said, "The same goes for me."

They lapsed a couple of times, but they pretty much stuck with that. In January of '75, when the governor's portrait was to be unveiled in the capitol, I flew up with the governor and Mrs. Reagan. We were met by Dale Rowlee, the governor's former Sacramento driver, and taken to the capitol. [We] met Brown in the office and he was very cordial. We went out and had a little ceremony with

Hannaford: the press and a small crowd, out where the portrait was being unveiled. It was a nice, gracious, short speech Brown gave for Reagan; Reagan gave the same in return.

Morris: You said, "Reagan's old driver." Did he have the same person drive him all the time when he was in Sacramento?

Hannaford: As far as I know Dale Rowlee, who was with the Highway Patrol, I think, drove for Jerry Brown during most of his term.

Down here we had Willard Barnett, who had been Pat Brown's driver in southern California--a retired highway patrolman. Then Barney drove for Reagan for eight years, and then Deaver and I hired him.

Morris: Really!

Hannaford: Yes, to be Governor Reagan's aide.

V THE YEARS BETWEEN

Reagan's Continuing Need for Staff

Hannaford: You see, when Reagan became a client of our firm, just after we left Sacramento, we hired several people from the administration to provide, in condensed fashion, similar services to what he had as governor--that is, staffing services. We hired Barney to be his personal aide, driver, general helper. A wonderful man.

Morris: To get him on and off airplanes and trains and to and from?

Hannaford: Barney took care of many things.

Morris: So at what point did you and Mike Deaver decide to set up shop together? Was this part of this master plan of keeping the options open?

Hannaford: Oh no. it wasn't part of a master plan.

In fall '74 it had fallen to me to examine various media-related offers that were coming to Reagan, of things to do when he was out of office, because he needed to make a living. I checked them all out, began to see some patterns emerging, shared them with Mike, and we began to see what could become a plan. We developed a budget.

I had told him I was going to go back to my little company and start it up again, and I asked what he was going to do. He said, "Well, I haven't decided yet."

I said, "Why don't we join forces?"

He said, "Well, maybe so." He said, "You know, the Reagans are going to need something when they leave office. If he's going to do all this, somebody's got to help him with the writing and the research, and somebody's got to do the scheduling, and somebody's got to do the advancing, somebody's got to do the secretarial work."

HannaFord: If not, on January 5 you're going to have Ronald and Nancy Reagan and Anne, the housekeeper, sitting there on San Onofre Drive with the mail bags cascading through the door and the telephone ringing off the hook."

Morris: Yes. [laughter]

HannaFord: So we made up a plan and a budget and talked to several of our colleagues to see if they would join us and work in our company.

Morris: Colleagues in the govoernor's office?

HannaFord: [Yes]. They said, "Yes," and we flew down one Saturday and made the presentation to the Reagans. This was in October, I think. They liked it and agreed to hire us.

So, in January we created a new company through what was left of mine and had a couple of other organizations that said that if we did go into business they'd hire us. So we started with, I think, six or seven clients. So that's how we started.

We had the final reception, I think it was Friday night the 2nd or 3rd of January, in Sacramento. I remember I turned in my state car, rented a car, filled it up with all the stuff in my little studio apartment and drove back to Piedmont. That was it. Sunday afternoon I drove to Los Angeles and Monday morning our new business started.

Morris: You opened a new door, yes.

HannaFord: Right, yes.

Morris: You said you and Mike flew down here to make a presentation to the Reagans. Had they pretty much been phasing themselves back to Los Angeles?

HannaFord: Oh, no, they just came home on the weekends whenever the schedule permitted. He'd usually fly back up on Monday morning. He'd fly down late Friday afternoon.

Informal and Policy Speeches

Morris: One last question. The mythology about Reagan has him putting his speeches together on 3 x 5 cards.

HannaFord: Four by six.

Morris: I thought 3 x 5 was too small. But anyhow, for years, going into the governorship, he did his own research and put the information on the cards?

Hannaford: Well, the way I've always put it was he was basically his own chief speechwriter. That's not to say he has written every draft of every speech. Between the governorship and the presidency, he did a great deal of speaking to civic groups, professional and trade associations--organizations of that kind--at their conventions, which was in income-raising activity for him. He had a "stump" speech for these appearances. Then he had a somewhat different speech for the county Republican Lincoln Day dinners that he did all over the country, political things like that, conservative groups, where he'd be the attraction for a fund-raising event. He'd also be paid for those appearances.

He was the crafter of those speeches. He had his own shorthand which involved mostly dropping vowels from words and dropping articles and prepositions. He'd just use dots and he'd remember what they meant. You and I could look at it and would not be quite sure. He always did these himself. I learned his shorthand pretty well and sometimes, when we'd work on some new material for him, I'd do the cards for him and he'd say "Thanks very much, but next time I'd like to do it myself." [laughter] He was much better at it.

He'd keep a whole briefcase of these cards. He had one set of cards with anecdotes and his one-liners, which were always changing, and then he'd have other quotations. He knew how he'd alphabetized it. Again, I'd look at it and I wasn't sure what the system was. But it worked for him perfectly. And then he'd have his current speech in a stack of its own.

Sometimes in those years newsmen would follow us around. For example, [Dick] Bergholz, from the Los Angeles Times, used to join us now and then, to see what Ronald Reagan was doing. After four or five days on one of these trips he'd say, "Oh, I'm hearing that same speech over and over and over again."

Well, he wasn't, literally. The speech never was quite the same twice, but the theme was always the same, you know, so if you heard it four days in a row you thought you were hearing exactly the same speech. But, Reagan would get back on the airplane and he'd pull out an anecdote here or he'd localize the speech for the next group or the next industry--whatever it was. Or he'd pick a new example of something he was trying to prove. He always had additions from me and others.

Morris: The anecdotes and the--

Hannaford: When he was speaking to a particular group where he wanted to set forth a view for the record, one of my jobs was to provide him the research and the basic draft to start from, or to cause it to be put together by somebody else. Then he'd take it and invariably improve upon it.

Morris: And recast it back into the 4 x 6 cards?

Hannaford: Yes. Then ultimately, once he'd signed off on the draft, if he was really busy he'd let us type it on cards as close to his shorthand as we could come. But he preferred always, ultimately, to--

Morris: --do it himself.

Hannaford: By hand. I think he was also mastering the material that way, too.

When he was governor, that was the same way. If he'd speak to a Republican group informally he would just either work from his memory bank (he has an amazing memory), or he'd use his cards. But if he were speaking as governor to a particular trade group of some kind, the speech office would work up the first draft, then he'd work it over. They'd work up the research base, because it related to policy. As you know, a governor can't sit down and write all of those things--he might have ten of them a week--and for the president, it's even worse.

So, that's the way it worked, and I ended up working on many speeches for him. The closer he came to being a candidate, or indeed when he was a candidate, the more he needed text speeches, where you would give the speech in order to lay down a particular view of an issue, and you want it on the record. His stump speech was less formal. During his years between Sacramento and Washington he would say, "That's an investment, basically. There are a lot of people who have never heard this speech, and as long as I'm in demand I don't want to give out the text because it might outwear its welcome."

Morris: I see. That's interesting. Yes, a very practical man.

Hannaford: Very practical. That's also partly why he kept working over his material, changing it a little here and there.

Morris: Thank you very much.

Hannaford: You're most welcome. It was nice to visit with you, and I'm happy to participate in your program.

Morris: I shall look forward to your book. It will be very useful to use as we go on.

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